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The structure and development of logical representations in thought and language  
 
Abstract 
 The expressive power of human thought and language comes from the ability to 
systematically combine a finite vocabulary of concepts into a boundless number of meaningful 
thoughts. What properties of conceptual representations enable their combination? Three papers 
investigate different aspects of the combinatorial system in the context of a single general 
approach ± taking logical concepts as a special case of concepts whose content is completely 
specified by their combinatorial properties7KHILUVWSDSHUORRNVDWLQIDQWV¶DELOLW\WRUHSUHVHQW
two types of goals: approach and avoid, where each goal-type could be represented as the 
negation of the other. Consistent with past literature, we find evidence of children representing 
approach at 7 month, but failing to represent avoid at both 7 and 14 months. This suggests that 
these children cannot combine their representation of approach with a negation operator, 
possibly because they do not yet have this operator. In the second paper, we continue to look at 
the emergence of logical negation through the relationship between the emergence of the concept 
and the words that label it. We find that, although 15-month-ROGVVD\WKHZRUG³QR´WKH\GRQRW
understand its logical meaning until 24 months. This is the same age at which they begin to 
SURGXFHWKHZRUG³QRW´FRPSUHKHQGits ORJLFDOPHDQLQJDQGXVHERWK³QR´DQG³QRW´WRGHQ\
WKHWUXWKRIRWKHUV¶VWDWHPHQWV7KLVSDWWHUQRIUHVXOWVVXJJHVWDFRPPRQOLPLWLQJIDFWRURQWKH
mapping of any word to the concept of logical negation. This factor could be the emergence of 
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WKHFRQFHSWRUDOLQJXLVWLFOLPLWDWLRQFRPPRQWRERWK³QR´DQG³QRW´ The third paper looks at 
the properties of the combinatorial system in adults, taking linguistic quantifier scope ambiguity 
phenomena as a case study. Using a priming paradigm, we find evidence for independent 
combinatorial operations for the universal quantifiers EACH, EVERY and ALL, but common 
operations for the numbers THREE, FOUR and FIVE. We also find that the semantic operations that 
compose quantifier meanings abstract away from the verb and noun content of sentences. This 
suggests a division of labor in adult combinatorial thought, with conceptual content represented 
separately from the combinatorial properties of concepts.  
  
v 
 
Table of Contents 
Chapter 1: IntroductLRQ««««««««««««««««««««««««««««.1 
  1.1. Combinatorial thought«««««««««««««««««««««2 
  1.2. The relationship between format and content««««««««««««3 
  7KHZD\IRUZDUG««««««««««««««««««««««« 
  1.4. The three SDSHUV«««««««««««««««««««««««17 
  1.5. The end of the beginning«««««««««««««««««««23 
 
Chapter 2: Infants' representations of others' goals: Representing approach over avoidance.......25 
  2.1. Introduction««««««««««««««««««««««««« 
2.2. Experiment 1«««««««««««««««««««««««« 
2.3. Experiment 2«««««««««««««««««««««««« 
2.4. Experiment 3«««««««««««««««««««««««« 
2.5. General Discussion«««««««««««««««««««««« 
  
Chapter 3: What do you mean, ³No´? <RXQJFKLOGUHQ¶VSURGXFWLRQRIVRPHQHJDWLRQ words 
precedes their understanding of logical negation«««««««««««««««««« 
  3.1. Introduction«««««««««««««««««««««««««55 
3.2. Experiment 1««««««««««««««««««««««««65 
3.3. Experiment 2««««««««««««««««««««««««76 
3.4. Experiment 3««««««««««««««««««««««««80 
3.5. Experiment 4««««««««««««««««««««««««93 
3.6. General Discussion««««««««««««««««««««««99 
 
Chapter 4: The logic in language: How all quantifiers are alike, but each quantifier is 
different«««««««««««««««««««««««««««««««««« 
  4.1. Introduction«««««««««««««««««««««««« 
  4.2. Experiment 1«««««««««««««««««««««««« 
4.3. Experiment 2«««««««««««««««««««««««« 
4.4. Experiment 3«««««««««««««««««««««««« 
4.5. Experiment 4«««««««««««««««««««««««« 
4.6. General Discussion««««««««««««««««««««« 
&RQFOXVLRQ««««««««««««««««««««««««« 
 
Chapter 5: Conclusion««««««««««««««««««««««««««««.161  
  5.1. 7KHGHYHORSPHQWRIQHJDWLRQ«««««««««««««««««.162 
  5.2. 7KHGHYHORSPHQWRITXDQWLILFDWLRQ«««««««««««««««.166 
  5.3. Content and combination.««««««««««««««««««.169 
 
5HIHUHQFHV««««««««««««««««««««««««««««««««...170 
  
vi 
 
  
Acknowledgements 
I owe the greatest thanks to my advisors, Susan Carey and Jesse Snedeker. It is hugely 
rewarding to work with either of them; that I have gotten to work with both seems unfairly lucky 
on my part. Neither this work, nor any work I do in the future, would be possible without their 
guidance, support, wisdom and infinite patience. 2QFH,¶YHKDWFKHG, and am trying to do some 
passable research without the benefit of our weekly meetings, I will constantly EHDVNLQJ³:KDW
would Jesse and Susan think of this"´$QGboth I and the work would always benefit from 
knowing the answer. Most importantly, I cannot imagine better models and mentors in the most 
important academic skills I know: decency and kindness. Thank you. 
 
I also owe many thanks to the other two members of my committee, Liz Spelke and Steve 
Pinker. 5HDGLQJ/L]¶VSDSHUVDVDQXQGHUJUDGXDWHWXUQHGPHRQWRGHYHORSPHQWDOSV\FKRORJ\. 
What ,GLGQ¶WNQRZthen is that every time Liz goes to a talk or comments on a paper, she makes 
them better. I have been very lucky to be able to discuss this work with her. For all the very nice 
things that have been said about Steve, he may still not get enough credit for being among the 
most responsive, generous and supportive people in our field. His contributions to this work 
extend from helpful conversations about the elements of both style and substance, all the way 
back to the time when, as a college sophomore, I first discovered cognitive science through his 
books. 
 
This work would be impossible without a number of incredible collaborators. Shilpa 
Mody has been the best colleague anyone could hope for. There is no one who provides deeper 
discussion, sharper insight, or better company. Fiery Cushman took me under his wing when I 
was first trying to get my bearings. His intellectual and practical contributions to the first paper 
are tremendous, and he has been a role model as both a scientist and a person ever since. 
 
Many brilliant and supportive people have taught and influenced me over the years. John 
Vervaeke, who introduced the questions. David Barner, who introduced the methods, and always 
made his students think hard and dream big. Nathan Winkler-Rhoades, who shepherded my first 
experience working in developmental research and supported my graduate school ambitions with 
good advice, kind friendship, and the most delicious food. Mathieu Le Corre, who first gave me 
the opportunity to do independent graduate research and whose friendship and support have been 
a joy in all the years since. Noah Goodman, who took the time to meet and talk every week, back 
when I was a first-year student with barely two decent thoughts to rub together, which I have 
never forgotten. Lawrence Lessig, who taught me that all of the intelligence and good intentions 
in the world would be wasted XQOHVVWKH\¶UH channeled to good purpose. Stephanie and Rakesh 
Khurana, along with all of the staff, students and tutors at Cabot House, who have thoughtfully 
and deliberately created the best possible community to call home. 
 
Being in two labs has the advantage of having twice as many fantastic lab mates. For 
invaluable discussion, support, and happiness, I am very grateful to Jean-Remy Hochmann, 
Mariko Moher, Paul Haward, Manizeh Khan, Arin Tuerk, Amy Skerry, Hugh Rabgliati, Tim 
2¶'RQQHOOBecky Nappa, Mahesh Srinivasan, Eva Wittenberg, Josh Hartshorne, Adena 
vii 
 
Schachner, Tanya Levari, Annemarie Kocab, Lindsey Powell, Bria Long, Igor Bascandziev, and 
Debbie Zaitchik. 
 
I owe thanks to all of the families and all of the anonymous Turkers who participated in 
this research, as well as the people in the lab who did most of the day-to-day work. Among the 
most instrumental contributors have been the lab managers: Carlyn Friedberg, Tracy Reuter, 
Margarita Zeitlin, Ellie Kaplan, Liz Chalmers, Yeshim Iqbal, Rebecca Distefano, Rebecca Zhu, 
and McCaila Ingold-Smith (first a lab manager, then a friend), Sophia Sanborn (first a friend, 
then a lab manager and a collaborator). Of course, all the really hard work was done by the most 
amazing research assistants. Chief among them have been Sophia Clavel, whose contribution 
cannot be overstated, Maggie Kandel, Karina Tachihara, Amelie Meltzer, Brendon Villalobos, 
Meltem Yucel, Laura Fitzgerald, Holly Cushman, Lara Bryfonski, Kelly Bell, and Jennifer Kim. 
Thanks also to the National Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada, for the 
funding that enabled much of this work. 1ROHVVLPSRUWDQWDUHWKHILQHIRONVDW6LPRQ¶V&RIIHH
Shop, where the vast majority of these pages were written, and whose caffeine is second to none. 
 
None of this would be worth doing without great friends. They have made the journey 
through graduate school as much about personal as intellectual growth. Thanks always to Dana 
Gore and to Kate Hobbs, Jennifer Sheehy-Skeffington, Donal Cahill, Phil Enock, Anna 
Leshinskaya, Alek Chakroff, Emily Bernier, Richard Chang, Steve Frankland, Liuba Papeo, 
Cristi Proistosescu, Marjorie Freedman, Dana Foarta, Ben Solomon-Schwartz, Cian Power, 
Bridget Alex, and many others. 
 
Thank you to my family: my wonderful parents, Michael Feiman and Alla Garbar, and to 
my grandparents for all of their support, encouragement and boundless love. Without their 
courage and determination, I would not have had a fraction of the opportunities that have led me 
here. I hope being a doctor of philosophy is close enough. 
 
And finally, thank you to my partner, Molly Baechtold. Her support and love have been 
the anchor and the harbor. 
  
viii 
 
 
,W¶VUHPDUNDEOHWKDWKXPDQVFDQPDNHDQ\FODLPVWKDWULVHWRWKHOHYHORIIDOVLW\2QFHDWKLQNHU
achieves this level of clarity and contact with her environment, truth is a mere negation sign 
away. 
-- Paul Pietroski, Framing Event Variables 
 
Rosencrantz: We might as well be dead. Do you think death could possibly be a boat? 
Guildenstern: No, no, no... Death is... not. Death isn't. You take my meaning. Death is the 
ultimate negative. Not-being. You can't not-be on a boat. 
Rosencrantz: I've frequently not been on boats. 
Guildenstern: No, no, no--what you've been is not on boats. 
-- Tom Stoppard, Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are Dead 
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Chapter 1: 
Introduction 
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1.1 Combinatorial thought 
One of the most remarkable things about human cognition is the ability to take a finite 
number of concepts and combine them to generate an infinite number of meaningful thoughts. 
<RXPD\QHYHUKDYHKHDUGWKHVHQWHQFHRUHQWHUWDLQHGWKHWKRXJKW³7Kere are no bears on 
0DUV´EXW\RXKDYHQRWURXEOHXQGHUVWDQGLQJZKDWLWPHDQV1RWRQO\GR\RXXQGHUVWDQGLW\RX
can judge that it is very likely true and you can make conclusions on that basis: if there are no 
bears on Mars, that means there are no brown bears there, no bear cubs, no bears climbing 
Martian trees. The ease with which you understand new thoughts, make judgments about their 
truth, and reason through to related thoughts, all have just one plausible explanation ± the 
thinking of complex thoughts is the result of a rule-governed system that combines meaningful 
component units (words, concepts) in systematic ways. 
What are the developmental origins of this system? Is it learned? If so, what kind of 
evidence would a learner use to induce or create it? Is it most like learning a natural language, or 
is it actually learning language itself that creates it? Or is this system so fundamental to human 
thought that it is given innately? What about the individual concepts that can be combined? What 
are the properties that allow concepts with meanings from very different content domains, like 
MARS and BEARS, to combine with each other? When a child learns a new concept, is it 
combinable with others at the outset, or is it possible to learn the content at one time and to gain 
the ability to combine it with other content later? Does learning a word make its content 
combinable? Or does natural language only provide a phonological gloss on the combinatorial 
system that otherwise works independently? Are words just labels, or are they the engine driving 
combinatorial thought? 
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These questions constrain each other. The aim of this thesis is to show the outcome of 
several empirical investigations into these questions and to delineate the mutual constraints. 
Since the broader project is to triangulate a solution from a few different sides, I do not try to 
mine a single psychological paradigm or pin down the exact computational details of a specific 
component of the combinatorial system. Rather, I broaden the empirical target by using a variety 
of methods and three different populations ± infants, children, and adults. The hope is that, 
although blind men feeling around different parts of an elephant might not come up with a clear 
picture, they stand a better chance than if they were all groping at the same leg over and over. 
I begin with a theoretical discussion that motivates this research program by focusing the 
many different questions surrounding the nature of combinatorial thought into a single central 
LVVXH:KDWPDNHVDPHQWDOUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ³FRPELQDWRULDO´LVQRWZKDWLWUHIHUVWRRUZKDWLW
represents, but how it combines with other representations; it is a matter of format rather than 
content. Before describing the three projects that make up the bulk of this dissertation, I examine 
the most relevant contemporary work in the philosophy of mind and, in its light, consider how 
empirical methods can be brought to bear on the study of combinatorial representational format. 
The goal is not to give a comprehensive review, but to make explicit theoretical commitments 
and to outline a broader framework that can guide empirical investigation into these issues. 
1.2 The relationship between format and content 
 Let me start by making some terms explicit. Following Evans (1982) and Camp (2004), 
DPRQJRWKHUV,XVHµSURSRVLWLRQDOWKRXJKWV¶WRPHDQWKRXJKWVUHSRUWDEOHE\WKDW-clauses, like the 
thought that there are no bears on Mars. Propositional thoughts are composed of concepts and 
have propositions as their content.1 Both concepts and propositions are types of mental 
                                                          
1
 The mention of a concept as such, as opposed to its referent or denotation, will be indicated by block capitals, e.g. 
BEAR or MARS. Since I will want to distinguish concepts from non-conceptual representations, I will use italics to 
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representations. All mental representations have both content and format. The content of a 
representation is its meaning, while the format is the way in which the meaning is 
represented.2The same content can be represented in multiple formats, but all formats cannot 
represent all content with equal fidelity or efficiency, and some formats cannot represent some 
content at all (for discussion, see Kosslyn, 1980). For example, a tally counting system cannot 
represent a trillion as efficiently as Arabic numerals, let alone Arabic numerals in scientific 
notation. And none of these formats can represent the proposition that there are no bears on 
0DUV)LQDOO\WKHWHUPµFRQFHSWXDOIRUPDW¶UHIHUVWRWKHIRUPDWWKDWDOORZVUHSUHVHQWDWLRQVWR
represent, or to be combined to represent, propositions. 
Testing the format of mental representations poses a problem fundamentally more 
difficult than testing their content. Experimental stimuli are always content-laden ± psychologists 
are always trying to get participants to represent something about what they are presented with. It 
is therefore difficult, maybe impossible, to test how representations interact with each other ± a 
property deriving from their format ± without the question necessarily being mediated by the 
particular content of the representations tested. Given that multiple formats can represent the 
same content, we cannot make conclusive inferences about format from information about 
content. However, since not all formats are equally good at representing all content, some degree 
of inference from content to format is possible. If we find that some computational system can 
represent trillion, it is a good bet that the format of representation is not a basic tally system. 
What we need are principles that can guide the inference from content to conceptual format. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
indicate representations when I am not making any commitment to whether they are conceptual. I will also 
RFFDVLRQDOO\XVHLWDOLFVIRUHPSKDVLVDQGZLOOKDYHWRUHO\RQWKHUHDGHU¶VFKDULW\WRGLVWLQJXLVKWKHWZRXVHV. 
2
 The present aim is to focus on the format as directly as possible, so I will not make any commitments to how 
meaning is cached out. 
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1.2.1 Pure predication 
One of the most recent attempts to describe such a principle comes from Tyler Burge 
(2010a, 2010b), as part of a larger project to distinguish perception from conception. Although 
Burge is very careful to note that not every non-perceptual representation qualifies as a concept, 
his insight emerges in the context of distinguishing conceptual from perceptual representation. 
%XUJHDUJXHVWKDWIRUDUHSUHVHQWDWLRQWREHFRQFHSWXDOLWPXVWLQYROYHµSXUHSUHGLFDWLRQ¶+HUH
is Burge: 
,GHILQHµSXUHO\SUHGLFDWLYHRFFXUUHQFH¶RIDQDWWULEXWLYHDVIROORZV$SXUHO\SUHGLFDWLYH
occurrence of an attributive is one in which the attributive functions predicatively but 
does not function to make an attribution within the scope of a context-bound, 
identificational, referential structure to the entity that is (purportedly) identificationally 
referred to. Such occurrences are purely predicative inasmuch as they function 
predicatively, but are either outside the scope of a context-bound, identificational 
referential structure, or are inside such scope but do not themselves function to make an 
attribution to the entity that the referential application of the relevant context-bound 
structure functions to refer to. (Burge, 2010a) 
2Q%XUJH¶VSURSRVDOWKHUHSUHVHQWDWLRQx is F is conceptual if and only if the tokening of 
F (i.e. the actual creation of the representation F) does not have to depend on the referent of any 
specific x. It would not be enough to find evidence that an infant can represent mom is happy to 
attribute to the infant possession of the concept HAPPY, since its representation of happiness in 
that context is (perhaps inextricably) bound to the perceptual experience of mom.3 Nor would it 
                                                          
3
 Although, of course, the concept HAPPY could, if it were available to the infant, be used to predicate happiness of 
mom within the scope of perceptual reference-fixation. Concepts can live both within and outside the scope of the 
reference-fixing function. Other representation can live only within the scope of this function. Therefore, according 
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be enough if the infant could represent mom is happy when mom is not around. Burge is explicit 
in stating that a distal memory representation of an event triggered in a referential context can be 
as much a perceptual representation as a proximate, immediate perceptual experience. Rather, 
representations that count as evidence for the concept HAPPY must be more general or abstract 
thoughts, entirely independent of any particular referent. This includes thoughts about entire sets, 
like ALL DOGS ARE HAPPY, or negated thoughts, where the predicate cannot be involved in fixing 
the referent because it does not apply to it in the first place, as in, MOM IS NOT HAPPY. 
/RFDWHGZLWKLQWKHSURMHFWRIGLVWLQJXLVKLQJFRQFHSWLRQIURPSHUFHSWLRQµSXUH
SUHGLFDWLRQ¶GRHVQRWH[SOLFLWO\WDUJHWFRQFHSWXDOFRPELQDWLRQDWDOO,WLVQRt clear that Burge is 
DWWHPSWLQJWRJLYHDQDFFRXQWRIFRPELQDWRULDOFRQFHSWV%XUJH¶VRZQH[SOLFLWJRDOKRZHYHULV
OHVVLPSRUWDQWIRUSUHVHQWSXUSRVHVWKDQZKHWKHUKLVµSXUHSUHGLFDWLRQ¶GHOLQHDWHVWKHVDPHMRLQW
in nature as the one I am interested in KHUH,ILWGRHVQRWLWLVQRWQHFHVVDULO\DNQRFNRQ%XUJH¶V
project. But if it does ± and it is a plausible candidate ± it would be a major finding that a 
criterion that makes no reference to conceptual combination nevertheless picks out those 
representations that have this format. One prima facie reason to think that the two criteria might 
pick out the same natural kind is that those representations that Burge takes to be particularly 
diagnostic of his notion of concepthood ± quantifiers like ALL or logical operators like NOT ± are 
paradigmatically combinatorial concepts in the presently relevant sense.  
7KLVLVDQLPSRUWDQWLQVLJKWIURP%XUJH¶VDSSURDFKZKLFK,ZLOOUHWXUQWR1HYHUWKHOHVV
LIWDNHQDVDVWULFWFULWHULRQIRUFRQFHSWKRRGµSXUHSUHGLFDWLRQ¶UXQVLQWRSUREOHPV2QWKHRQH
hand, it is too strong a requirement. Certain representations may not be extractable from within 
the scope of reference fixation. When demonstratives like this and that, indexicals like I and you, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
to Burge, to diagnose that a representation is a concept, we must have evidence of it being tokened outside of 
reference fixation. 
7 
 
and referential pronouns like he, she and it are tokened, they are almost always tokened with 
their meaning dependent on some referent (except perhaps in explicit meta-discourse, like when 
savvy philosophers are making a use/mention distinction).4 But are these not perfectly good 
concepts that can be combined to form perfectly good propositional thoughts? Take the 
propositional thought, I AM NOT A BEAR ON MARS and imagine a creature that is capable of 
representing it, but is only capable of representing the first-person pronoun, I, within the scope of 
a single referent ± LWVHOI7KLVFUHDWXUHZRXOGQRWXQGHUVWDQGDQGFRXOGQRWUHSUHVHQWWKDWµ,¶
could refer to anything but itself. Nevertheless, it does not seem that anything would prevent this 
creature from combining that representation, I, with NOT, BEAR, MARS, etc, as long as that 
representation has the right syntactic and semantic features to be properly combinable. It seems, 
therefore, that being combinable and being a pure predicate are independent.5 
1.2.2 The generality constraint 
8QOLNH%XUJH¶VµSXUHSUHGLFDWLRQ¶ZKLFKZDVQRWPHDQWWREHDFULWHULRQIRU
FRPELQDWRULDOUHSUHVHQWDWLRQVWKHµJHQHUDOLW\FRQVWUDLQW¶ZDVSURSRVHd by Gareth Evans (1982) 
                                                          
4
 ,WPD\EHWKDW%XUJHGRHVQRWWKLQNWKDWGHPRQVWUDWLYHVDQGLQGH[LFDOVDUHHYHUµDWWULEXWLYH¶RUµSUHGLFDWLYH¶VLQFH
they are generally the argument of predication, rather than the predicate, in the kinds of examples he gives (e.g. that1 
is brown, is the representation brown being predicated on a context-bound, fixed-within-the-scope-of-reference 
demonstrative). In that case demonstratives could not bHµSXUH¶SUHGLFDWHVEHFDXVHWKH\ZRXOGQRWEHSUHGLFDWHVDW
all. At best, this means that pure predication provides an incomplete criterion of concepthood, since there is a class 
of non-predicative representations that it does not apply to, and these may or may not be conceptual. More 
significantly, however, it is easy enough to turn arguments into predicates. Take the perceptually bound 
representation that1 is I, for a creature referring to itself. I seems perfectly predicative in this case. Being tokened 
(possibly only ever) within the scope of a reference-fixing cognitive operation, the arguments given above apply as 
before. 
5
 7KLVLVQRWWRGHQ\WKDWWKHUHLVVRPHWKLQJWR%XUJH¶VLQWXLWLRQ7KHUHGRHVVHHPWREHDVHQVHLQZKLFK
the first-person indexical representation I FRXOGEHDVRPDWRVHQVRU\UHSUHVHQWDWLRQRIWKHDJHQW¶VRZQ
body in space, in which case there would be no obvious reason for it to be conceptual in the relevant way. 
But then contra Burge, it appears that whether I is tokened within the scope of reference-fixation is not a 
sufficient criterion for determining whether it is a conceptual or perceptual representation. Both a 
perceptual somatosensory I and a very distinct conceptual combinatorial I might only ever be tokened 
within the scope of reference-IL[DWLRQLQWKHVDPHSHUVRQ¶VPLQG,QWKDWFDVHSXUHSUHGLFDWLRQFRXOGQRW
distinguish them. 
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IRUMXVWWKHSUHVHQWSXUSRVH2QHSRVLWLYHIHDWXUHLWVKDUHVZLWK%XUJH¶VSURSRVDOLVWKDWLWWRRFDQ
be taken not just as a theoretical desideratum, but also as a methodological guide. Here is Evans: 
The thought that John is happy has something in common with the thought that Harry is 
happy, and ... something in common with the thought that John is sad.... Thus, someone 
who thinks that John is happy and that Harry is happy exercises on two occasions the 
conceptual ability which we FDOOµSRVVHVVLQJWKHFRQFHSWRIKDSSLQHVV¶« 
We thus see the thought that a is F as lying at the intersection of two series of thoughts: 
on the one hand, the series of thoughts that a is F, that b is F, that c is F, ..., and, on the 
other hand, the series of thoughts that a is F, that a is G, that a LV+« 
If a subject can be credited with the thought that a is F, then he must have the conceptual 
resources for entertaining the thought that a is G, for every property of being G of which 
he has a conception. 
The methodological corollary of the generality constraint is that in order to test whether 
someone ± infant or adult ± has the concept HAPPY, it is not sufficient to show that the person 
responds in a way that reflects the content of that concept in a specific case. It is not enough, for 
example, to know that a baby smiles at a favorite toy, or interprets mom smiling at the toy as 
evidence that the toy is safe to play with.6 The generality constraint requires that the infant be 
capable of representing that X IS HAPPY for any conceptual X that the infant can represent, and 
that all the individual predications of HAPPY should be tokens (instances) of the same type. 
In the course of empirical research, we can only know whether these constraints are 
satisfied in relation to each other. We do not know a priori which xs are concepts and which are 
                                                          
6
 Note the similarity between the requirements imposed by the generality constraint and by pure predication: both 
insist that representational content is not in itself a good indicator of conceptual format. No coincidence, given the 
dissociation between content and format discussed at the very beginning. Yet, as I argue below, it is a mistake to 
think that content can never be a sufficient diagnostic for conceptual format. 
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not. If it is the case that happy cannot be combined with some representation z, is it because 
happy is not a concept, or because z is not one? Just from the evidence that happy and z cannot 
combine, there is no way to tell. The more representations we have evidence of happy combining 
with, the less likely it is that the different tokens of happy are independent of each other, and the 
more convinced we become that the representation happy is in fact the concept HAPPY. If, for 
example, we have evidence that an infant can represent only two xs as HAPPY ± e.g. herself and 
mom ± it is more plausible that the individual tokens of what looks to the theorist like the 
concept HAPPY are in fact tokens of two different types (something like me-happy and mom-
happy). If, on the other hand, there is evidence that for any new person the infant meets and sees 
smiling, the infant can represent that this person is happy, it becomes much more likely that the 
representations of person-a is happy and person-b is happy involve two tokens of the same 
concept, HAPPY. 
The research program that follows from the generality constraint is relatively 
straightforward ± find evidence that for a given representational predicate of interest, it can be 
attributed to as many individual stimuli as possible. To the extent that there are many such 
stimuli, and new ones can be arbitrarily introduced, it is likely that the representation is a 
concept. In this way the JHQHUDOLW\FRQVWUDLQWLVYHU\GLIIHUHQWIURP%XUJH¶VSURSRVDO:KHUHDV
Burge is content with only a single x combining with F, as long as it does so outside the scope of 
reference, it is relevant for Evans how many xs there are and what other representations those xs 
can combine with.  
 The generality constraint has been extremely influential in the philosophy of mind, but 
(or perhaps, therefore) it has not gone unchallenged. Critics most often focus on the notion that 
some representations may be conceptual but are nevertheless not combinable in the way the 
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constraint demands (see, for example, Peacocke, 1992). One well-known class of examples are 
sentences that are syntactically well-formed but express semantic category mistakes, so as to be 
(arguably) uninWHUSUHWDEOH7KHVHDUHVHQWHQFHVOLNH³&DHVDULVDSULPHQXPEHU´RU³&RORUOHVV
JUHHQLGHDVVOHHSIXULRXVO\´CAESAR is a perfectly good concept, the argument goes, and so is A 
PRIME NUMBER, and yet the two cannot be meaningful combined, so being meaningfully 
combinable cannot be constitutive of being a concept. Arguments of this sort challenge the 
generality constraint as a necessary criterion for conceptual thought (but see Camp, 2004, for 
rebuttal). Setting this issue aside, I focus on whether the generality constraint is sufficient rather 
than whether it is necessary. If we find that an infant is able to represent X is happy for a variety 
of xs, does that mean that happy is a concept ± that it is freely combinable in a system of thought 
with other concepts? 
Take any cognitive mechanism that functions to identify a particular stimulus type in the 
environment. This can be a basic perceptual mechanism ± say, one that represents that an object 
is blue or round ± or a mechanism that represents more abstract fHDWXUHVVXFKDVWKHµLQSXW
DQDO\]HUV¶WKDWKDYHEHHQSURSRVHGIRUUHSUHVHQWLQJREMHFWVDJHQWVDQGDSSUR[LPDWHPDJQLWXGH
(see Carey, 2009). Any such mechanism will be able to represent that x is F, where x is a variable 
ranging over some set of stimuli and F is the predicate (e.g. the property, category, or attribute) 
that this mechanism processes and represents. If F is the representation happy and the various xs 
are all the individuals that the infant can represent as being happy, then the generality constraint 
looks to be met to the extent that there is some significant number of xs that can meaningfully be 
represented as being happy.7 Note that it is not necessary here that the mechanism for 
representing F be dedicated to representing F and nothing else, or that it be modular, innate, etc. 
                                                          
7
 Although Evans would want the criterion to be predication over all xVWKDWDUHFRQFHSWV,VD\³DVLJQLILFDQWQXPEHU
of xV´EHFDXVHZHKDYHQRLQGHSHQGHQWZD\RINQRZLQJZKLFKxs are concepts and which are not. 
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It just needs to be capable of assigning some represented property F to some fairly wide set of 
stimuli (following Evans, to all of the xs to which other properties ± G, H, etc. ± can also be 
assigned). There is only one important requirement on F ± that it be tokened specifically as a 
predicate bound to different arguments. It would not be enough for an infant to see many 
different happy people and represent happiness every time. To meet the generality constraint, it 
is important that the infant actually represent person-A is happy as distinct from person-B is 
happy. 
But if this is what it takes for a representation to qualify as a concept, it is far too weak a 
requirement. Any cognitive mechanism that represents any stimulus in the world in a way that 
involves recognition or categorization of a property is going to abstract away from some 
properties of the individual token stimuli that trigger that representation. A mechanism that 
responded only to one token ± to one specific instance of a stimulus ± or only to stimuli identical 
in every way to the same token, would be very nearly useless. A mechanism that represented the 
abstract property without binding it to a particular object would hardly be better. It would not 
allow for any behavioral (or even further cognitive) response directed at the entity to which the 
property applies, would not be able to distinguish between entities that have the property and 
RQHVWKDWGRQ¶WZRXOGQRWLQIDFWEHDEOHWRLGHQWLI\WKHVRXUFHRILWVhappiness (or whatever 
other representation). 
Imagine a study in which infants see two rapidly flashing video feeds. To one side of the 
seated infant, one feed always flashes the exact same picture on-and-off. The picture contains 
three colored squares, and nothing ever changes. The other feed, on the other side of the infant, 
rapidly flashes different pictures, also of three colored squares. But in this feed, two of the 
squares swap colors every time the new picture flashes. What if infants, by 7.5 months of age, 
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differentiate the two streams, attending longer to the feed where two squares are swapping colors 
(as in fact they do, see Oakes, Ross-Sheehy & Luck, 2006)? To pass this task, infants cannot 
simply be representing blue and red, unconnected to any other representation. They must be 
binding coloUIHDWXUHVWRREMHFWVWREHDEOHWRQRWLFHWKDWWKHREMHFW¶VFRORUFKDQJHV7KLV
experiment shows that infants represent x is blue for at least two xs, and do indeed bind these 
objects to the predicate blue. It shows the important result that infants can solve a version of the 
µELQGLQJSUREOHP¶RIYLVLRQLQVKRUWWHUPPHPRU\ELQGLQJGLIIHUHQWSHUFHSWXDOIHDWXUHVWRJHWKHU
± in this case, objects to colors. But it does not come close to showing that infants can combine 
their representations of blue and red productively to form propositional thoughts. It does not 
VKRZWKDWLQIDQWV¶UHSUHVHQWDWLRQblue is the concept BLUE.8 
The generality constraint imposes a condition on mental representations having predicate-
DUJXPHQWVWUXFWXUHIURPWKHWKHRULVW¶V-eye view. But that alone is not a sufficiently strong 
constraint to identify conceptual combinatorial thought. Despite its influential history in the 
contemporary philosophy of mind, at the very least, some additional criterion is needed to 
distinguish concepts from other types of representations.9 
                                                          
8
 It is no help that Evans requires all of the Xs combinable with (represented as having the property) blue to also be 
combinable with other predicates. Imagine, as in fact seems to be the case, that the same infant cognitive system 
contains other inputs analyzers ± ones that recognize objects and estimate approximate relative size, for example 
(Carey, 2009). All of the same blue objects could serve as perfectly good input to these processors, triggering the 
representation that they are all objects, and that their approximate common size is some specific quantity, yea big. 
But just in the case of the blue representation, the object and approximately-yea-big representations do not bring this 
network any closer to conceptual combination. Each input analyzer, and each representation produced by it, is 
independent of the others and none need be combinable together. Being able to recognize that some specific toy is 
blue and, separately, that it is an object (and thus ought to remain solid and not to teleport), is not the same as being 
able to represent the proposition that it is a BLUE OBJECT. Representational co-reference is not conceptual 
combination. 
9
 Another potential objection to the generality constraint is that it could characterize a very small-scale, encapsulated 
FRPELQDWRULDOV\VWHPVXFKDVWKH³ODQJXDJH´RIEHHGDQFHRUELUGYRFDOL]DWLRQVZKLFKGHVSLWHKDYLQJVRPH
FRPELQDWRULDOVWUXFWXUHWKHRULVWVPD\QRWZDQWWRFDOODµFRQFHSWXDO¶V\VWHP,GRQRWSXUVXHWKLVREMHFWLRQKHUH
because it goes right to the question of just how much systematic combinability is needed to grant a creature the 
possession of a conceptual combinatorial system. This debate seems to me to be a matter of both terminological taste 
and preferred degree of species-chauvinism. The critique above is stronger because it argues that the generality 
constraint is not a sufficient condition no matter how many different predicates can be combined with how many 
different arguments. 
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1.3 The way forward 
It appears that both the generality constraint and the requirement of pure predication are 
not sufficient, and may not even be necessary, as criteria for concepthood. The approach that I 
propose to take here nevertheless draws on both of these principles. But while the goal for both 
Burge and Evans is to come up with a criterion or test which can be applied to any representation 
to tell whether it is a concept, the approach on offer here is a bit more modest. I propose to look 
for evidence of specific representations that can only be conceptual, and once these are found, 
use them to examine which other representations they can combine with. If a concept can 
combine with a representation, that other representation must itself be a concept. In this way, a 
single concept can be used as a wedge into the rest of the conceptual network. But which 
concepts can serve this purpose? Burge hit on the right examples, though he used them for 
different reasons. 
The key is this: representations of abstract logical operators, like not and all, are the rare 
case where content is diagnostic of format. The content ± the meaning ± of these representations 
just is in their combinatorial properties. That is not to imply that other concepts somehow do not 
have comparable combinatorial properties ± they must, or else they would not be concepts in the 
present sense. But while the content of bears can be represented in either a conceptual or non-
conceptual format, logical representations can only be concepts because they have nothing but 
combinatorial properties. Not is a unary function that takes as input one truth-value (True or 
False) and produces the other truth-value as output. Any creature able to represent not X, even 
just for one solitary x (perhaps because they only have one x that is in the right format), and even 
just if that one x is tokened in a referentially-dependent way, possesses an ability to combine 
concepts systematically to form propositional thoughts. If the representation not really has a 
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truth-functional meaning that takes truth-values as inputs and produces truth-values as outputs, 
then it is the concept NOT. And if the representation x can combine with this conceptual NOT, 
then x has the combinatorial properties that make it a concept, too. X and NOT may not be 
combinable with many other representations if those other representations are not yet conceptual, 
but they would already be components of a nascent system of combinatorial propositional 
thought.10 
In this way the presence of the concept NOT can itself serve as a diagnostic tool for 
identifying whether other representations are concepts. This approach provides a way to resolve 
the epistemic problem that was raised earlier in the discussion of the generality constraint. If we 
establish that a person is capable of representing both happy and z, but cannot combine these to 
form what would be the propositional thought that Z IS HAPPY, how do we know if only one or 
both of the representations are not conceptual, and therefore not combinable? Unlike happy, NOT 
is a representation that cannot be anything but conceptual. If we know that a person is in 
possession of NOT, and yet still find that the same person cannot represent NOT Z, then we know 
that the fault must lie with the representation z ± that it is not a concept. Representations of 
logical operators allow us to grab hold of one of the horns of the disjunction, and the 
interpretational ambiguity that poses a difficulty for the generality constraint transforms into an 
investigative method, where we test concepts one by one to see if they can combine with NOT 
and with other logical operators. 
There is still a significant challenge, however. For any task that requires the infant to 
negate some specific content ± whatever the content in the experimental stimuli ± there can be 
                                                          
10
 The picture here is one of a system of thought that gets filled out with concepts as the developing person acquires 
them. For the purpose of characterizing this system, it is then possible to stay agnostic about how individual 
concepts are acquired -- whether they are acquired through language, explicit education RUWUDLQLQJDFKLOG¶V
exploratory hypothesis formation and testing, or some interaction between these and still other factors. 
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domain-specific representational imposters. Within any particular content domain or even within 
a single computational circuit, nothing prevents there being a less general representation, say 
not-blue, which performs only the single limited function of representing that some stimulus is 
not blue, but that is entirely separate from a logical conceptual NOT. In fact, the finding that even 
neonates can habituate to some repeated stimulus and dishabituate when that stimulus changes 
(for example, Brody, Zelazo & Chaika, 1984; Bartoshuk, 1962) means that, at some level of 
description, there is a computation that uses a kind of negation, since they recognize that the new 
stimulus is not the old one. Even the sea slug Aplysia californica, whose cognitive architecture is 
implemented in a comparatively simple nervous system of only 20,000 neurons, can habituate 
when stimuli are presented repeatedly and dishabituate when they change (Pinsker, Kupferman, 
Castellucci, & Kandel, 1970). Logic gates ± physical devices set up to implement the input-
output mappings specified by logical operators ± are among the most fundamental building 
blocks of all computation. A NOT gate is an exceedingly simple thing ± it is just a circuit that 
blocks or inverts the signal it receives, taking 1 and outputting 0; taking 0 and outputting 1. NOT 
gates and other logic gates can be trivially implemented in neural networks, in the connections 
between individual neurons, in the action potential signal of a single neuron and even in 
intracellular molecular structures (see Gallistel & King, 2009 for discussion). The difference 
between a NOT logic gate and the concept NOT is, at least in part, in the range of its application. 
A single NOT-gate is wired to take input from a single source, deep within a computational 
system. For example, the biochemistry of a single neuron could function to implement a NOT-
gate so as to produce a habituation response to the kind of stimulus that the neuron is typically 
responsive to. In contrast, the concept NOT, since it is part of an entire combinatorial system, 
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needs to operate as a function that can be called and reused with many different arguments ± 
many different concepts. 
If telling whether a given representation is the concept NOT or a much more input-limited 
NOT-gate is a matter of seeing how many other representations the representation of not can 
FRPELQHZLWKDUHZHQRWMXVWEDFNWR(YDQV¶JHQHUDOLW\FRQVWUDLQW"1RWTXLWH7KHDUJXPHQW
given previously still holds ± we ought not grant possession of the concept BLUE to a creature on 
the basis of its being able to predicate blue of a variety of arguments. But the earlier point that 
logical operators are different holds as well. The content of logical operators is inherently 
combinatorial, and combinability with a wide range of inputs is precisely the thing that 
distinguishes an encapsulated and computation-internal NOT-gate from the conceptual operator 
NOT. Only with a logical operator like negation does this generality ensure that we are dealing 
with a concept ± a part of a combinatorial system of meaningful thought ± and not an input-
analyzer that can process a variety of different inputs. Put another way, while the generality 
constraint alone is not sufficient to diagnose a concept, the generality constraint together with the 
content of a representation being necessarily semantically combinatorial, are jointly sufficient.11 
The framework laid out above is meant to make explicit theoretical commitments, as well 
as to give the overarching theme for the specific projects presented below. The rest of this 
chapter will introduce the three papers that comprise this dissertation. It will relate each paper to 
                                                          
11
 There is another important difference between the generality constraint as it is used here and by Evans 
(1982). The generality constraint here is diagnostic (sufficient) rather than constitutive (necessary). A 
creature could in principle be in possession of conceptual NOT, but not of any other concept. In that case, 
NOT would not be any less conceptual for its inability to combine with other representations. The fault 
would lie with the paucity of other concepts, even if there would not necessarily be any way to tell that 
the creature does possess NOT in this case. Importantly, the use of the generality constraint as diagnostic 
in the case of logical operators in particular, rather than constitutive for all concepts in general, also 
means that seeing whether a logical representation satisfies the generality constraint is only one possible 
research strategy, and not the only one. 
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a particular research strategy that addresses some of the central questions concerning 
combinatorial thought. 
1.4 The Three Papers 
1.4.1 The first paper 
In answering the question of whether a conceptual system of thought is innate or in some 
way learned or acquired, we are interested not only in evidence of the presence of a concept but 
also in evidence of its absence. While evidence that a creature non-linguistically represents not-x 
for some specific x is ambiguous between possession of conceptual NOT and some domain-
specific imposter not-x, what about evidence that the creature fails to represent the negation of x 
in either format? At the very least, such a finding means the lack (or failure of deployment) of 
some limited not-x representation for that x. It does not, however, necessarily mean that the 
creature is not in possession of conceptual NOT. The reason should be clear given the preceding 
discussion -- it could be that the x involved is non-conceptual, even if the creature can represent 
NOT in combination with some other Xs.  
,QWKHILUVWSDSHUZHWHVWLQIDQWV¶XQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWZREDVLFW\SHVRIJRDOV± approaches 
and avoidances. We use an establiVKHGSDUDGLJPIRUWHVWLQJLQIDQWV¶UHSUHVHQWDWLRQVRIJRDO-
directed action (Woodward, 1998). The goal-directed action here is a hand appearing from 
behind a screen, touching and picking up one of two objects on stage. In the classic Woodward 
paradigm, two objects (e.g. a ball and a bear) are presented and a hand is seen repeatedly 
grasping one of them. At test, the objects change locations and the hand either grasps the same 
object as before in a new location or a never-before-grasped object in the old location. In the 
original study and in many subsequent replications infants have been found to dishabituate if the 
hand reaches for a new object but not for the old object in a new location. 
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We modify the paradigm to create two distinct conditions ± RQHµ$SSURDFKFRQGLWLRQ¶
where one object is always approached (while, one by one, an array of others are avoided in 
UHODWLRQWRLWDQGDQRWKHUµ$YRLGDQFHFRQGLWLRQ¶ZKHUHRQHREMHFWLVDYRLGHGLQFRQWUDVWWR
many others, which are approached, one by one). We then see whether infants look longer to an 
event that violates the previous pattern ± finally reaching for a new object in the Approach 
condition or finally reaching for the previously avoided object in the Avoidance condition. Given 
that infants succeed in representing a consistent approach in the Approach condition, they could 
succeed in the Avoidance condition in one of two ways. They could have a distinct 
representation, avoid, or they could combine the approach representation we know them to have 
with a conceptual NOT. Finding that they fail to notice the violation event in the Avoidance 
condition would be evidence that they either do not have access to conceptual negation or else 
that their representation approach is not the concept APPROACH, and therefore cannot be 
combined with negation. 
1.4.2. The second paper 
'HVSLWHWKHDEVWUDFWPHDQLQJRIORJLFDOQHJDWLRQWKHZRUG³QR´LVDPRQJWKHHDUOLHVW
words children produce. This might suggest that children have the logical meaning of the word 
very early, perhaps before they begin to learn language at all, and that mapping the word to the 
ORJLFDOFRQFHSWLVUHODWLYHO\HDV\([FHSWWKDWLWLVQRWFOHDUWKDWFKLOGUHQSURGXFH³QR´ZLWKD
logical meaning as soon as they produce the word. Early on they seem to use it primarily to 
reject parental commands, offers or prohibitions. However, data from production alone is 
DPELJXRXVFKLOGUHQ¶VXVHRI³QR´WRUHMHFWFRXOGUHIOHFWHLWKHUWKHLUKDYLQJPDSSHGWKHZRUG
only to some representation like get-away-from-me, or it could reflect their using the same 
logical meaning as adults for a narrower set of speech acts. After all, adults who have a logical 
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QHJDWLRQPHDQLQJIRU³QR´FDQYHU\UHDVRQDEO\XVHLWIRUUHMHFWLRQWRH[SUHVVWKHSURSRVLWLRQDO
thought, I DO NOT WANT THAT. Maybe children simply have more reason or occasion to make 
rejection speech acts using the same truth-functional concept than do adults. 
In the second paper, we investigate the relationship between learning the words that 
express logical negation and acquiring that concept. Do children have a concept of truth-
functional negation before they learn the words ³Qo´ and ³Qot´, so that learning these words is a 
matter of mapping a label to a preexisting concept? Or does learning the word precede learning 
the concept? If the latter, is it because children do not have the concept at the time they first learn 
the word, or because mapping the concept to the word is a difficult language-learning problem? 
To make progress on these questions, the second paper compares two aspects of the linguistic 
GHYHORSPHQWRIQHJDWLRQWKHGHYHORSPHQWDOFRXUVHVRIWKHSURGXFWLRQRIWKHZRUGV³Qo´ and 
³Qot´DQGWKHFRPSUHKHQVLRQRIWKHORJLFDOPHDQLQJRIWKRVHZRUGV 
The strategy taken in the second paper is to look for a gap between comprehension and 
SURGXFWLRQIRUERWKZRUGV:KLOH³QR´LVRQHRIWKHHDUOLHVWZRUGVFKLOGUHQSURGXFHWKH\GRQRW
EHJLQWRVD\³QRW´XQWLOHDUO\LQWKHWKLUG\HDU,IZHILQGWKDWIRUHDFKZRUGHLWKHUORJLFDO
comprehension and production track together or comprehension precedes production, it would 
suggest that the child has the concept before the word and that mapping the word to the concept 
is constrained by linguistic properties of each word, such as their input frequencies and their 
different grammatical properties. If, on the other hand, production precedes comprehension, 
there are two options to explore. One is that the child does not yet have the adult-like concept at 
the time when the word is first learned. This is the case in which learning the word could 
possibly play some causal role in the acquisition of the concept. The other possibility is that the 
adult concept is present, but that mapping the word to that concept is itself a hard problem 
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because the hypothesis space of possible mappings is initially insufficiently constrained for the 
child to identify the right one (see Snedeker and Gleitman, 2004).  
To test the comprehension of ³QRW´ZHSUHVHQWFKLOGUHQZLWKDVLWXDWLRQZKHUHDEDOOLV
hidden behind an occluder in either a bucket or a truck, and the child is told verbally that the ball 
LV³QRWLQWKHEXFNHWWUXFN´2QFRQWURODIILUPDWLYHWULDOVFKLOGUHQDUHWROGZKHUHWKHEDOODFWXDOO\
LVHJ³,W¶VLQWKHEXFNHWWUXFN´:KHQWHVWLQJFKLOGUHQ¶VFRPSUHKHQVLRQRIORJLFDO³QR´ZH
modify the paradigm to include a question-DQVZHUGLDORJXHZLWKWKHFKLOG¶VSDUHQW7KHSDUHQW
DVNV³,VLWLQWKHEXFNHWWUXFN"´$QGWKHH[SHULPHQWHUDQVZHUVHLWKHU³<HVLWLV´RU³1RLW¶V
QRW´ :HILQGWKDWFKLOGUHQ¶VFRPSUHKHQVLRQRIERWK³QR´DQG³QRW´HPHUges at the same time, 
DURXQGPRQWKVDQGSDWWHUQVZLWKWKHLUSURGXFWLRQRI³QRW´7KLVLVDERXWD\HDUODWHUWKDQ
ZKHQWKH\EHJLQWRSURGXFH³QR´VXJJHVWLQJWKDW³QR´KDVDGLIIHUHQWPHDQLQJIRUWKHPIRUWKH
first year that they are producing it, and is retrofitted to map to the concept of logical negation 
RQO\ODWHU,QDFRQWUROH[SHULPHQWZHWHVWWKHGHIODWLRQDU\DFFRXQWWKDWFKLOGUHQ¶VLPSURYLQJ
performance between 19 and 28 months is due to an increasing ability to inhibit attention and 
search find that when children are shown that the bucket is empty. 
The finding of a year-long comprehension-SURGXFWLRQJDSIRU³QR´VXJJHVWVHLWKHUWKDW
children do not have the concept of truth-functional negation before 24 months ± the age at 
which they begin to succeed on the comprehension task ± or else, if they do have the concept, 
that mapping the word to the concept poses a particularly difficult language-learning problem. 
7KDW³QR´DQG³QRW´DUHFRPSUHKHQGHGDWWKHVDPHWLPHFRQVWUDLQWVWKHSRVVLEOHQDWXUHRID
language-learning difficulty. The difficulty cannot be with the specific grammatical or 
frequency-EDVHGIHDWXUHVRI³QR´DQG³QRW´VLQFHDOOWKHVHDUHTXLWHGLIIHUHQWIURPHDFKRWKHU,I
it is a language learning problem, it is likely to be the same problem for both words. One 
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possibility is that to map either word to a logical negation concept requires knowing a significant 
DPRXQWRIWKHV\QWD[DQGOH[LFRQRIWKHODQJXDJH,WLVKDUGWRXQGHUVWDQG³7KHUHDUHQREHDUVRQ
0DUV´XQOHVVRQHXQGHUVWDQGVWKHPHDQLQJRI³EHDUV´DQG³0DUV´DQGKRZWKH\FRPELQH
PerhDSVFKLOGUHQQHHGWRNQRZHQRXJKRIWKHODQJXDJHWRILJXUHRXWWKHVHPDQWLFUROHERWK³QR´
DQG³QRW´SOD\DVORJLFDOQHJDWLRQ2QFHWKH\KDYHDFTXLUHGHQRXJKOLQJXLVWLFNQRZOHGJHWKH\
might make the mapping for both words with equal ease. We discuss how these two possibilities 
might be addressed by future work looking at a special population that provides a natural 
experiment that separates conceptual sophistication from linguistic competence ± internationally 
adopted toddlers who begin to learn English much older than native learners. 
1.4.3 The third paper 
The third paper is different from the other two in a number of ways. The participants 
tested in it are adults. Rather than trying to tell whether they have access to a logical concept like 
NOT or ALL, this paper looks at the structure of logical combinatorial concepts in their fully 
GHYHORSHGVWDWHV:HH[DPLQHTXDQWLILHUZRUGVOLNH³(YHU\´³(DFK´DQG³$OO´DQGDVNZKDW
structure these have in combinatorial language. The fundamental question in this paper is: in the 
process of assembling complex meanings from the combinations of individual words, which 
properties of meaning are the combining operations sensitive to and which ones do they abstract 
from? On one level of description, all three of the quantifier words above instantiate the same 
logical operator (the universal quantifier). However, fine-grained patterns of grammaticality 
judgments also show meaning-relevant differences between all three quantifiers. Using a priming 
paradigm, we ask whether interpreting one ambiguous sentence with one of these quantifiers 
affects how participants interpret another similar ambiguous sentence with the same or another 
quantifier. We compare the presence and strength of priming between sentences with different 
22 
 
universal quantifiers, as well as between sentences with one universal quantifier and another 
TXDQWLILHUZLWKDGLIIHUHQWPHDQLQJHJ³7KUHH´ 
The priming methodology takes advantage of a linguistic phenomenon called scope 
ambiguity, which gets at the heart of how combinatorial meaning is assembled. Sentences with 
WZRGLIIHUHQWW\SHVRITXDQWLILHUZRUGVHJDXQLYHUVDOOLNH³(YHU\´DQGDQH[LVWHQWLDOOLNH³$´
have a systematic ambiguity in the possible interpretations they can have, having to do with 
wKLFKTXDQWLILHUWDNHVVFRSHRYHUWKHRWKHU)RUH[DPSOHLQWKHVHQWHQFH³(YHU\ER\FOLPEHGD
WUHH´RQHPHDQLQJKDVWKHXQLYHUVDOWDNLQJZLGHVFRSHRYHUWKHH[LVWHQWLDO± for every boy, there 
is a potentially different tree ± while the other meaning has the existential taking wide scope ± 
there is a tree, which every boy climbed. 
Using a picture-choice paradigm where both alternatives are presented and participants 
are asked to match one of the pictures with the ambiguous sentence, the first experiment in this 
study provides baselines for preferences between the two readings for many combinations of 
GLIIHUHQWTXDQWLILHUZRUGVLQVXEMHFWSRVLWLRQZLWKWKHTXDQWLILHU³$´LQREMHFWSRVLWLRQHJ
³(YHU\ER\FOLPEHGDWUHH´³(DFKER\FOLPEHGDWUHH´HWF7KLs baseline experiment shows 
that the preferred reading depends strongly on the subject quantifier word used. From previous 
work on scope ambiguities, we know that the preference for one reading over another can be 
primed by a preceding ambiguous sentence with different noun content but the same two 
TXDQWLILHUVJHQHUDWLQJWKHVDPHNLQGRIDPELJXLW\HJ³(YHU\KLNHUFOLPEHGDKLOO´ZKHUHRQH
or the other type of reading is forced (eg. participants must choose the picture where many hikers 
are on the same hill; Raffray and Pickering, 2010). We adapt the priming paradigm to look at 
SULPLQJHIIHFWVDFURVVGLIIHUHQWTXDQWLILHUVWHVWLQJDOOSHUPXWDWLRQVRI³(YHU\´³(DFK´³$OO´
and number quantifiers in both prime and target position.  
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We find a priming effect across all prime-target pairs with the same quantifier words (i.e. 
IURP³(YHU\-$´WR³(YHU\-$´³(DFK-$´WR³(DFK-$´³$OO-$´WR³$OO-$´DQG³7KUHH-$´WR
³7KUHH-$´VHQWHQFHVEXWILQGQRHIIHFWDFURVVGLIIHUHQWTXDQWLILHUVHJIURPDQ³(YHU\-$´
prime to DQ³(DFK-$´WDUJHW)XUWKHUH[SHULPHQWVVKRZWKDWWKHSULPLQJHIIHFWGRHVQRWGHSHQG
on overall lexical similarity between prime and target, since the priming effect obtains when 
prime and target sentences have different verbs as well as different nouns, and when they have 
GLIIHUHQWQXPHUDOTXDQWLILHUZRUGVHJWKHUHLVDSULPLQJHIIHFWEHWZHHQ³7KUHHER\VFOLPEHGD
WUHH´DQG³)LYHKLNHUVFOLPEHGDKLOO´7KLVODVWH[SHULPHQWVXJJHVWVWKDWWKHFRPELQDWRULDO
machinery of meaning is blind to some underlying semantic differences ± like those between the 
PHDQLQJVRI³IRXU´DQG³ILYH´± but not others, like the differences between the universal 
quantifiers. 
This last finding is worth emphasizing for its implications both for the structure of natural 
language semantics and the interface of language with thought. Setting aside several implications 
for specific classes of linguistic theories (discussed in more detail in the paper), one key result is 
the division of labor between the combinatorial semantics of words and the concepts those words 
SRLQWWR2QDQ\RQH¶VWKHRU\RIVHPDQWLFVWKHFRPELQDWRULDOSURSHUWLHVRI³7KUHH´³)RXU´DQG
³)LYH´DUHWKHVDPHWKHRQO\GLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQWKHPLVLQWKHFDUGLQDOLW\FRQFHSWVWKH\SRLQW
to. That the priming effect is specific to each individual universal but is not sensitive to the 
differences between different numbers provides empirical support for this foundational 
theoretical assumption. 
1.5. The end of the beginning 
The papers that comprise this dissertation are concerned with the format of combinatorial 
thought rather than with the content of any specific representation. To study format requires 
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finding properties of representations that abstract away from what the representations are about 
and looks at what they can do in terms of interacting with other representations. What is the 
format of representations involved in a system of combinatorial thought, which is capable of 
recombining a finite array of concepts to represent an infinite array of meaningful propositions? I 
KDYHDUJXHGDJDLQVWWZRSRSXODUFULWHULDIRULGHQWLI\LQJWKLVFRQFHSWXDOIRUPDW%XUJH¶VSXUH
SUHGLFDWLRQDQG(YDQV¶JHQHUDOLW\FRQVWUDLQW,DUJXHWKDWLWLVQHYHUWKHOHVVSRVVLEOHWRVWXG\WKH
emergence and structure of conceptual format empirically by focusing on just those 
representations that have combinatorial properties ± and nothing but combinatorial properties ± 
by virtue of their content, then testing other target representations for their ability to combine 
with these concepts as a test of thHWDUJHWV¶FRQFHSWXDOIRUPDW,QRZWXUQWRGHVFULELQJWKH
collaborative work wherein the rubber meets the road, empirically investigating the emergence 
of logical negation in infants and children and the structure of natural language quantification in 
adults. 
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Chapter 2: 
Infants' representations of others' goals: Representing approach over avoidance 
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2.1. Introduction 
Convergent research indicates that young infants, even neonates, create representations of 
agents and attribute intentions to their actions (e.g. Senju & Csibra, 2008; Sommerville, 
Woodward & Needham 2005; Woodward, 1998; Luo & Johnson, 2009; Gergeley & Csibra, 
2003; Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Senju, Southgate, Snape, Leonard, & Csibra, 2011; see 
Baillargeon, Scott, He, Sloane, Setoh, Jin, Wu, & Bian, 2014 for a review). Much less is 
understood, however, about the form those representations take and how they are computed.   
&RQVLGHUDSDUDGLJPLQWURGXFHGE\:RRGZDUGWRLQYHVWLJDWHLQIDQWV¶
representations of goals. In this paradigm infants are habituated to an experimenter repeatedly 
reaching for and touching one of two objects (e.g. a ball over a bear). On the critical test trials 
that follow, the two objects switch locations and the experimenter reaches again, either for the 
same target (the ball contacted during habituation, which is now in a new location) or for the 
same location (the bear that the experimenter had never before touched, now sitting in the 
location where the experimenter had formerly reached). Infants dishabituate to a reach to the new 
object in the old location, but not to a reach for the old object in a new location. This paradigm 
has been extended to displays where the agent picks up the object (Phillips, Wellman & Spelke, 
2002; Sodian & Thoermer, 2004), and ones where the entire agent approaches the object rather 
WKDQUHDFKLQJIRULW+HUQLN	6RXWKJDWH/DNXVWD:DJQHU2¶+earn, & Landau 2007). In 
all of these cases, experimenters concluded that infants' intentional construal of the event was of 
the agent fulfilling its goal to contact the object. More recently, these and other manipulations 
have also been interpreted as providing information to the child that the agent has a positive 
disposition toward the approached object, which in turn leads to the prediction that the agent will 
approach the object in the future (Baillargeon, et al., 2014).  
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There is, however, another possibility. When an agent consistently chooses a ball over a 
bear, this action is consistent not only with the agent having a goal to obtain the ball, but also 
with the agent not having a goal to obtain the bear, or with a goal to avoid it. Either of these 
representations alone would be sufficient to explain dishabituation in the Woodward paradigm, 
and neither is mutually exclusive with the standard interpretation: Infants might represent goals 
alongside non-goals, or approach alongside avoidance. This ambiguity is present in the account 
where infants represent agents as having a particular disposition towards an object as well. Not 
only is the Woodward paradigm ambiguous with respect to the evidence the child uses to 
HVWDEOLVKWKHDJHQW¶VGLVSRVLWLRQDSSURDFh to one object or avoidance of the other), it is also 
DPELJXRXVZLWKUHVSHFWWRZKLFKDWWULEXWHGGLVSRVLWLRQXQGHUOLHVWKHFKLOG¶VDWWHQWLRQWRWKH
unexpected event (attributing to the agent a positive disposition toward the approached object or 
a negative disposition toward the avoided object). 
Although these alternative possibilities have not received much attention, a number of 
considerations lend them some plausibility. From an evolutionary perspective, avoiding is often 
more critical for survival than approaching ±a single encounter with a predator could well be 
GHDGO\5HSUHVHQWLQJQRWLFLQJDQGOHDUQLQJIURPRWKHUV¶DYRLGDQFHJRDOVDUHWKHUHIRUHOLNHO\WR
be important for young humans, as for other animals. Furthermore, recent work on a negativity 
biDVLQERWKDGXOWV¶DQGLQIDQWV¶SURFHVVLQJRIYDOHQFHGLQIRUPDWLRQVXJJHVWVLQIDQWVGRDWWHQGWR
negative information. Three-month-old infants prefer neutral over antisocial agents, but not 
prosocial over neutral agents (Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 2010). Studies of social referencing 
show that infants generally modify their own behavior more in response to negative than to 
positive affective information from their caregivers (see Vaish, Grossman, & Woodward, 2008, 
for a review). Twelve-month-old infants faced with an ambiguous new toy play with it less if 
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their caregiver looks disgusted rather than neutral, but do not play with it more if the caregiver 
emotes positively, rather than neutrally, towards the toy (Hornik, Risenhoover, & Gunnar, 1987). 
Additionally, DQXPEHURIRWKHUVWXGLHVWHVWLQIDQWV¶VHQVLWLYLW\WRRWKHUV¶SRVLWLYHDQG
negative emotions and preferences, by providing both kinds of information within the same 
FRQGLWLRQ7KHVHVWXGLHVLQGLFDWHLQIDQWV¶VHQVLWLYLW\WRYDOHQFHGLQWHQWLRQDOLQIRUPDWLRQ, even if 
they do not allow us to compare positive to negative directly. Thus, by 18 months, infants will 
give an agent an object she emoted positively rather than negatively towards, (Egyed, Király, & 
Gergely, 2013), match the food preference of a prosocial or novel agent who indicated liking one 
food and disliking another (but not of an antisocial agent; Hamlin & Wynn, 2012), and override 
their own preference to give an agent a food that the agent has shown a preference rather than a 
dispreference for (Repacholi & Gopnik, 1997). This literature suggests that infants in the 
Woodward paradigm might indeed attend to the consistent avoidance, and perhaps even attend to 
it preferentially over a consistent approach, and might indeed attribute a negative disposition 
toward that object to the agent. 
 Most studies using the Woodward paradigm are ambiguous on this point, because every 
trial with a persistently reached-for object has always included a persistently not-reached for 
object. Some relevant evidence comes from studies where the habituation display involves only 
one object that is consistently approached. If an agent simply approaches a single object along a 
straight path, as in the Woodward paradigm, infants do not expect the agent to continue 
approaching that object (Luo and Baillargeon, 2005). However, when the agent approaches the 
object by taking an efficient path around an obstacle, infants successfully predict an approach to 
the same object during test (e.g. Biro, Verschoor, & Coenen, 2011; Hernik & Southgate, 2012). 
These studies indicate that infants can represent a consistent approach, since there is no 
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consistent avoidance during habituation. However, they do not bear on the question of whether 
infants also represent avoidance given evidence consistent with both avoidance and approach, as 
in the canonical and widely-used Woodward paradigm. 
The present study addresses this ambiguity through a modification of the original 
Woodward paradigm. As in the original, two objects are present during habituation. But, while 
RQHRIWKHREMHFWVVWD\VWKHVDPHDFURVVDOOWULDOVWKHRWKHUREMHFW¶VLGHQWLW\FKDQJHVRQHYHU\
trial. Infants see one of two habituation displays: either a consistent reach to the same fixed 
object (the Approach condition), or a consistent reach to the always-novel, variable object and, 
therefore, a consistent avoidance of the fixed object (the Avoidance condition). The Approach 
and Avoidance conditions each provide equivalent evidence for an approach goal or an 
avoidance goal, as well as for a positive or a negative disposition toward the fixed object, 
respectively. 
If infants only require that one fixed reached-for object be paired with a foil in order to 
establish that the agent has the goal of contacting that fixed object, then they should succeed at 
the Approach condition. Similarly, if infants need only one unreached-for fixed object and a foil 
to establish that the agent has the goal of avoiding or of not picking up the fixed object, they 
should succeed at the Avoidance condition. If infants succeed in both of these conditions, that 
would suggest that imputing positive and negative valences, goals to approach and goals to 
avoid, are equally available to young infants as they make sense of the events in the basic 
Woodward paradigm. We begin our investigation with 7-month-old infants, who have been 
shown to succeed robustly in multiple versions of the basic Woodward paradigm (Woodward, 
1998; Luo & Baillargeon, 2005; Luo & Johnson, 2009). 
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2.2. Experiment 1 
2.2.1. Method 
2.2.1.1. Participants 
 Sixteen full-term infants participated in the Approach condition (mean age 7;3, range 
6;15-7;15, 11 female) and another 16 in the Avoidance condition (mean age 7;1, range 6;15-
7;15, 10 female). One other infant was excluded from analysis and subsequently replaced due to 
fussiness, and another one due to parental interference. 
2.2.1.2. Stimuli 
 8SWRREMHFWVZHUHXVHGIRUHDFKLQIDQWRQH³IL[HG´REMHFWSUHVHQWRQHYHU\WULDODQG
³YDULDEOH´REMHFWVHDFKXVHGRQRQHWULDORQO\7KHLGHQWLW\RIWKHIL[ed object was varied 
across participants. The objects were similarly sized, but differed in material, texture, color, 
shape and semantic category. They included, for example, a small section of a wooden branch, a 
rubber duck, a plastic carrot, a shoe brush, and a jewelry box. 
2.2.1.3. Setup 
 ,QIDQWVVDWRQDSDUHQW¶VULJKWNQHHDERXWFHQWLPHWHUVIURPDVWDJHVXUURXQGHGE\
black curtains. Parents were instructed to close their eyes throughout the experiment and not to 
GLUHFWWKHLQIDQW¶VDWWHQWLRQ7KHVWage had exits on each side with black curtains shielding the 
experimenters from view. A black plank spanned the width of the stage, extending out of both 
side exits. This plank had strips of velcro attached, corresponding to the three locations where 
objects could be placed. Objects, each with a strip of velcro underneath to keep them from 
rolling off or from wiggling relative to the plank as it was moved, were placed on the sliding 
plank and shuttled to one side or the other such that the fixed object and one variable object were 
in view on each trial (see Fig. 2.1). 
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 A camera behind the infant recorded events on stage, while another hidden in the stage 
FXUWDLQVUHFRUGHGWKHLQIDQW¶VJD]H7ZRWUDLQHGFRGHUVLQDQRWKHUURRPKHQFHEOLQGWR
condition) recordHGLQIDQWV¶ORRNLQJWLPHV$SULPDU\FRGHU¶VLQSXWGHWHUPLQHGWKHHQGRIDWULDO
Average percent agreement on all trials was 94.1 for Experiment 1, reflecting the proportion of 
100 ms time segments during which both coders agreed about whether the baby was looking at 
the display. 
2.2.1.4. Procedure 
Both conditions consisted of a habituation phase followed by a test phase. Habituation 
ODVWHGXQWLOWKHLQIDQW¶VORRNLQJWLPHRQWKUHHFRQVHFXWLYHWULDOVZDVOHVVWKDQKDOIWKDWIRUWKH
first three trials, with a maximum of 14 habituation trials. This habituation phase was followed 
by four test trials. In the first and third test trials the hand reached to the unexpected object, while 
the second and fourth trials maintained the pattern of reaching established during habituation. All 
trials began when the infant looked onstage for at least 0.5 seconds and ended when the infant 
looked offstage for at least 2 seconds. 
In the Approach condition, all habituation trials consisted of a hand emerging from the 
back stage curtain, reaching for the fixed object, picking it up and shaking it in the air until the 
end of the trial before replacing it and retreating behind the curtain. Avoidance condition 
habituation trials consisted of an identical action performed on the variable object. No curtain or 
barrier was used to block view of the stage between trials. 
The variable object was swapped off-stage between each trial. The fixed object sat at the 
center of the plank and remained in full view of the infant throughout the experiment. Variable 
objects were placed on either side of the fixed object and shuttled on- and off-stage on the plank. 
When a new variable object was shuttled onstage from the right, the old variable object exited to 
32 
 
the left, and vice-versa. Once off-stage the old variable object was replaced with a new one. 
Thus, the relative location of the fixed and variable object (right stage versus left stage) 
DOWHUQDWHGRQHYHU\KDELWXDWLRQWULDODVGLGWKHGLUHFWLRQRIWKHKDQG¶VUHDFKVHH)LJ2.1). 
 In both conditions, the first test trial was always an unexpected trial, in which the hand reached 
for the variable object in the Approach condition and the fixed object in the Avoidance 
condition. This broke the left-right alternation of reaches. However, because the pattern of 
alternation was established identically and broken identically across both conditions, differential 
patterns of dishabituation between them cannot be attributed to the sequence of right stage versus 
left stage reaches. 
 
Fig. 2.1: The stage setup (left) allows for a single fixed object to be shuttled from one side of the 
stage to the other via the sliding bar on which it is placed. The variable objects are switched after 
they are shuttled off stage and out of sight of the infant. The procedure, illustrating the pattern of 
alternating reaches (right) is shown only for the Approach condition, although all conditions 
involved the same alternation of positions for the fixed and variable objects. In the Approach 
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condition, the hand always reaches for the ball during habituation. On the first test trial, it 
reaches for a novel object (and breaks the alternation) for the first time. This first test trial always 
violated expectation. 
 
2.2.3. Results 
2.2.3.1. Habituation Trials 
The first two panels of Figure 2.2 shows the looking times during the first three 
habituation trials, the last three, plus the violation and expected test trials of the Approach and 
Avoidance conditions of Experiment 1.  Infants habituated similarly in both conditions. Thirteen 
reached criterion in the Approach condition and 14 in the Avoidance condition. An ANOVA 
examined the effects of condition (Action vs. Avoidance) and habituation trial block (first 3 vs. 
last 3) on looking times during habituation. There was a main effect of habituation block, F(1,30) 
= 52.59, p < 0.0001, indicating that infants looked less over time (M first 3 = 19.52 seconds; M 
last 3 = 8.78 seconds. There was no main effect of condition, F(1,30) = 0.2, p = 0.66, nor did 
condition interact with habituation block, F(1,30) = 0.95, p = 0.34. Thus, infants entered the test 
trial phase in similar attentional states. 
Fig. 2.2: Results from both conditions of Experiment 1 and Experiments 2 and 3, showing looking time 
per trial averaged across participants. Error bars indicate 1 S.E. from the mean. 
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2.2.3.2. Test Trials 
We excluded data when the difference between the violation and expected test trials 
exceeded 2 standard deviations from the mean difference across subjects, considering the first 
and second pairs of test trials separately. One pair of second test trials was excluded in each 
condition.  
An analysis of variance examined the effects of the within-subject variables of trial type 
(Violation vs. Expected) and trial pair (first vs. second pair) and the between-subject variable of 
condition (Approach vs. Avoidance) on looking times during the test trials. Critically, this 
revealed an interaction between trial type and condition, F(1, 28) = 19.81, p < 0.001, indicating 
dishabituation to violation trials selectively in the Approach condition. This pattern was strongest 
for the first pair of test trials, leading to a significant three-way interaction between trial type, 
trial pair and condition F(1, 28) = 4.69, p = 0.04. Finally, a main effect of trial pair F(1, 28) = 
10.85, p < 0.01 indicated that looking times were longer overall on the first pair of test trials.  
There were no other significant main effects or interactions. 
Planned comparisons illuminate the source of the interaction between trial type and 
condition. The results of these comparisons and the associated parametric statistics are shown on 
Table 2.1.12  
                                                          
12
 Order of expected/unexpected trials in violation of expectancy experiments are usually counterbalanced, because 
usually they have some salient difference in overall structure that in itself might increase looking time.  For 
example, in the Woodward paradigm, the location of the two objects is switched between habituation and test trials.  
However, in our design there is no break or any signal of difference between habituation and test trials, we did not 
counterbalance the order of test trials ± violation trials were always presented first. This raises the potential concern 
that infants may dishabituate to the first test trial, regardless of its content. Critically, however, this cannot explain 
the different patterns of dishabituation between the Approach and Avoidance condition, and specifically, the lack of 
dishabituation to the first violation test trial in the Avoidance condition. 
Furthermore, to verify that infants did not dishabituate on the first violation test trial only because it came 
first, we conducted pairwise comparisons, treating the last habituation trial each infant received as if it were the first 
H[SHFWHGWHVWWULDO7KXVWKH³st SDLU´DQDO\VLVLQWKLVFDVHFRPSDUHVWKHODVWKDELWXDWLRQWULDODQGWKHILUVWYLRODWLRQ
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  Approach        
7 month olds 
(Exp. 1a) 
Avoidance       
7 month olds 
(Exp. 1b) 
Avoidance         
14 month 
olds (Exp. 2) 
Inherent 
Motion             
7 month olds 
(Exp. 3)         
Violation 1 ʹ Avg. of Last 3 Hab 
(n = 16) 
9.18 **           
t(15)=3.02 
d=0.95 
-0.90              
t(15) = -0.48 
d=0.12 
2.76                  
t(15) = 1 
d=0.26 
7.81                  
t(15) = 1.56 
d=0.39 
Violation 1 ʹ Expected 1  
(n = 16) 
8.43 **                
t(15) = 3.78 
d=0.95 
- ? ? ? ? ?
t(15) = -1.96 
d=0.49 
1.16                  
t(15) = 0.32 
d=0.08 
7.84                      
t(15) = 1.58 
d=0.40 
Violation 2 ʹ Expected 2  
(n = 15) 
3.69 *                   
t(14) = 2.31 
d=0.60 
-0.94              
t(14) = -0.92 
d=0.24 
-2.95                    
t(14) = -0.76 
d=0.20 
 ? ? ? ? ? ?
t(14) = 1.90 
d=0.49 
Avg. Violation ʹ Avg. Expected 
(n = 16) 
6.17 ***              
t(15) = 4.32 
d=1.08 
-3.45 *             
t(15) = -2.49 
d=0.62 
-0.34                    
t(15) = -0.13 
d=0.03 
9.45 **                
t(15) = 3.52 
d=0.88 
Table 2.1: Differences between means of the average looking times on the trials indicated. Significance 
was obtained from planned paired-sample t-test comparisons, 2-WDLOHGp < .1; * p p < .01, *** 
p < .001). d-values are point estimates of CRKHQ¶Vd measure of effect size. 
 
In the Approach condition infants looked significantly longer at violation trials than 
expected trials, both for the first pair of test trials and for the second pair, indicating that they 
expected the hand to continue reaching for the fixed object. This conclusion is further supported 
by their longer looking on the first violation test trial than on to the last three habituation trials. 
However, in the Avoidance condition infants did not look longer at violation trials than expected 
trails; in fact they trended in the opposite direction. Nor did they recover interest to the first 
violation test trial relative to the last three habituation trials. Thus, infants in the Avoidance 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
test trial. The 2nd pair comparison is between the first expected and the second violation test trial. And the 
comparison over the averages of violation and expected trials would take the average of the first and second 
members of these pairs. Analyzing the data in this way reveals essentially the same pattern of findings.  Importantly 
infants in the Approach condition looked longer at the violation trials, t(15)=3.15, p=0.007, averaged across both 
pairs, whereas infants in the Avoidance condition did not differentiate, overall, between the two trial types, 
t(15)=1.51, p=0.15. In the Avoidance condition, infants looked significantly longer at the expected trial that follows 
the first violation trial relative to that violation trial, t(14)=2.65, p=0.02, an effect discussed in the text. 
36 
 
condition apparently failed to expect that the hand would continue not reaching for the fixed 
object. Nonparametric analyses confirmed these results. Fourteen out of 16 infants looked longer 
at the violation than the expected test trials in the Approach condition, which was significantly 
different from chance according to a Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test (z = 2.99, N = 16, p < 0.01). 
In contrast, 4 out of 16 infants looked longer at the violation events in the Avoidance condition, 
which was also different from chance, but in the other direction (z = -2.17; N = 16, p = 0.03); 
that is, infants looked longer at the expected outcome. 
2.2.4. Discussion 
In the Approach condition infants expected a hand that consistently reached for one 
object to continue reaching for that object. In contrast to the basic Woodward paradigm, the 
setup of tKH$SSURDFKFRQGLWLRQUXOHVRXWWKHSRVVLELOLW\WKDWLQIDQWV¶GLVKDELWXDWLRQGHSHQGHG
upon encoding a consistent avoidance of one of the objects. Rather, consistent with previous 
interpretations, they apparently took the repeated approach to the fixed object as evidence for a 
SRVLWLYHGLVSRVLWLRQWRZDUGLWDQGHQFRGHGWKHIL[HGREMHFWDVWKHKDQG¶VJRDOVKRZLQJVXUSULVH
when the hand approached, for the first time, one of the variable objects.  
In contrast, infants in the Avoidance condition did not form an expectation that the 
KDQG¶VJRDOZDVDOZD\VWKHYDULDEOHREMHFWDQGQHYHUWKHIL[HGREMHFWRUGLGQRWDWWULEXWHD
negative disposition toward this object to the agent. In fact, in the Avoidance condition, infants 
looked longer at the first expected than the first violation trial. That is, they looked longer at the 
trials when the hand reached for a novel variable object, even though they had been habituated to 
the hand always reaching for the variable object rather than the fixed object (e.g., a ball). This 
counterintuitive result has a number of possible explanations. It may reflect a powerful tendency 
to impute approach goals to agents. Recall that the first expected trial always followed the first 
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violation trial. Infants may be rapidly encoding the fixed object as a goal on the first test trial, 
when the hand reaches for the fixed object (e.g., the ball) for the first time. This reach towards 
the ball does not surprise infants, consistent with our interpretation that they had failed to encode 
the habituation trials as the agent avoiding the ball. Next, on the second test trial the hand 
reaches for some entirely new object, now avoiding the ball. For the first time in the experiment, 
infants are confronted with a non-reach to a previously reached-for object ± the ball ± that is still 
onstage. This may explain greater interest on the second and fourth test trials ± the trials that 
ZRXOGEH³H[SHFWHG´LILQIDQWVUHSUHVHQWHGWKHKDELWXDWLRQHYHQWVLQWKH$YRLGDQFHFRQGLWLRQDV
consistent avoidances, which apparently they did not. Alternatively, infants may have 
represented the identity of the object that is reached for on every trial, without forming a 
UHSUHVHQWDWLRQRIWKHDJHQW¶VJRDOIURPDVLQJOHWULDO7KH\PD\KDYHOHDUQHGDSDWWHUQDIWHUDQ
object is reached for, it is replaced. The first expected trial presents a violation of this pattern, 
which causes infants to dishabituate. 
2.3. Experiment 2 
Although 7-month-ROGVDOUHDG\KDYHVRSKLVWLFDWHGUHSUHVHQWDWLRQVRIRWKHUV¶LQWHQWLRQDO
states, these representations continue to be greatly enriched throughout development. Between 9 
and 15 months, infants increasingly show a capacity for joint attention and attention-following, 
among other skills (Carpenter, Nagel, & Tomasello, 1998). By 10 months, but not at 9, infants 
expect agents to look at another agent they are interacting with (Beier & Spelke, 2012). 
5HSUHVHQWDWLRQVRIRWKHUV¶JRDOVLQSDUWLFXODUDUHHQULFKHGDVZHOO%\PRQWKVEXWQRWDW
LQIDQWVLQWHUSUHWWKHGLUHFWLRQRIDQDJHQW¶VJD]H:RRdward, 2003) and pointing behavior 
(Woodward & Guajardo, 2002) as object-directed. Fourteen-month-olds, but not 10-month-olds, 
look predictively in anticipation of the outcomes of goal-directed reaching events in which 
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objects were moved around, but not to similar hand movements with a closed fist (Gredebäck, 
Stasiewicz, Falck-Ytter, Rosander, & van Hofsten, 2009). Many other studies have not explicitly 
compared younger and older infants, but have reported abilities in 12-14 month-olds that have 
not been reported in infants any younger. Infants at these ages differentiate between an agent 
who is unwilling versus one who is unable to complete a goal-directed giving action (Behne, 
Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello, 2005) and, knowing two out of the three components of the 
teleological analysis of rational actions (environmental constraints, goals, means), infer the third 
(Gergely & Csibra, 2003). 
Unlike older infants, 7-month-olds also have severely limited domain-general 
information processing capacities. For example, working memory increases greatly between 6.5 
and 12-months, probably due to maturation of prefrontal cortex (Diamond & Goldman-Rakic, 
1989). Other executive functions, such as the capacity to inhibit prepotent responses also show 
marked developmental changes over this age range (Diamond, 1991). Relatively impoverished 
goal representations, plus domain-general information processing limitations, may have 
contributed to the failure of the 7-month-olds in the avoidance condition. Perhaps their failure 
reflects a relatively superficial bias in favor of approach over avoidance representations as well 
as information processing limitations that preclude overcoming this bias. If this is so, much older 
babies, relative experts at goal representations, with markedly increased executive function, 
might succeed at the avoidance condition of Experiment 1. Experiment 2 tests this hypothesis 
with 14-month-olds. 
2.3.1. Method 
2.3.1.1. Participants 
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 Sixteen full-term infants (mean age 14;1, range 13;18-14;22, 5 female) participated in 
Experiment 2. Three additional infants were tested, but were excluded from analysis due to 
fussiness. 
2.3.1.2. Procedure 
The stimuli, setup and procedure were identical to the Avoidance condition of 
Experiment 1. 
2.3.2. Results 
As in Experiment 1 we excluded data when the difference between the violation and 
expected test trials exceeded 2 standard deviations from the mean difference across subjects, 
considering the first and second pairs of test trials separately. Two pairs of second test trials were 
excluded on this basis. The results are shown on Figure 2.2. 
2.3.2.1. Habituation 
Nine infants reached the habituation criterion, and a paired samples t-test indicated that 
infants looked less over time during habituation (M first 3 = 32.2; M last 3 = 15.8; t(15) = 3.96, p 
= 0.001). Comparing the 14 month old infants in Experiment 2 to the 7 month olds in the 
Avoidance condition of Experiment 1, an ANOVA examined the effects of experimental group 
(7 m.o. vs. 14 m.o.) and habituation trial (first 3 vs. last 3) on looking times during habituation. 
There was no significant interaction, F(1,30) = 0.87; p = 0.36, suggesting that infants of different 
ages did not habituate at different rates to the Avoidance display; There was a significant main 
effect of experiment, F(1,30) = 8.23; p < .01, indicating that the older infants looked longer over 
the habituation phase (M 14 m.o. = 24.01; M 7 m.o. = 14.7). 
2.3.2.2. Test Trials 
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An ANOVA examined the effects of the within-subject variables of trial type (Violation 
vs. Expected), trial pair (first vs. second pair) and experiment (7 m.o. vs. 14 m.o.) on looking 
times during the test trials. This revealed a main effect of trial pair, F(1,28) = 4.5, p = 0.04, with 
infants looking longer overall on the first pair of test trials. There was also a main effect of 
experiment, F(1,28) = 9.8, p < 0.01, with older infants looking longer than younger ones at the 
test events. Importantly, there was no significant interaction of trial type and experiment, 
suggesting that older infants did not differentiate the expected from the unexpected events any 
more than did younger infants. Planned comparisons (see Table 2.1) found that the 14-month-
olds failed to dishabituate to the first violation test trial, relative to the last three habituation 
trials, and did not differentiate the violation test trials from the expected test trials, nor on the 
first or second pairs of test trials, nor overall.13 Nine out of 16 infants looked longer at the 
violation test trials than the expected trials, which was not significantly different from chance 
according to a Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test. Thus, 14-month-olds, like 7-month-olds, failed to 
predict that the hand would continue to avoid the fixed object, in favor of the variable ones. 
2.3.3. Discussion 
Like younger infants, 14 month-olds do not look longer at violation than expected events 
in this Avoidance condition. Given all the additional capacities of 14-month-olds over 7-month-
olds, both domain general capacities such as increased working memory and executive function 
(Diamond, 1991), and domain specific capacities relevant to intentional attributions (Gredebäck, 
et al., 2009; Beier & Carey, 2013; Woodward, 2003, Carpenter, et al., 1998, Behne, et al., 2005; 
                                                          
13
 As in Experiment 1, we again analyze the data in a way that treats the last habituation trial as if it was the first test 
WULDO6RWKH³st SDLU´DQDO\VLVKHUHFRPSDUHVWKHODVWKDELWXDWLRQWULDODQGWKHILUVWYLRODWLRQWHVWWULDO7KHnd pair 
comparison is between the first expected and the second violation test trial. And the comparison over the averages of 
violation and expected trials would take the average of the first and second members of these pairs. Analyzing the 
data of Experiment 2 this way, there were no significant differences between violation and expected trials in 
Experiment 2. 
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*HUJHO\	&VLEUDWKHROGHULQIDQWV¶IDLOXUHWRUHSUHVHQWDYRLGDQFHVLQWKHSUHVHQWVWXG\LV
particularly striking. 
We do not claim that 14-month-old infants cannot represent avoidance behavior under 
any circumstances, since it is of course possible that they would succeed if given additional cues 
WKDWWKHDJHQW¶VJRDOLVLQIDFWWRDYRLGWKHIL[HGREMHFW7KHVDPHLVWUXHRI-month-olds. Further 
ZRUNLVUHTXLUHGWRFKDUDFWHUL]HWKHH[WHQWRILQIDQWV¶GLIILculty with avoidance and the 
conditions necessary for them to represent avoidance goals. For example, if the agent showed a 
negative emotional reaction towards the avoided fixed object, or if the hand hovered over the 
avoided object repeatedly, as if considering reaching for it, before reaching for the variable 
object every time, infants may be more likely to notice the avoidance. Nevertheless, the 
experiments presented here show that there is a significant asymmetry between the evidence 
infants need to represent a goal-directed approach versus an avoidance. While the evidence given 
7-month-olds in the Approach condition suffices to lead them to consistently expect continued 
approach, perhaps having taken consistent approach as evidence for a positive disposition toward 
the fixed object, the same sort and amount of evidence is not enough for 7-month-olds, or even 
14-month-old infants to expect continued avoidance. 
2.4. Experiment 3 
Experiments 1 and 2 show that infants do not encode consistent reaches to and away from 
an object with equal ease, given the same kind of evidence. It is possible that on the basis of 
observed actions, avoidance goals are more difficult to encode than approach goals because of 
WKHEDVLFVWUXFWXUHRILQIDQWV¶FDSDFLW\IRUJRDOLQIHUHnce. We will return to why that might be so. 
However, infants may also have failed to encode the consistent avoidance in experiments 1 and 2 
because of general cognitive demands of the Avoidance condition that are not specific to 
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representations of the ageQW¶VDWWLWXGHVWRZDUGWKHREMHFWVRUWRWKHDJHQW¶VJRDOV)RULQVWDQFHWKH
movement of each object may be an overpowering attentional draw, such that on every trial 
infants encode only the moved object and fail to encode the object that remains still on the stage. 
This would lead to encoding the identity of the fixed object in the Approach condition, since it is 
the one that always moves, and failure to encode the identity of the fixed object in the Avoidance 
condition, since it never moves.  Relatedly, it may be that the cognitive resources necessary to 
represent what is happening to the bear preclude an additional representation of what LVQ¶W 
KDSSHQLQJWRWKHEDOO2USHUKDSVLQIDQWVUHSUHVHQWWKHHQWLUH$YRLGDQFHGLVSOD\DV³DGLIIHUHQW
REMHFWPRYHVHYHU\WLPH´± a representation not possible in the Approach condition ± in which 
case the violation test event is not a violation of the rule and would not be expected to cause 
dishabituation. Finally, perhaps infants simply assume that the fixed object is part of the plank, 
DQGWKXVGRQ¶WDWWHQGWRLWDWDOO 
Experiment 3 tests these alternative accounts. Instead of a hand reaching for each variable 
REMHFWZHGUDZWKHLQIDQW¶VDWWHQWLRQWRWKHYDULDEOHREMHFWVE\PDNLQJWKHREMHFWVPRYHRQWKHLU
own, rising into the air and dangling (pulled up on invisible strings controlled by the 
experimenter). The fixed object never moves during habituation, moving only on the violation 
event during the test phase. If the attentional pull or processing demands of the moving object 
preclude attention to or inferences about the stationary object, then 7-month-old infants will fail 
to dishabituate to the violation event here as well.  In contrast, if the failure in Experiments 1 and 
2 reflects constraints on representing intentional actions per se, 7-month-olds may succeed in 
Experiment 3, where the inherent motion of the objects does not signal any goal-directed action. 
Since there are no reaching actions, there is no avoidance to represent in this case, and no 
dispositional attitudes of an agent towards the object.  Infants would need to encode only that 
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there is one exceptional object, which sits still while all the others move, in order to dishabituate 
when that fixed object finally moves on the violation test event. 
 The stage and object setup of Experiment 3 was identical to the Avoidance condition of 
Experiment 1. Variable and fixed objects were attached to thin wire which allowed them to be 
lifted and dangled in the air (exhibiting motion similar to Experiment 1, but without a hand). 
Following the design of the Avoidance condition of Experiment 1, the variable object dangled in 
the air on every habituation trial, while the fixed object never did. Thus, Experiment 3 was 
identical to the Avoidance condition of Experiment 1 except that the motion of the objects was 
not caused by a visible hand. 
2.4.1. Method 
2.4.1.1. Participants 
 Sixteen full-term infants participated in the study (mean age 7;3, range 6;15-7;15, 7 
female). Ten additional infants were excluded and replaced: 9 due to fussiness and 1 due to 
parental interference. 
2.4.1.2. Stimuli and Setup 
 We modified the stimuli used in Experiment 1 by gluing a small magnet on top of each 
object. While objects were onstage, this magnet was connected to a thin wire, allowing the 
H[SHULPHQWHUWROLIWDQGGDQJOHHDFKREMHFWE\WXJJLQJRQWKHZLUHIURPDERYHRXWRIWKHLQIDQW¶V
view). Once each variable object was shuttled offstage, the experimenter disconnected it from 
the wire and swapped a new variable object into place. 
2.4.1.3. Procedure 
 The procedure was identical to Experiment 1, except that instead of a hand reaching for 
DQREMHFWLQWKHLQIDQW¶VYLHZWKDWRbject was lifted by the wire and dangled, jiggling, until the 
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infant looked way and the trial ended. We attempted to give the strongest possible impression of 
a freely floating object by using black wire against a black background. 
2.4.2. Results 
2.4.2.1. Habituation 
The results are depicted on Figure 2.1 and in Table 2.1. Looking times decreased 
significantly during habituation (first 3 trials M = 28.8; last 3 trials M = 15.09; t = 2.55, p < .05). 
Nine infants in Experiment 3 reached criterion, which was significantly fewer than the 14 infants 
who reached criterion on the Avoidance condition of Experiment 1 (Ȥ2(1, N = 32) = 3.87, p < 
0.05).  However, an ANOVA comparing habituation (first vs. last three trials) between this 
experiment and the Avoidance condition of Experiment 1 (Inherent Motion vs. Avoidance) 
found no interaction, F(1,30) = 0.07, p = 0.79. Infants, therefore, entered the Test Trials of 
Experiment 3 having lost interest in the habituation trials to a similar degree as infants in the 
Avoidance condition of Experiment 1. There was also a marginal main effect of condition, 
) S ,QIDQWV¶RYHUDOOORRNLQJWRWKe free-floating objects was greater than to 
those lifted by hand, perhaps because they do not expect objects such as these to move by 
themselves and float.  
2.4.2.2. Test Trials 
2QHLQIDQW¶VVHFRQGSDLURIWHVWWULDOVZDVH[FOXGHGIURPDQDO\VLVEHFDXVHWKH difference 
in looking time between expected and violation trials was greater than two standard deviations 
from the mean. As can be seen from Table 2.1, averaging across the first and second pair of test 
trials, infants looked significantly longer to violation trials than expected trials t(15) = 3.52, p < 
0.01.14  This pattern was observed on both the first and second pairs of test trials, although not 
                                                          
14
 As in Experiments 1 and 2, we again analyze the data in a way that treats the last habituation trial as if it was the 
ILUVWWHVWWULDO6RWKH³st pair´DQDO\VLVKHUHFRPSDUHVWKHODVWKDELWXDWLRQWULDODQGWKHILUVWYLRODWLRQWHVWWULDO7KH
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significantly on each pair. A non-parametric analysis confirmed this result. Fourteen out of 16 
infants looked longer at the two violation trials than the two expected events, significantly more 
than expected by chance according to a Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test (z = 2.69, N = 16 p < 0.01). 
Thus, infants were more surprised to see floating by a previously non-floating object, compared 
to floating by a novel object.  
To confirm that the difference in the pattern of results from the Avoidance condition in 
Experiment 1 and those from Experiment 3 was statistically reliable, an ANOVA examined the 
effects of trial type (expected vs. violation), trial order (first pair vs. second pair), and 
Experiment (Avoidance condition of Experiment 1 vs. Experiment 3) on looking times during 
the test trials. This analysis revealed a significant interaction of trial type and condition, F(1, 29) 
= 14.45, p = .001, and no other significant main effects or interactions. The interaction reflected 
the fact that infants looked longer at the unexpected test trials only in Experiment 3, the reverse 
pattern compared with the Avoidance condition of Experiment 1 (see Figure 2.2). 
2.4.3. Discussion 
In Experiment 3 infants looked reliably longer when an object rose and jiggled if that 
particular object had repeatedly failed to do so on previous trials, compared to when a novel 
object moved. Thus, infants were able to notice that the fixed object was always still and 
expected it to continue being still. This finding constrains our interpretation of Experiment 1, in 
which infants were not surprised to see a hand lift and jiggle an object when, previously, that 
object had never moved. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
2nd pair comparison is between the first expected and the second violation test trial. And the comparison over the 
averages of violation and expected trials would take the average of the first and second members of these pairs. 
Analyzing the data of Experiment 3 this way, there is a significant difference between the averages of the two 
expected trials, on the one hand, and the two unexpected trials, on the other: t(15)=2.62, p=0.02. 
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Many experiments show that even young infants may take the capacity for self-generated 
motion as evidence that an entity is a dispositional causal agent, whereas evidence that an entity 
moves only upon contact leads to its categorization as dispositionally inert (e.g., Luo & 
Baillargeon, 2005; Saxe, Tenenbaum, & Carey, 2005; Saxe, Tzelnic, & Carey, 2007; Muentener 
& Carey, 2010; Luo, Kaufman & Baillargeon, 2009). That is, both of the categories dispositional 
causal agent and inert object are available to infants, and both have inferential consequences in 
predictions about future events that involve that type of entity. Thus, it seems possible that the 
intermittent self-generated movement of each variable object provided a sufficient cue to it 
falling in the IRUPHUFDWHJRU\ZKLOHWKHVWLOOREMHFWZDVPRUHVDOLHQWO\LQHUWE\FRQWUDVW,QIDQWV¶
surprise at the violation trial of this experiment may be due to an object that they thought was 
inert moving on its own for the first time, effectively revealing itself to be a causal agent. 
Nevertheless, in order to make such an inference, infants must have attended to the fixed object 
DQGUHSUHVHQWHGLWVLQHUWQHVV7KXVLQIDQWV¶IDLOXUHLQWKH$YRLGDQFHFRQGLWLRQRI([SHULPHQWV
and 2 cannot reflect a complete inability to process information about persistent inertness, given 
LQIDQWV¶VXFFHVVLQ([SHULPHQW1RUFDQLWUHIOHFWDQLQDELOLW\WRDWWHQGWRWKHQRQ-moving fixed 
REMHFWGXULQJKDELWXDWLRQQRUWKHLUUHSUHVHQWLQJWKHVHVLWXDWLRQVDV³DGLIIHUHQWREMHFWPRYHV 
HYHU\WLPH´QRUGLVFRXQWLQJWKHIL[HGREMHFWDVDIIL[HGWRWKHSODQNDQGWKHUHE\LUUHOHYDQWQRU
an inability to entertain two simultaneous representations ± both of what is dangling and what is, 
by contrast, still. All these would have predicted a failuUHRQ([SHULPHQW5DWKHULQIDQWV¶
failure in the Avoidance condition of Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 may reflect a more narrow 
processing bias or constraint, specific to the domain of interpreting goal-directed behavior and 
DJHQW¶VSRVLWLYHRUQHJDWLYH dispositions toward objects. 
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,WLVSRVVLEOHWKDWDKDQG¶VSLFNLQJXSDQREMHFWDQGVKDNLQJLWLVDPRUHSRZHUIXO
DWWHQWLRQDOGUDZWKDQLVWKDWREMHFW¶VPRYLQJE\LWVHOIVXFKWKDWWKHIDLOXUHWRGLVKDELWXDWHLQWKH
avoidance condition does reflect a failure to attend to the stationary object after all, in spite of 
LQIDQWV¶DWWHQGLQJWRWKLVREMHFWLQ([SHULPHQW6HYHUDOFRQVLGHUDWLRQVVSHDNDJDLQVWWKLV
explanation. Previous research shows that the standard reaching paradigm only works when the 
hand reacKHVLQDJRDOGLUHFWHGPDQQHUQRWLQD³IORS´VXJJHVWLQJWKDWDWWHQWLRQDOELDVHV
WRZDUGVKDQGVRUUHDFKLQJWKLQJVJHQHUDOO\FDQQRWDFFRXQWIRULQIDQWV¶VXFFHVVHV:RRGZDUG
1999). Additionally, infants had ample opportunity to attend to the avoided object in the 
Avoidance condition: it was present on-stage for the full duration of the experiment (including 
between trials, when no hands were present), it was never occluded from view, and it was 
shuttled across the stage between each trail. Finally, overall looking was greater in Experiment 3 
than in the Avoidance condition of Experiment 1, suggesting that various objects moving on 
their own are a powerful attentional draw. We do not deny, of course, that the reaching and 
grasping hand in Experiments 1 and 2 is the relevant difference between these experiments and 
Experiment 3, for this is what sets up the context for representations of approach and avoidance, 
and positive or negative dispositions towards objects. 
2.5. General Discussion 
Experiment 1 demonstrates that 7-month-old infants expect consistency in the approach 
behavior of a goal-GLUHFWHGKDQGEXWQRWLQDKDQG¶VDYRLGDQFHEHKDYLRU,IDQREMHFWKDVEHHQ
consistently approached in favor of diverse others, infants expect the hand to continue to 
approach that object. In contrast, if an object has been consistently avoided in favor of diverse 
others infants do not predict that the agent will continue to avoid that object. Experiment 2 shows 
that this failure to generalize across instances of avoidance extends at least until 14 months. 
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Experiment 3 shows that if the objects move on their own instead of being picked up by a hand, 
7-month-olds do expect an object that has never moved to continue being still, thereby 
controlling for a number of low level alternative explanations. These findings allow us to specify 
PRUHSUHFLVHO\WKHFRQWHQWVRILQIDQWV¶HDUO\UHSUHVHQWDWLRQVRIRWKHUV¶PHQWDOVWDWHVSDUWLFXODUO\
in the most commonly used paradigm to study early goal attributions and attributions of agents¶
dispositions towards objects. 
2XUUHVXOWVDOVREHDURQDGHEDWHFRQFHUQLQJLQIDQWV¶JRDOUHSUHVHQWDWLRQVWKDWGHULYHV
IURP/XRDQG%DLOODUJHRQ¶VILQGLQJWKDWLI there is only one object present during 
habituation, infants do not expect the agent to continue approaching that object during a 
subsequent test event in which there is a choice between it and a second object.  Luo and 
%DLOODUJHRQDUJXHGWKDWLQIDQWV¶H[pectation of a consistent reach is contingent on seeing 
HYLGHQFHRIWKHDJHQW¶VUHODWLYHSUHIHUHQFHVGXULQJKDELWXDWLRQ± for example, that the agent 
specifically prefers the ball to the bear, not just that the agent wants the ball. Further evidence for 
this interpretation derives from the fact that the nature of the foil matters (it must be a different 
basic-level kind from the target of the reach; Spaepen and Spelke, 2007) and the fact that 7- and 
12-month-old infants are sensitive to whether the foil is visible to the reaching agent (Luo and 
Johnson, 2009; Luo and Baillargeon, 2007).  Luo and Baillargeon concluded that infants are 
representing a preference between two particular objects. 
+RZHYHULQIDQWV¶VXFFHVVRQWKH$SSURDFKFRQGLWLRQRI([SHULPHQWsupports 
%DLOODUJHRQ¶VDQGKHUFROOHDJXHV¶UHYLVLRQRIWKLVK\SRWKHVLV%DLOODUJHRQHWDO,QWKH
violation test trials of the Approach condition, infants expected an agent to continue reaching for 
a ball over a brush (for instance), even though the brush had never appeared before and there was 
WKHUHIRUHQRHYLGHQFHRIWKHDJHQW¶VSUHIHUHQFHEHWZHHQWKHVHWZRVSHFLILFREMHFWV7KLVVKRZV
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WKDWLQIDQWVGRQRWUHTXLUHHYLGHQFHRIWKHDJHQW¶VSUHIHUHQFHRIRQHRXWRIWZRVSHFLILFREMHFWVLQ
order to foUPDQH[SHFWDWLRQDERXWWKHDJHQW¶VIXWXUHUHDFKHVWRZDUGVHLWKHUREMHFW,ILQIDQWVGR
UHSUHVHQWWKHDJHQW¶VSUHIHUHQFHEHWZHHQWKHWZRREMHFWVLWLVDJHQHUDOL]HGSUHIHUHQFHRIWKH
form the agent prefers X to other things rather than the agent prefers X to Y. Alternatively and 
perhaps most simply, as Baillargeon et al (2014) now argue, infants can infer that the agent has a 
general positive disposition towards the object ± a representation that the agent likes X, though in 
some contexts an alternative chRLFHRUDQRWKHUFXHWRWKHDJHQW¶VGLVSRVLWLRQLVQHHGHGWRVXSSRUW
this inference. Other recent results converge on this interpretation. Robson and Kuhlmeier (2013) 
found that infants who are habituated to a reach for X over Y ± but not to a reach for X when 
presented alone ± will dishabituate to a reach for a novel object Z over X, again suggesting that 
their expectation of continued reaching for X does not depend solely upon a representation of a 
preference of X over Y. 
The news from the present results is the failure of both 7-month-old and 14-month-old 
infants to distinguish between violation and expected events in the test trials of the avoidance 
displays. This failure does not show that infants of these ages are incapable of encoding 
avoidances, or, alternatively, of attributing negative dispositions toward objects. Whether or not 
there exist other mechanisms that process avoidance, it is at least the case that avoidance is not 
spontaneously computed by the specific mechanism responsible for attributinJJRDOVRUDJHQWV¶
dispositions toward objects given consistent reaches to one object over another. This is the case 
even when the amount of information available to compute avoidance is strictly equated with the 
amount of information available to compute approach.  
There are two possible biases, which are not mutually exclusive, that might explain 
LQIDQWV¶IDLOXUH7KHILUVWLVDELDVRSHUDWLQJRQUHSUHVHQWDWLRQDOLQSXWV7KLVPHFKDQLVPLQIHUV
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JRDOVEDVHGRQWKHUHSUHVHQWDWLRQDOLQSXW³approaches object´ as compared with the input 
³avoids object´$OWKRXJKE\SUHVHQWLQJH[DFWO\WZRREMHFWVRQHDFKWULDORXUVWXG\ZDV
designed to equate the statistics relevant to computations of approach and avoidance, these 
constraints rarely apply in natural settings.  Typically, a hand reaching for a ball clearly means to 
grab the ball, while a hand reaching away from a bear (and for the ball) might not have any 
particular designs concerning the bear at all; it might simply want the ball. More generally, the 
number of actions an agent is performing at any given time is dwarfed by the number of actions 
that agent is not performing, and trying to compute for each non-action whether it is goal-
directed is neither computationally plausible nor a good way of figuring out what the agent is 
likely to do next.  Thus, it is plausible that there is a bias to attend selectively to approaches 
when encoding goals.  The second possibility is a bias operating on representational outputs: 
This mechanism preferentially infers mental stateVRIWKHW\SH³wants or likes object´³has the 
goal to touch the object´DVFRPSDUHGZLWKWKHW\SHV³GRHVQ¶WZDQWRUGRHVQ¶WOLNHREMHFW´RU
³has the goal to avoid the object´ 
In either case, the question arises how adults are able to represent avoidance goals. In 
order to verify that adults possess this competency and will spontaneously deploy it in our 
experimental design, we randomly assigned 16 adults to watch videos of either the Approach or 
Avoidance conditions, where the length and number of habituation trials matched the means 
from the respective conditions in the infant-directed paradigm in Experiment 1. Pausing the 
video at the end of the habituation trials, we asked adults to say what is happening in the video 
and to predict what would happen next. Although answers on the first question were generally 
under-LQIRUPDWLYHHJ³$KDQGUHDFKHVRXWDQGJUDEVRQHRIWKHREMHFWV7KHREMHFWVJHW
UHSODFHG´LQDQVZHUWRWKHVHFRQGTXHVWLRQHYHU\SDUWLFLSDQWLQERWKFRQGLWLRQVGHVFULEHGWKH
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KDQG¶VSDWWern correctly and predicted that the hand would continue its pattern once the video 
resumed. Following these two prompts, adults saw a violation trial and were asked if this trial 
was what they expected. Again, every participant but one expressed surprise at the violation, 
VD\LQJWKDWIRUH[DPSOHWKHKDQGZDV³JRLQJQXWV´³EUHDNLQJZLWKWUDGLWLRQ´RU³XQGHUPLQLQJ´
LWVSDWWHUQLQDZD\WKDWZDV³VKRFNLQJ´7KHRQHGLVVHQWLQJSDUWLFLSDQWZKRZDWFKHGWKH
Approach condition, had previously predicted that the hand would continue grabbing the same 
REMHFWEXWVDLGKHKDG³KRSHG´LWZRXOGJUDEWKHRWKHURQHQH[W³MXVWWRFKDQJHWKLQJVXS´7KLV
SDUWLFLSDQWVDLGKHZDVQRWVXUSULVHGZKHQWKHKDQGYLRODWHGLWVSDWWHUQEHFDXVHKHZDV³KRSLQJ
WKDWZRXOGKDSSHQ´Out of the eight adults who saw the Avoidance habituation display, six used 
some form of verbal negation to justify their prediction of what would happen next (e.g. the hand 
JUDEEHGWKHQHZWR\³DQGQRW´WKHROGRQH³QHYHU´WRXFKHGWKHROGREMHFW³KDGQ¶W´WRXFKHGLW
RU³ZDVQ¶W´WRXFKLQJLW7KHUHPDLQLQJWZRGHVFULEHGWKHKDQGDV³DYRLGLQJ´WKHREMHFW 
Perhaps the most significant resource available to adults is a facility with a combinatorial 
system of thought. This system can access the logical concept NOT, and can represent the 
avoidance condition as a series of events of the same kind ± reaches for NOT the ball.  However, 
WKHFRQFHSWXDOEDVLVRIDGXOW¶VFRPSHWHQFHLQUHDVRQLQJDERXWDYRLGDQFHUHPDLQVDQLPSRUWDQW
topic for future research, as does the developmental process by which this competence is 
acquired. As a next step, it will be important for future work to determine the age at which 
infants or toddlers begin to succeed in representing avoidance from the same kind of information 
they use to represent approach. 
The failure of infants to note the violation in the Avoidance display shows not only that 
the sequence of consistent non-UHDFKHVLQWKH$YRLGDQFHFRQGLWLRQGRHVQ¶WVSRQWDQHRXVO\WULJJHU
an avoid representation, but also that the approach representations that they do generate do not 
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spontaneously enter into a domain-JHQHUDOFRPSXWDWLRQZLWKDQHJDWLRQRSHUDWRU³6KHZDQWV
the ball but not the bear«6KHZDQWVWKHKDWbut not the bear«6KHZDQWVWKHDSSOHbut not the 
EHDU«´, etc.) This account predicts that success on the Avoidance condition of Experiment 1 
would be enabled as children gain facility with truth-functional negation ± the knowledge that if 
some proposition P is true, than its negation, NOT-P is false. Little is known about the 
GHYHORSPHQWDOFRXUVHRIWKLVFDSDFLW\EXWLWGRHVQRWDSSHDULQFKLOGUHQ¶VVSHHFKXQWLODWOHDVW
months or, according to some, much later than that (24 months, Pea, 1982; around 28 months, 
Hummer, Wimmer and Antes, 1993; not until 4-5 years, Kim, 1985; Nordmeyer and Frank, 
2014:KLOHWKHILQGLQJVRILQIDQWV¶VXFFHVVLQ([SHULPHQWPLJKWEHVHHQDVFKDOOHQJLQJWR
this hypothesis, they are far from showing that infants succeed in processing negation or 
attending to consistent non-events broadly. Rather, as we argued above, infants have categories 
of both self-moving dispositional causal agents and inert objects. If infants interpreted the 
variable floating objects as agents, they may have succeeded on Experiment 3 by noticing the 
contrast between these agents and the inert fixed object. Being surprised that what they thought 
was inert suddenly turned out to be an agent does not require use of a negation operator. 
The distinction between approach and avoidance is related to the distinction between 
actions and omissions. The avoidances we presented to infants are a form of omission: The agent 
is not acting on the fixed object. The distinction between actions and omissions has been 
explored in the literature on adults, where it has been shown to influeQFHDGXOWV¶MXGJPHQWVRI
causal responsibility, intent, and blame (Spranca, Minsk, & Baron, 1991; Ritov & Baron, 2010). 
For example, if adults read about Evan who deliberately tips over a bucket of water and Jeff who 
deliberately allows a shaky bucket to tip over on its own, they say that Evan caused and intended 
the water to spill more than Jeff did. (Cushman & Young, 2011).  If they read about Evan who 
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deliberately kills a man and Jeff who deliberately allows a man to die, they say that Evan 
committed a greater moral wrong (e.g., Spranca, et al., 1991). 
Our findings suggest a possible connection between infant cognition and the adult bias to 
draw stronger inferences from representations of actions than from representations of omissions. 
Adults appear to place observed actions into a causal and moral framework spontaneously, but 
require some measure of cognitive control to treat omissions the same way (Cushman, Murray, 
Gordon-0F.HRQ:KDUWRQ	*UHHQH7KLVVXJJHVWVFRQWLQXLW\DFURVVLQIDQWV¶DQGDGXOWV¶
UHSUHVHQWDWLRQVRIHYHQWV,ILQIDQWV¶FDSDFLW\IRUJRDODWWULEXWLRQRSHUDWHVRYHUDFWLRQVPRUH
readily than over omissions ± or if, in the extreme case, the capacity to engage in the controlled 
processing needed to see omissions and avoidances as goal-directed emerges later in 
development ± WKHDGXOW³RPLVVLRQHIIHFW´PLJKWUHIOHFWDQHQGXULQJVLJQDWXUHRIWKHHDUOLHVW-
emerging psychological capacity for intentional attribution. 
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Chapter 3: 
What do you mean, ³No´? <RXQJFKLOGUHQ¶VSURGXFWLRQRIVRPHnegation 
words precedes their understanding of logical negation 
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3.1. Introduction 
One of the most remarkable things about human cognition is the ability to take a finite 
number of concepts and combine them to generate an infinite number of meaningful thoughts. 
An English speaker who has never heard the sentence or entertained the thought, THERE ARE NO 
BEARS ON MARS, has no trouble understanding what it means. Not only can we understand it, we 
are able to judge that it is very likely true and make conclusions on that basis: if there are no 
bears on Mars, that means there are no brown bears there, no bear cubs, no bears climbing 
Martian trees. The ease with which a language user can understand new thoughts, make 
judgments about their truth, and reason through to related thoughts, all have just one plausible 
explanation ± the thinking of complex thoughts is the result of a rule-governed system that 
combines meaningful component units (words, concepts) in systematic ways. 
To understand the meaning of a sentence entails understanding its truth-conditions ± that 
is, under what circumstances it would be true or false (Heim & Kratzer, 1998). And to 
understand the meaning of a sentence containing a negative like, THERE ARE NO BEARS ON MARS 
entails understanding that its truth conditions are the opposite of THERE ARE BEARS ON MARS. 
Negation, as expressed in English by the words ³No´ and ³Not´, is an operation that flips the 
truth value of a sentence ± if an affirmative sentence is false, that sentence negated is true, and 
vice versa. This makes negation a highly abstract function word. Unlike the vast majority of 
content words ± nouns, verbs and adjectives ± it does not refer to anything in the world, or even 
in the mind (like BELIEF or WANT). Its only meaning is in the systematic way in which it alters 
the meanings of the propositions it combines with. Yet despite how abstract the negation 
operator is, there is not a language in the world without a word for it and not a culture that has 
ever been reported to dispense with it in their thought. 
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Taking negation as a case study of abstract, combinatorial concepts, this paper explores 
its developmental origins. We ask whether and how learning the language of negation might be 
involved in acquiring the concept of this truth-functional logical operator ± that is, a mental 
symbol with the conceptual role of the negation operator and the right combinatorial properties 
to meaningfully compose with propositions and other concepts. Do children have a concept of 
truth-functional negation before they learn the words ³No´ and ³Not´, so that learning these 
words is a matter of mapping a label to a preexisting concept? Or does learning the word precede 
learning the concept? If so, is it because children do not have the concept at the time they first 
learn the word, or because mapping the concept to the word is a difficult language-learning 
problem? Does the word perhaps participate in acquiring the concept in some way, for example 
by creating a linguistic placeholder structure upon which increasingly rich and abstract 
representations can later be built (Carey, 2009)? 
To make progress on these questions, we look at two aspects of the linguistic 
development of negation, comparing the developmental courses of the production of the words 
³No´ and ³Not´ to the comprehension of the logical meaning of those words. The idea is to look 
for a gap between the two. If we find that for each word logical comprehension and production 
track together, it would suggest that the child has the concept before the word and that mapping 
the word to the concept is constrained primarily by the input frequency of each word and by their 
different grammatical properties. In this case, as with many other words, comprehension might 
also precede production as children gradually gain certainty that they have made the right 
mapping between word and concept (Goldin-Meadow, Seligman, & Gelman, 1976; Harris, 
Yeeles, Chasin, & Oakley, 1995). 
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The third possibility is that the production of negation words might precede their 
comprehension as logical operators. Although less common than comprehension preceding 
production, this pattern of acquisition has been observed in word learning across a number of 
domains, including color words (Pitchford & Mullen, 2003; Sandhofer & Smith, 1999; Soja, 
1994; Wagner, Dobkins & Barner, 2015), object labels (Ameel, Malt & Storm, 2008), number 
words (Wynn, 1992; Carey, 2009), time words (Tillman & Barner, 2015; Busby Grant & 
Sudendorf, 2011; Shatz, Tare, Nguyen, & Young, 2010), certain theoretical terms, like ALIVE and 
DEAD (Carey, 1985), and emotion words (Widen & Russell, 2003). Whenever production of a 
word precedes comprehension of the meaning it has for adults, there are two classes of 
explanations possible. One is that the child does not yet have the adult-like concept at the time 
when the word is first learned. This is the case in which learning the word could possibly play 
some causal role in the acquisition of the concept. The other possibility is that the adult concept 
is present, but that mapping the word to that concept is itself a hard problem because the 
hypothesis space of possible mappings is initially insufficiently constrained for the child to 
identify the right one (see Snedeker and Gleitman, 2004 for discussion). 
Consistent with the possibility that production of negation words precedes 
comprehension of the truth-functional meaning of negation, longitudinal studies have found that 
when children first begin to produce these words, they appear to use them for a narrower set of 
functions than do adults (Bloom, 1970; Pea, 1980a). Despite the fact that both ³No´ and ³Not´ 
are equally common in their input (at least when a reliable quantitative estimate is available, at 
25 months; see Cameron-Faulkner, Lieven & Theakston, 2007), children begin to produce ³No´ 
much earlier than ³Not´ (Dale & Fenson, 1996; see Fig. 3.1), and the types of meanings they 
express with ³No´ are initially more limited than the meanings used by adults. At first, when 
58 
 
children are producing mostly single-word utterances, they use single-word ³No´ primarily to 
reject prohibitions, imperatives and other forms of parental tyranny. When they begin to combine 
³No´ with other words to form two-word utterances, the primary use of negation shifts to express 
µQRQH[LVWHQFH¶± the often unexpected absence of WKHRWKHUZRUG¶VUHIHUHQWDVZKHQDFKLOG
opens the fridge to look for juice, finds none and says, ³No juice!´ Although estimates vary 
depending on whether one looks at the earliest age, the age of consistent or frequent use, or some 
point in between, it is not until 24-30 months that children systematically use ³No´ to deny the 
WUXWKRIRWKHUV¶XWWHUDQFHV (Bloom, 1970; Pea, 1980b, 1982; Hummer, Wimmer and Antes, 1993; 
Choi, 1988). These are cases when a child points to a dog and says, ³Not bear´, or when a parent 
asks, ³Is this a bear?´ while pointing to a dog and the child answers, ³No´. This latest-emerging 
IXQFWLRQLVFDOOHGµGHQLDO¶ and is most closely associated with truth-functional negation (Pea, 
1982). When children first begin to produce denials, they use both ³No´ ± which had previously 
been used to express nonexistence and rejection ± and also begin to use ³Not´. The emergence of 
³Not´ LQDFKLOG¶VSURGXFWLYHYRFDEXODU\WUDFNVFORVHO\ZLth the emerging production of denial 
negations with either word, although once it begins to be produced, ³Not´ is also used to express 
other functions (Choi, 1988; Cameron-Faulkner, et al., 2007). Given that children begin to 
produce denial negations between 24 and 30 months, why not simply conclude that this is the 
age at which children map the concept of truth-functional negation to both the words ³No´ and 
³Not´? 
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Figure 3.1: Production of the words ³Not´ and ³No´ by age, from the Wordbank database of Macarthur-
%DWHV&',QRUPV&KLOGUHQ¶VDJHLQPRQWKVLVDORQJWKH;-axis, and the percent of children producing the 
words is on the Y-axis. 
 
The problem with data from production alone is that it is impossible to distinguish 
different meanings from different uses. Adults, who understand the truth-functional meaning of 
³No´, can nevertheless use it to reject or signal nonexistence as well as to deny. It is easy enough 
WRSDUDSKUDVHWKHQDUURZHUPHDQLQJVRIµUHMHFWLRQ¶DQGµQRQH[LVWHQFH¶DVIXOO\FRPSRVHG
propositions containing truth-functional negation. A rejection ³No!´ means I DO NOT WANT THIS 
and a nonexistence ³No juice´ means THERE IS NO JUICE IN THE FRIDGE. 3HUKDSVFKLOGUHQ¶V
relatively narrow uses of negation reflect the kinds of speech acts they prefer to make rather than 
the kinds of meanings they have mapped to negation words. Perhaps a young child is in a 
position where she knows little about the world, but is confident about her distaste for bathing, 
and therefore has less occasion to deny a factual claim than to reject the offer of bath time, even 
if she does understand negation to be a truth-functional operator. To address this ambiguity, we 
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turn to H[DPLQHFKLOGUHQ¶VFRPSUHKHQVLRQof negation. If, for young children, negation really 
does not have a truth-functional meaning, they would fail in comprehending sentences where 
negation words invert truth value, even though they might be producing those same words. 
 Though there are fewer studies of the comprehension of negation than of its production, 
those that exist point to the comprehension of truth-functional negation posing a significant 
challenge for children much older even than the age at which they begin to produce denial 
negations. Kim (1985) presented 3-5 year-old children with a puppet that would sometimes 
describe objects correctly and sometimes incorrectly, using both affirmative and negative 
statements. Given a banana, the puppet might say, ³This is a banana´, ³This is not a banana´, 
³This is an apple´, or ³This is not an apple´. Using a truth-value judgment task, Kim asked 
children to judge if the puppet was right or wrong. Children from three to five years old correctly 
MXGJHGWUXHDIILUPDWLYHVHQWHQFHVDVµULJKW¶DQGIDOVHDIILUPDWLYHVDVµZURQJ¶EXWVWUXJJOHGZLWK
both false and true negatives. Children had the most difficulty with true negatives: even five-
year-olds judged them as correct only 62% of the time (see also, Lloyd & Donaldson, 1976; 
Donaldson, 1972). Although it is possible to interpret these failures as reflecting a lack of a 
conceptual understanding of negation, there are several other reasons children might have 
difficulty with this task. The task is metalinguistic, with children having to judge whether a 
statement is right or wrong rather than responding directly on the basis of affirmative or negative 
information. Not only might this kind of judgment pose an added layer of difficulty, it also 
FRPSOLFDWHVWKHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIFKLOGUHQ¶VUHVSRQVHV-XGJPHQWVRIZKHWKHUDVWDWHPHQWLV
µULJKW¶RUµZURQJ¶GHSHQGQRt only on truth value, but also on considerations of pragmatic felicity 
(Pea, 1982; Katsos & Bishop, 2011). Pragmatic felicity poses a particular problem for true 
negative sentences. Saying that a banana is not an apple when no apples had previously been 
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mentioned may be reasonably judged as conversationally inappropriate, even if children know 
that it is, strictly speaking, true. The paper you are reading is not an aardvark, but processing that 
proposition involves considering aardvarks and their possible relation to psychology research 
papers for the first time in this discourse. Using negated statements to introduce novel concepts 
into the discourse out of the blue imposes a processing load on adults (Kaup, Ludtke, & Zwaan, 
2006; Kaup, Yaxley, Madden, Zwaan, & Ludtke, 2006) and may cause failure of ultimate 
comprehension in children, even outside of a metalinguistic truth value judgment task. 
Recently, Nordmeyer and Frank (2014) took a less metalinguistic approach, looking at 
FKLOGUHQ¶VVSRQWDQHRXVH\HPRYements as they were presented with two pictures ± a boy with 
apples and a boy with nothing (or, in a different condition, a boy with gifts). They asked children 
between the ages of two and four to ³Oook at the boy who has no apples´. All children started out 
by looking at the boy with apples. While older children eventually recovered to look at the right 
boy (at above-chance levels in one of the conditions, if still not perfectly) two-year-olds never 
looked away from the boy with apples. On the one hand, this too is consistent with an inability to 
understand truth-functional negation at age two. On the other, it is also consistent with an 
imperfect sentence processor that considers the predicate BOY WHO HAS APPLES, finds its referent, 
and gets stuck there. As Nordmeyer and Frank point out, it would be surprising if kids all 
through the third year of life truly failed to understand logical negation, given that these children 
SURGXFHµGHQLDO¶QHJDWLRQVFRQVLVWHQWO\+XPPHUHWDO Pea, 1980a, 1982). 
)LQDOO\MXVWRQHUHFHQWVWXG\RIFKLOGUHQ¶VFRPSUHKHQVLRQILQGVVXFFHVVDWDQDJHPRUH
consistent with their production of denial negations. Austin, Theakston, Lieven, & Tomasello 
(2014) get around the limitations of previous paradigms by presenting children with a 
pragmatically supportive context where both the negative and affirmative statements they hear 
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are made plausible by the preceding discourse. Children play a game in which they have to find a 
ball that an experimenter has hidden in either a bucket or a house. A second experimenter asks 
one of two questions ± ³Is it in the house?´ or ³Is it in the bucket?´ ± and the first experimenter 
DQVZHUVGLIIHUHQWO\DFURVVWKUHHGLIIHUHQWFRQGLWLRQV,QDµVLQJOHZRUG¶FRQGLWLRQWKH
experimenter says simply ³Yes´ or ³No´LQDµVHQWHQFH¶FRQGLWLRQWKHH[SHULPHQWHUVD\V³,W¶V
in the [bucket/house]´ or ³,W¶VQRWLQWKH>EXFNHWKRXVH@´DQGLQDµJHVWXUH¶FRQGLWLRQWKH
experimenter either nods to indicate an affirmative or shakes their head for a negative. Austin, et 
al. find earlier success with the comprehension of negation than previous studies, with 24-month-
olds basing their search on negative verbal information, and 29-month-olds doing so even more 
reliably  ± that is, looking in the correct location when given either the single-word clue, ³No´, 
or the sentence clue, ³,W¶VQRWLQWKHEXFNHW´7KLVDJHRIVXFFHVVWUDFNVFORVHO\ZLWKFKLOGUHQ¶s 
emerging production of the word ³Not´ (Bloom, 1970; Pea, 1980b, 1982; Choi, 1988; Hummer, 
et al., 1993), suggesting that the production of denial negations does reflect an emerging concept 
of truth-functional negation. 
In the search for a gap between the production of negation words and their 
comprehension as logical operators, the findings of Austin, et al. (2014) provide a tentative 
answer. They find that children begin to comprehend ³No´ and ³Not´ as logical operators at the 
same time, and that this happens at the same age range at which children typically begin to 
produce ³Not´ and to use both ³No´ and ³Not´ to deny. This indicates a large production-
comprehension gap for ³No´, and no gap for ³Not´. +RZHYHUVRPHDVSHFWVRI$XVWLQHWDO¶V
data give pause to this conclusion. To negate a proposition, one must be able to represent the 
content of the un-negated proposition and combine it with the negation operator. The negative 
sentences used in Austin, et al. are the negated counterparts of their affirmatives. It is therefore 
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surprising that, while the children they tested performed significantly better than chance with 
negative clues containing both ³No´ and ³Not´ at 24 months, both 24- and  28-month-olds did 
no better than chance when given whole-sentence affirmative clues (e.g. ³,W¶VLQWKHEXFNHW´). 
This pattern of results is even more surprising in the context of rich evidence of younger 
FKLOGUHQ¶VUREXVWXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIDIILUPDWLYHVHQWHQFHVDFURVV a variety of other paradigms 
(Kim, 1985; Hummer, et al., 1993, Pea, 1980b; 1982). 
7KDWWKHILQGLQJVRI$XVWLQHWDOXQGHUHVWLPDWHFKLOGUHQ¶VFRPSUHKHQVLRQRIDIILUPDWLYHV
raises the possibility that they also underestimate their success with negatives. It is therefore 
important to provide converging evidence for the age at which children understand the negation 
words ³1R´ and ³Not´, ideally in a task where children respond successfully to affirmative 
VWDWHPHQWVDVZHOO,Q$XVWLQHWDO¶VSDUDGLJPDIILrmative and negative trials alternate. This 
may cause interference from one trial type to the other. To facilitate success on affirmative ± and 
possibly also negative ± WULDOVZHXVHDEORFNHGGHVLJQ,QFDVHFKLOGUHQ¶VDELOLW\WRXVHHLWKHU
type of information is obscured by their perseveration from one type of trial to another, a blocked 
design may reveal a latent competence, even if only on the first block. We also go beyond 
identifying an average age of success in the comprehension of truth-functional negation and 
relating it to an average age of production that is based on population norms. By collecting 
productive vocabulary measures for each child we test, we can directly relate comprehension 
VXFFHVVWRHDFKFKLOG¶VGHYHORSLQJSURGXFWLRQRIWKHZRUGV ³No´ and ³Not´. 
If children have the logical concept before they learn these words and mapping the words 
to the concept has to do with getting sufficient exposure to each word, there should be no gap 
between production and comprehension for either word and no relationship between the 
acquisition of the two words to each other. In this case, children should begin to comprehend the 
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truth-functional meaning of ³No´ much earlier than of ³Not´, since they produce ³No´ nearly a 
year earlier (see Fig. 3.1). If children successfully comprehend logical ³No´ and ³Not´ at the 
same time ± which, since ³No´ is produced earlier, would translate to a larger comprehension-
production gap for ³No´ and a small or no gap for ³Not´ ± it would suggest a single limiting 
factor for the logical comprehension of both ³No´ and ³Not´. There are several possibilities for 
what that could be. It may be the concept of truth-functional negation, with acquisition of that 
concept enabling a relatively problem-free mapping for both ³No´ and ³Not´. It could also be 
that mapping the words ³No´ and ³Not´ to a logical concept requires knowing enough language 
± knowing the syntactic roles of words and how they combine along with the syntactic properties 
of the negative particle, as well as knowing the meanings of a sufficient number of content 
words. When ³No´ or ³Not´ are heard in a sentence, the meaning of the sentence must be parsed 
enough to identify that these words serve to change the truth-value of the proposition constructed 
from the other words. It is hard to understand what role ³No´ is playing in ³There are no bears 
on Mars´ until one knows what ³bear´ and ³Mars´ mean and how to combine them. 
 In Experiments 1 and 2, like Austin, et al., ZHWHVWFKLOGUHQ¶VFRPSUHKHQVLRQRI³Not´ as 
a logical operator in the context of a hiding game. A ball is hidden in one of two containers: a 
truck or a bucket. Children are given verbal information about where the ball is hidden, either in 
an affirmative form ± ³,W¶VLQWKHEXFNHW´; ³,W¶VLQWKH truck´ ± or with a negative ± ³,W¶VQRWLQ
the bucket´; ³,W¶VQRWLQWKHWUXFN´. ,Q([SHULPHQWZHWHVWFKLOGUHQ¶VFRPSUHKHQVLRQRIWKH
logical meaning of the word ³No´. In Experiment 4 we control for a plausible deflationary 
account: that the increasing comprehension success for ³No´ and ³Not´ reflects increasing 
inhibitory control, necessary for inhibiting a tendency to go to the container that had been 
named. 
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3.2. Experiment 1: Comprehending ³Not´ 
3.2.1. Method 
3.2.1.1. Participants 
The participants were recruited in separate age groups, with 22 20-month-olds (mean age 
20.7, range: 19.2-22.0, 11 boys), 24 24-month-olds (mean 23.8, range: 22.1-25.6, 10 boys) and 
26 27-month-olds (mean 27.0, range: 26.1-28.0, 11 boys). All participants were monolingual 
English speaking children, receiving less than ten hours per week of input in any other language. 
Thirty-VL[SDUWLFLSDQWVZHUHUHFUXLWHGDWWKH%RVWRQ&KLOGUHQ¶V0XVHXPDQGSDUWLFLSDWHGGXULQJ
their visit. The remaining participants were recruited by phone and email from the greater Boston 
area and were tested at the Laboratory for Developmental Studies at Harvard University. 
3DUWLFLSDQWVIURPWKH%RVWRQ&KLOGUHQ¶V0XVHXPZHUHJLYHQDVWLFNHUIRUSDUWLFLSDWLQJ
Participants tested at the Laboratory for Developmental Studies were given a small gift, and their 
parents were compensated $5.00 for travel expenses. An additional 19 children (seven 20-month-
olds; three 24-month-olds; nine 27-month-olds) were excluded from analysis: nine (three 20-
month-olds; no 24-month-olds; six 27-month-olds) for searching in the wrong location on any of 
the practice trials (see Sec. 3.2.2. below for discussion of this criterion), six (two 20-month-olds; 
three 24-month-olds; and one 27-month-old) for failure to complete the study, and four (two 20-
month-olds; no 24-month-olds; two 27-month-olds) for searching in the same container on every 
trial (i.e. side bias). 
3.2.1.2. Materials 
The stimuli consisted of a small 2.5 ? tall table, one bright green opaque bucket, one red-
and-yellow toy dump truck, a small yellow ball, and a wide black cardboard occluder. Both of 
the containers, the bucket and the truck, were lined with felt to ensure that the ball would not 
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make a sound when placed inside. These two containers were chosen because ³Bucket´ and 
³Truck´ are the earliest known nouns that could readily name containers for the ball (Dale & 
Fenson, 1996). A µMLQJOHER[¶ was used as a reward activity for successfully finding the ball ± the 
child inserted a ball into an opening on one end, which would roll down a xylophone hidden 
inside the box, making a sound, and come out the other end. 
We also collected productive vocabulary data using the Macarthur Bates CDI short form 
(Fenson, Pethick, Renda, Cox, Dale, & Reznick, 2000). We modified this form to include the 
additional words, ³Not´, ³Bucket´, and ³Truck´. Parents were instructed to indicate the words 
that their children produced, and completed this form before the start of the experiment. 
3.2.1.3 Procedure 
We created four lists, which counterbalanced the following variables across participants: 
the container used for the first practice trial (bucket or truck); which side of the table the bucket 
and the truck were on; and whether the first correct response would be the bucket or the truck. 
Within participants, the order of experimental trials was always A-B-B-A-A-B-B-A where A and 
B indicate where the ball was hidden (either the bucket or the truck). The first block of A-B-B-A 
trials had all negative trials and the second was all affirmative. Since we were interested in the 
earliest age of success on negative trials and reasoned that doing affirmative trials first may 
cause children to perseverate onto negative trials, hurting their performance on the latter, we did 
not counterbalance block order in this experiment (see Experiment 2). 
The experimenter stood behind the table and the child sat in their SDUHQW¶VODSRQWKH
floor, 5 feet in front of the table. The table was tall enough that the child could not see into the 
bucket or truck when they were placed on the table, though they could reach up and touch either 
container. The experimenter introduced the game to the child as follows: ³:H¶UHJRLQJWRSOD\D
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IXQKLGLQJJDPH,¶PJRLQJWRKLGHWKLVEDOODQG\RX¶UHJRLQJWRILQGLW:KHQ\RXIind the ball, 
you get to put it in the jingle box!´ The experimenter then demonstrated how the jingle box 
worked. Then the experimenter hid the ball on three practice trials and eight experimental trials. 
On every trial, after giving the child the clue, the experimenter invited the child to search by 
saying, ³Can you find it? Can you find the ball?´ Parents were instructed to encourage the child 
to find the ball if the child was shy, but without naming or pointing to either container. They 
were also instructed to release the child to search only once the experimenter asked the child to 
find the ball. 
3.2.1.3.1. Practice Trials  
Three practice trials were used to introduce the game. The first practice trial was meant to 
familiarize children with the occlusion of the containers. In this trial, the experimenter placed 
only one container on the table: either the bucket or the truck, counterbalanced across subjects. 
The experimenter then placed the occluder in front of the container and hid the ball. Finally, the 
experimenter removed the occluder and gave an affirmative clue (e.g., ³,W¶VLQWKHWUXFN´). The 
second and third practice trials were meant to get the child used to making a choice between the 
two containers, given both an affirmative and a negative clue. In both the second and third 
practice trials, the experimenter placed both the bucket and truck on the table, in the same 
positions that would later be used for the test trials. For these two trials, the experimenter hid the 
ball without using the occluder, so that the child could see where the ball was hidden. In the 
second practice trial, the experimenter always hid the ball in the other container than the first 
practice trial and gave an affirmative clue (e.g., ³,W¶VLQWKHEXFNHW´). In the third practice trial, 
the experimenter always hid the ball in the same container as the second practice trial, but gave a 
negative clue (e.g. ³,W¶VQRWLQWKHWUXFN´).  On each practice trial, if a child answered incorrectly 
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or refused to search, the same trial would be repeated and children would be given a second try. 
If children failed the second try, the trial would not be repeated again. 
3.2.1.3.2. Test Trials  
Eight test trials followed the practice trials. The bucket and the truck stayed on the same 
sides of the table as in the second and third practice trials. On each test trial, the experimenter 
placed the occluder at the front of the table so that the bucket and truck were no longer visible to 
the child. The experimenter held up the ball with both hands and said, ³5HDG\":DWFKZKHUHLW¶V
going!´ The experimenter then brought the ball straight down behind the occluder. While 
looking down at the center of the table, she separated her hands behind the occluder and gently 
placed the ball in either the bucket or truck. The experimenter touched the bottoms of both 
containers when placing the ball, to equate any noise resulting from the placement of the ball 
between the two containers.  
)RUWKHILUVWIRXUWHVWWULDOVµnegative WULDOV¶WKHH[SHULPHQWHUWROGWKHFKLOGZKHUe the 
ball was not, by saying, ³,W¶VQRWLQWKH>EXFNHWWUXFN@´. )RUWKHODVWIRXUWHVWWULDOVµaffirmative 
WULDOV¶WKHH[SHULPHQWHUWROGWKHFKild the location of the ball by saying, ³,W¶VLQWKH
[bucket/truck]´. After each clue, the experimenter invited the child to find the ball by saying, 
³Can you find it? Can you find the ball?´ The experimenter gave affirmative and negative clues 
with the same friendly prosody, always looking directly at the child, and gave no additional clues 
through body language. 
7KHFKLOG¶VFKRLFHZDVWDNHQWREHWKHILUVWREMHFWthey touched or pointed to. If the child 
did not touch either the bucket or truck (for example, if they stood in front of a container but 
never touched it or pointed to it), the trial was excluded. If the child correctly found the ball, 
he/she got to place it in the jingle box before the next trial. If the child chose the wrong 
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container, they were shown that the container was empty and told, ³,W¶VQRWLQWKHUH´. They were 
then shown that the ball was in the other container and told, ³Look! There it is!´ They were not 
given the ball or allowed to put it in the jinglebox, but were LQVWUXFWHGWRJREDFNWRWKHLUSDUHQW¶V
lap and try again. This was meant to encourage the child to try and get it right on the first try. 
3.2.2. Results 
&KLOGUHQ¶VFKRLFHRIWKHEXFNHWRUWKHWUXFNZDVUHFRUGHGGXULQJWKHVWXG\E\WKH
experimenter. Individual trials were excluded for several reasons. Across all age groups, 17 trials 
were excluded because the child did not make a clear response (e.g. failed to approach the table, 
stood in front of the bucket or the truck but did not touch them or indicate a preference, etc.) One 
additional trial was excluded because the parent gave away the answer before the child searched. 
)RUDOOQRQSDUDPHWULFDQDO\VHVFRPSDULQJDJHJURXSVEHORZFKLOGUHQ¶VSHUIRUPDQFHRQ
affirmative and negative trials was transformed into percentages by dividing the number of trials 
on which they chose the correct container by the total number of trials of each type (affirmative 
and negative), after these exclusions. For the logistic regression models, excluded trials were 
simply treated as missing data points.15 
Before turning to the analysis of the data, a word about the exclusion criteria used in this 
experiment. In principle, we want to include only those children who understood the hiding game 
and were trying to find the ball. To avoid the problem of filtering on the same dependent variable 
as the one being analyzed (see Vul & Kanwisher, 2010), we chose not to exclude any children on 
the basis of their performance on the eight test trials for any reason other than a 100% side bias. 
InsWHDGZHWRRNFKLOGUHQ¶VSHUIRUPDQFHRQWKHWKUHHSUDFWLFHWULDOVDVLQGLFDWLYHRIWKHLU
                                                          
15
 Unlike Austin, et al. (2014), we do not apply a Bonferroni correction to our results. Each test we perform is 
theoretical motivated, and given that we expect performance to improve with age, none of the tests are truly 
independent of each other. Therefore, it is not clear that the probability of a false positive across multiple tests is 
multiplicative and that a correction is appropriate. 
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understanding of the game. If children understand that their job is to find the ball, they should at 
least search correctly when they see exactly where the ball has been placed, as they do in all 
three practice trials. 
 Nevertheless, there is no single correct exclusion criterion to apply to the practice trials. 
Children got two tries on practice trials. Many children were too shy to search on the first try of 
one or more practice trials. Some children searched in the wrong container on their first try but 
then searched correctly on the second try ± were these children coming to an understanding of 
the task, or simply trying all the containers? What if they got the next practice trial right from the 
first try, or, conversely if they got it wrong? It is easy to over-interpret any pattern of choices on 
three practice trials. Since any exclusion criterion involves some degree of arbitrariness, we 
analyzed the data using three different, plausible criteria. 
We report one consistent exclusion criterion for all experiments in the main analysis 
below. This criterion excludes any child who searched in the wrong container on any of the 
practice trials, even on their first try, but does not exclude children who were too shy to search 
and therefore required multiple tries to make a choice. In this experiment, we analyzed all of the 
results with two additional exclusion criteria: excluding children who on the first try of more 
than one practice trial either searched incorrectly or were too shy, and not excluding anyone 
based on practice trial performance at all. Both of these criteria excluded fewer children. 
However, we found that while the coefficients in regression models and the values of test 
statistics changed slightly depending on the choice of the exclusion criterion, no test of 
significance moved across the threshold of p=0.05 in either direction. However, in the other 
experiments reported below, the choice of exclusion criterion does have some impact on the 
results involving block order (see Sec 3.2.4. and 4.2.1.4.). 
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3.2.2.1. Performance by age group 
Figure 3.VKRZVFKLOGUHQ¶VSHUIRUPDQFHLQ([SHULPHQWE\DJHJURXS7RLGHQWLI\WKH
age at which children successfully begin to comprehend the truth-functional meaning of the word 
³Not´ZHFRPSDUHGSHUIRUPDQFHZLWKLQHDFKDJHJURXSWRFKDQFH&KLOGUHQ¶VFKRLFHVLQ
response to affirmative and negative clues were analyzed separately, using a Mann-Whitney test 
relative to a chance baseline of 50% correct responding.16 On negative trials, 20-month-olds 
chose the correct container significantly below chance (W=24, 0.02), 24-month-olds performed 
at chance levels (W=114, p=0.21), and 27-month-olds were significantly above chance 
(W=106.5, p=0.005). On affirmative trials, 20-month-olds were marginally better than chance 
(W=100.5, p=0.09), while 24-month-olds (W=170, p=0.0001) and 27-month-olds (W=184, 
p=0.0002) were highly significantly better (see Fig. 3.2). Coding 20-month-ROGV¶FKRLFHVWR look 
at performance relative to the mentioned container rather than the correct choice, we find no 
GLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQFKLOGUHQ¶VFKRLFHVRQDIILUPDWLYHDQGQHJDWLYHWULDOV: p=0.83). Thus, 
20-month-olds chose the bucket equally often whether they heard, ³,W¶VQRWLQWKHEXFNHW´ or, 
³,W¶VLQWKHEXFNHW´. 
3.2.2.2. Improvement with age 
2QERWKW\SHVRIWULDOVFKLOGUHQ¶VSHUIRUPDQFHLPSURYHGZLWKDJH$.UXVNDO-Wallis test 
revealed significant differences in the rates of correct responding between the three age groups 
RQDIILUPDWLYHȤ2=12.11, p DQGQHJDWLYHȤ2=14.29, p=0.0008) trials. According to a 
Mann-Whitney test, comparing age groups on both types of responses, the youngest age group of 
                                                          
16
 Not counting those children for whom one or more trials were excluded, children could have only gotten 0, 1, 2, 3 
or 4 trials correct, in each trial type. This does not allow for a normal distribution of responses, particularly as older 
children were nearer to ceiling and younger children nearer to floor. In contrast to Austin, et al. (2014), we therefore 
report only more conservative nonparametric tests for overall group comparisons, and logistic regressions with a 
binary outcome on each trial (1 for successful search and 0 for failure) for looking at continuous predictors (see 
below). 
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20-month-olds had significantly lower rates of correct responding on both affirmative (W=155.5, 
p=0.01) and negative (W=142, p=0.006) trials relative to the middle age group of 24-month-olds. 
However, the 24-month-olds did not significantly differ from the 27-month-olds on either 
affirmative (W=204, p=0.34) or negative (W=172.5, p=0.1) trials.  
 
Fig. 3.&KLOGUHQ¶VSHUIRUPDQFHRQDIILUPDWLYHDQGQHJDWLYHWULDOVEURNHQGRZQE\DJHJURXS
experiment, and block order. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. A) Experiment 1, 
comprehension of logical ³Not´ with negative trials first; B) Experiment 2, comprehension of logical 
³Not´ with affirmative trials first; C) Experiment 3, comprehension of logical ³No´ with negative trials 
first; D) Experiment 3, comprehension of logical ³No´ with affirmative trials first 
 
:HDOVRORRNDWFKLOGUHQ¶VLPSURYLQJSHUIRUPDQFHZLWKDJHWUHDWLQJDJHDVDFRQWLQXRXV
YDULDEOH7DNLQJHDFKSDUWLFLSDQW¶VH[DFWDJHFRQYHUWLQJGD\VWRIUDFWLRQVRI-day months), we 
fit a series of logistic mixed-effect models with grand-mean centered Age as a fixed effect and a 
random effect of subject with random intercept. Although we are interested in responses to 
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negative and affirmative trials separately, fitting a model that includes Trial Type as a fixed 
effect and including data from both types of trials allows us to fully account for between-subject 
variance by providing more data for the random effect of subject than would fitting a separate 
models for each Trial Type. To look at performance on negative and affirmative trials separately, 
we run the model twice, dummy coding either the affirmative or the negative Trial Type as the 
reference level. 
For this and all subsequent experiments, we first fit a model with a three-way interaction 
between the variables of Trial Type (Affirmative or Negative), Trial Order (1-8), and the 
FRQWLQXRXVYDULDEOHRI$JH7KHGHSHQGHQWYDULDEOHLVVXEMHFWV¶ELQDU\VFRUHRQHYHU\WULDORU
0). We included the effect of Trial Order because we were interested in the potential presence of 
practice effects over the course of the experiment, as children became familiar with the task. 
There was no significant effect of Trial Order and no significant interactions with Trial Order, on 
performance in either affirmative or negative trials in any of the experiments. This led us to 
remove this variable from subsequent models, and we do not discuss it further here. 
Subsequent models containing only Trial Type and Age showed a significant simple 
HIIHFWRI$JHRQDIILUPDWLYHWULDOVȕ &,>@z=2.36, p=0.02)17 and a highly 
VLJQLILFDQWVLPSOHHIIHFWRIDJHȕ &,>@z=4.12, p<0.0001) on negative 
WULDOVLQGLFDWLQJFKLOGUHQ¶VLPSURYHPHQWZLWKDJH 
 
 
3.2.2.3. Comprehension performance relative to production of the word ³Not´ 
                                                          
17
 $OOȕFRHIILFients reported are odds ratios of effect size (that is, exponentiated log-odds coefficients taken from the 
output of the mixed effects models). We also report 95% confidence intervals for these estimates of effect size. 
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Using the same logistic mixed-HIIHFWPRGHOLQJDSSURDFKDVDERYHZHORRNDWFKLOGUHQ¶V
performance as a factor of their production of the word ³Not´ (once again, with subject as 
random factor with random intercept), as indicated on the CDI. We find that chLOGUHQ¶V
production of ³Not´ VLJQLILFDQWO\SUHGLFWVWKHLUSHUIRUPDQFHRQQHJDWLYHWULDOVȕ &,
[1.9, 5.7], z=4.29, p<0.0001EXWQRWRQDIILUPDWLYHWULDOVȕ &,>@z=1.3, 
p=0.2). However, it is difficult to separate this effect from the effect of total CDI score. When 
we fit a model that includes both CDI score (range: 0-103) and production of ³Not´ as predictors 
of performance on negative trials, CDI score has a significant LQGHSHQGHQWHIIHFWȕ 
CI [1.02, 1.05], z=5.12, p<0.0001), while there is no independent effect of producing ³Not´. This 
is not surprising, given that the production of ³1RW´ is a binary predictor, with parents indicating 
only whether their child produces it, while the continuous nature of total CDI score makes it 
possible for this variable to predict more powerfully. Given the limited statistical predictive 
SRZHURIDELQDU\YDULDEOHLWLVQHYHUWKHOHVVQRWHZRUWK\WKDWFKLOGUHQ¶VSURGXFWLRQRIWKH word 
³1RW´ is so highly predictive of performance on negative, but not affirmative trials. 
3.2.3. Discussion 
Testing the comprehension of the logical meaning of ³1RW´, we find that 20-month-olds 
perform significantly worse than chance, 24-month-olds are at chance, and 27-month-olds do 
reliably better than chance, with a significant improvement across the entire age range. We find 
WKDWFKLOGUHQ¶VLQFUHDVLQJFRPSUHKHQVLRQRIORJLFal ³1RW´ tracks closely with their production of 
that word (although we cannot, at present, distinguish the independent contributions of the 
increasing production of ³1RW´ from increasing vocabulary and linguistic development more 
broadly). 
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$OWKRXJKFKLOGUHQ¶VSHUIRUPDQFHRQDIILUPDWLYHWULDOVLPSURYHVZLWKDJHDVZHOOHYHQ
the youngest 20-month-old group did marginally better than chance on these trials, indicating 
that they understand the search task and can use the name of the container to guide their search. 
When 20-month-olds hear the negative, ³,W¶VQRWLQWKHEXFNHW´, they are more likely than chance 
to go to the bucket. In fact, they are as likely to go to the bucket in this case as when they hear 
the affirmative clue, ³,W¶VLQWKHEXcket´. This is exactly the pattern of results we would expect if 
children at this age do not know the word ³1RW´ at all ± they treat it as if they had not heard it 
and simply search in the named container. 
In Experiment 1 negative trials always preceded affirmative trials. Although we were 
concerned about children perseverating from affirmative to negative trials, with their 
performance on the latter suffering, it is also possible that hearing affirmative sentences can 
facilitate subsequent processing of similar negative sentences. Since the negative sentences are 
the same as the affirmatives, with a negation inserted, perhaps some of the processing load of 
constructing a sentence with a negation can be alleviated by repeatedly constructing the 
affirmative counterpart first. And perhaps a series of similar affirmative assertions lend 
pragmatic support to a subsequent negative, making it more natural and easier to process. In 
Experiment 2 we look for the presence of an order effect between affirmative and negative trials 
by giving children the affirmative block of trials first. In Experiment 2, we also gave children an 
extra search attempt, up to three, on each practice trial, if they were either too shy to search or 
searched incorrectly. We reasoned that this may facilitate their understanding of the experimental 
paradigm and facilitate performance on both affirmative and negative trials. Experiment 2 also 
provides the opportunity to replicate the findings of Experiment 1, looking at the age when an 
understanding of verbal negation develops. 
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3.3. Experiment 2: Manipulating block order 
3.3.1. Method 
3.3.1.1. Participants 
An additional 43 monolingual English-speaking participants were recruited in the greater 
Boston area. All of them were tested at the Laboratory for Developmental Studies at Harvard 
University. None participated in any of the other experiments reported here. The participants 
were 18 20-month-olds (mean age 20.3, 19.1-21.7, 10 boys), 25 24-month-olds (mean 23.6 
months, 22.2-25.6, 10 boys). Recruitment and compensation were identical to Experiment 1. 26 
additional toddlers were excluded from analysis: 13 (ten 20-month-olds and three 24-month-
olds) were excluded for searching incorrectly on any of the three practice trials, six (four 20-
month-olds and two 24-month-olds) for failure to complete the study, and seven (four 20-month-
olds and three 24-month-olds) for searching in the same container on all trials (i.e. side bias). 
3.3.1.2. Materials and Procedure 
Experiment 2 was identical to Experiment 1 in all respects, except that in Experiment 2 
participants were given the block of affirmative trials before the block of negative trials. 
3.3.2. Results 
Across both age groups, only one trial was excluded because the child did not make a 
clear response (i.e. failed to approach the table). 
3.3.2.1. Performance by age group 
 Figure 3.2 shows the results of Experiment 2, broken down by age group. We followed 
the same analysis strategy as in Experiment 1, looking at performance on affirmative and 
negative trials separately. As in Experiment 1, we first look at performance split up into two age 
groups: 20- and 24-month-olds ± corresponding to the youngest and middle age groups in 
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Experiment 1 (see Fig. 3.2). Unlike the below-chance performance of 20-month-olds in 
Experiment 1 on negative trials, in Experiment 2 this group was not significantly different from 
chance (W=7, p=0.24), 24-month-olds, who performed at chance levels in Experiment 1, did 
significantly better than chance in Experiment 2 (W=196, p=0.02). On affirmative trials, 20-
month-olds were marginally better than chance (W=96, p=0.054), while 24-month-olds did 
highly significantly better than chance (W=228.5, p<0.0001). 
 Unlike in other experiments, while performance on affirmative trials does not depend on 
the choice of exclusion criterion, performance on negative trials does. Using a different criterion 
and excluding children who failed their first try on multiple practice trials, we would exclude six 
20-month-olds and no 24-month-olds. In this case, 24-month-olds still perform better than 
chance (W=76, p=0.03), but 20-month-olds are now significantly below chance (W=10, p=0.03). 
Applying no exclusion criterion at all, the total sample would include 28 20-month-olds and 28 
24-month-olds, with 24-month-olds performing marginally above chance (W=212, p=0.07), 
while 20-month-olds perform significantly worse than chance (W=10, p=0.03). We thus 
conclude that while 24-month-olds perform consistently better than chance in Experiment 2 
(unlike Experiment 1), whether 20-month-olds are significantly below chance (as they were in 
Experiment 1) depends the exclusion criterion, and likely on sample size ± the fewer children 
excluded, the more robust the significant performance below chance on negative trials in this 
group.  
3.3.2.2. Improvement with age 
Mann-Whitney tests comparing the two age groups on both types of responses revealed a 
significant difference between the 20-month-olds and the 24-month-olds on both affirmative 
(W=151, p=0.047) and negative (W=123.5, p=0.01) trials. As in Experiment 1, taking each 
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SDUWLFLSDQW¶VH[DFWDJHFRQYHUWLQJGD\VWRIUDFWLRQVRI-day months), we fit a series of logistic 
mixed-effect models with grand-mean centered Age as a fixed effect and a random effect of 
subject with a random intercept. Models containing only Trial Type and Age as fixed effects 
showed a significant simple effect of Age on affirPDWLYHWULDOVȕ &,>@
z=2.47, p DQGRQQHJDWLYHWULDOVȕ &,>@z=2.1, p=0.04). Note that 
since Experiment 1 had an additional group of older children included in the analyses, the full 
age ranges from the two experiments are not directly comparable. 
3.3.2.3. Comprehension performance relative to production of the word ³Not´ 
 As in Experiment 1, we use the same modeling strategy to look at whether production of 
the word ³1RW´ is a significant predictor of performance. We do not find a significant effect of 
producing ³1RW´, as indicated on the CDI, on performance on either affirmative or negative 
trials. We attribute this to a lack of statistical power, due to the smaller sample and more limited 
range of age (and performance) in Experiment 2, relative to Experiment 1. 
3.3.2.4. Block order effects: Comparison of Experiments 1 and 2 
 Given that 24-month-olds in Experiment 2 perform better than chance on negative trials, 
while the same age group in Experiment 1 did not, we compare similar age groups from the two 
experiments directly in order to look for an effect of block order. Mann-Whitney tests comparing 
the youngest 20-month-old groups in Experiments 1 and 2 find no significant difference between 
the two on either affirmative (W=150, p=0.18) or negative (W=150, p=0.17) trials. Comparing 
the 24-month-old groups from the two experiments also shows no significant differences on 
either type of trial (affirmative: W=295.5, p=0.36; negative: W=246, p=0.27). Taking both age 
groups and building a logistic mixed-effects model with a random intercept for participants and 
Experiment (1 or 2) as a fixed effect, we find no significant effect of this variable on 
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performance in either the affirmative or negative trials. While the performance of 24-month-olds 
relative to chance depends on the exclusion criterion, the lack of significant difference between 
performance on Experiments 1 and 2 does not. 
3.3.3. Discussion 
In Experiment 1, when doing negative trials before affirmative, 20-month-olds performed 
below chance and 24-month-olds were at chance on negative trials. In Experiment 2, 20-month-
olds stay below chance (whether significantly so depends on the choice of exclusion criterion), 
and 24-month-olds perform significantly better than chance (regardless of exclusion criterion). 
Although there was no difference between the performance of 24-month-olds in Experiments 1 
and 2, the finding that they are at chance on the former and above-chance on the latter suggests 
that receiving affirmative trials before negative trials may help 24-month-olds succeed in 
understanding the word ³1RW´. This pattern suggests that 20-month-olds do not, on average, 
comprehend the logical meaning of ³1RW´, whether they get practice and pragmatic support by 
first hearing highly similar affirmative clues. On the other hand, 24-month-olds may be at a 
transitional age at which building representations of affirmative propositions facilitates later 
processing of those propositions combined with a logical negation operator. 
Taken together, Experiments 1 and 2 show that the ability to comprehend the word ³1RW´ 
as logical negation emerges early in the third year of life. This tracks quite closely with 
FKLOGUHQ¶VHPHUJLQJSURGXFWLRQRIWKHZRUG³1RW´ (Dale & Fenson, 1996; see Fig. 3.1 for 
population norms and Fig. 3.3 for production data from the present sample). At 27 months ± the 
average age of the group of children who succeed in Experiment 1 ± just over 50% of children 
are reported to produce this word in normed CDI data. Our findings replicate the age of 
comprehension success of logical ³1RW´ that had been identified by Austin, et al. (2014). In 
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contrast to ³1RW´, ³1R´ is one of the earliest words children produce, with 55% of 15-month-
olds producing ³1R´, at an age when there are almost no reports of any child producing ³1RW´. 
Austin, et al. find that children comprehend ³1R´ as a logical operator at the same age as ³1RW´. 
,Q([SHULPHQWZHVHHNWRUHSOLFDWHWKLVSDWWHUQZKLOHDJDLQUHODWLQJHDFKFKLOG¶V
comprehension success to their reported production of both ³1R´ and ³1RW´. 
:HDOVRORRNDWFKLOGUHQ¶VSHUIRUPDQFHDFURVVDOOWKUHHH[SHULPHQWVRQDIILUPDWLYH
relative to negative trials. Affirmative trials might be easier for one or both of the following 
reasons: negative statements might be more difficult to comprehend than affirmatives (if 
comprehending sentences containing logical ³1R´ and ³1RW´ is pragmatically or semantically 
difficult); and, even once a negative statement has been well-understood, the decision-making 
process involved in searching for the ball may be easier given affirmative than negative clues. 
Once a child has comprehended an affirmative clue, the decision of where to search follows. To 
find the ball from a negative clue, the child must not only comprehend where the ball is not, but 
make an additional inference to where it might be. Whether one or both factors play a role, we 
expect children to perform better on affirmative than negative trials, particularly at younger ages, 
when their performance on negative trials is at or below chance. Yet Austin, et al. (2014) find 
chance performance on affirmative trials even at older ages, when success on negative trials is 
reliable. Though they do not compare affirmative to negative trials directly, the finding that 
children are at least not clearly better on affirmative trials is surprising. 
3.4. Experiment 3: Comprehending ³No´ 
To adapt the paradigm of Experiments 1 and 2 to include No, we introduced a question-
answer interaction between the parent and the experimenter, more similar to Austin, et al. (2014). 
The parent, sitting with the child and unable to see where the ball is hidden, asks the 
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experimenter, Is it in the bucket/truck? The experimenter would answer, ³Yes, it is´. Or ³1RLW¶V
not´. As before, the child would be invited to search for the ball. Although the negative clue in 
this construction includes the word ³1RW´, we have already determined in Experiments 1 and 2 
that children below either 24 or 27 months (depending on the block order) do not comprehend 
³1RW´. In this experiment, we are interested primarily in the success of younger children, so that 
the inclusion of ³1RW´ in the negative clue is unlikely to help them, except to make the utterance 
sound more natural and less abrupt. 
3.4.1. Methods 
3.4.1.1. Participants 
Seventy monolingual English-speaking participants were recruited in the greater Boston 
area, across the same age groups as in Experiment 1. All of them were tested at the Laboratory 
for Developmental Studies at Harvard University and none participated in Experiments 1 or 2 
(one child had previously participated in Experiment 4). The participants were 20 20-month-olds 
(mean age: 20.6, 19.2-22.0, 11 boys), 25 24-month-olds (mean age: 23.4, 22.2-, 11 boys) and 25 
27-month-olds (mean age: 27.3, 26.2-29.0, 13 boys). Recruitment and compensation were 
identical to Experiment 1. An additional 34 children (17 20-month-olds; 12 24-month-olds; four 
27-month-olds) were excluded from analysis: 11 (four 20-month-olds; seven 24-month-olds; no 
27-month-olds) for searching in the wrong location on any of the practice trials, 14 (seven 20-
month-olds; three 24-month-olds; and four 27-month-olds) for failure to complete the study, and 
six (four 20-month-olds; two 24-month-olds; no 27-month-olds) for searching in the same 
container on every trial (i.e. side bias). Two additional 20-month-olds were excluded because of 
parent error (parents reading the wrong line in their script and asking the wrong question on one 
of the trials). 
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3.4.1.2. Materials and Procedure 
The procedure differed from Experiments 1 and 2 only in the clues given and how these 
involved interacting with the parent. Parents were given a script to follow during the experiment. 
On every trial, parents waited for the experimenter to finish hiding the ball and remove the 
occluder. The experimenter then made eye contact with the parent, which served as a cue for the 
parent to turn to the child and say a phrase to engage them: Hm, where did it go? or, I wonder 
where it is! Then the parent would look at the experimenter and ask, Is it in the bucket? or, Is it 
in the truck? depending on the trial. The script instructed the parent which container to ask about, 
and the order of mention of the containers was counterbalanced in an ABBA pattern, the same as 
in Experiments 1 and 2. The parent was not aware of the actual location of the ball until the 
experimenter answered their question. 
Just as in Experiments 1 and 2, affirmative and negative trials were blocked, so that all 
four trials of the same type occurred in a row. Experiment 3 counterbalanced block order across 
subjects, so that half of the children received the affirmative trials first, and half received the 
negative trials first. In the affirmative trials, the experimenter answered, Yes, it is. In the negative 
trials, the experimenter answered, ³1RLW¶VQRW´. 3DUHQWV¶VFULSWVDOZD\VFRUUHVSRQGHGWRWKH
H[SHULPHQWHUV¶DQVZHUVso that the answers were always correct UHODWLYHWRWKHEDOO¶VDFWXDO
location. The experimenter gave affirmative and negative clues with identical prosody, making 
eye contact directly with the parent, and gave no additional clues through body language. After 
giving the clue, the experimenter looked at the child and invited them to find the ball. Parents 
were instructed not to give any additional clues. We excluded from analysis trials in which there 
was parental interference. For all participants, if the child correctly found the ball, he/she got to 
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place it in the jingle box before the next trial. If they did not, they returned to the parent to try 
again. 
3.4.2. Results 
3.4.2.1. Comprehension of ³No´ 
 Across all age groups, seven trials were excluded because the child did not make a clear 
response (e.g. failed to approach the table, stood in front of the bucket or the truck but did not 
touch them or indicate a preference, etc.) One additional trial was excluded due to experimenter 
error and one for parental interference. 
3.4.2.1.1. Performance by age group 
Figure 3.2 shows the results of Experiment 3, broken down by age group and block order. 
As in Experiments 1 and 2, we first compare the performance of each age group to chance to 
look for an age of success. On negative trials, 20-month-olds chose the correct container 
significantly below chance (W=16.5, p=0.04), 24-month-olds performed significantly better than 
chance (W=147.5, p=0.049), as did 27-month-olds (W=230, p=0.0005). On affirmative trials, all 
three age groups performed better than chance (20-month-olds: W=105, p=0.0008); 24-month-
olds: W=147.5, p=0.0006; 27-month-olds: W=221, p=0.0002). Coding 20-month-ROGV¶FKRLFHV
by performance relative to the mentioned container rather than the correct container, just as in 
([SHULPHQWZHILQGQRGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQFKLOGUHQ¶VFKRLFHVRQDIILUPDWLYHDQGQHJDWLve 
trials (W=144, p=0.11). Thus, when hearing the question, Is it in the bucket? 20-month-olds 
chose the bucket as often when the answer was ³Yes, it is´ as ³1RLW¶VQRW´. 
The above-chance performance of 24-month-olds depended on the exclusion criterion. 
When no children were excluded based on the practice trials, and additional three children were 
included in this age group. Their inclusion made this groups performance no longer different 
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from chance (W=202, p 7KHIUDJLOLW\RIWKLVJURXS¶VSHUIRUPDnce relative to chance 
depends on order effects (See Sec. 3.4.2.1.4. below). 
3.4.2.1.2. Improvement with age 
8QOLNH([SHULPHQWVDQGFKLOGUHQ¶VSHUIRUPDQFHRQDIILUPDWLYHWULDOVZDVQRW
significantly different between the three age groups, according to a Kurskal-:DOOLVWHVWȤ2=0.87 
p &KLOGUHQ¶VSHUIRUPDQFHRQQHJDWLYHWULDOVRQWKHRWKHUKDQGGLGGLIIHUEHWZHHQDJH
JURXSVȤ2=17.75, p=0.0001). Comparing performance on negative trials between pairs of age 
groups using a Mann-Whitney test, the youngest age group of 20-month-olds had significantly 
lower rates of correct responding (W=241, p=0.02) relative to the middle age group of 24-
month-olds. The 24-month-olds were significantly worse than the 27-month-olds (W=220, 
p=0.01). There were no significant differences between pairs of groups on affirmative trials. 
Next, we again fit a logistic mixed-effects model with score on each trial as the binary 
dependent variable, grand-mean centered Age as a predictor and a random effect of subject with 
UDQGRPLQWHUFHSW7KHVHPRGHOVVKRZHGQRVLJQLILFDQWHIIHFWRIDJHRQDIILUPDWLYHWULDOVȕ 
95% CI [0.98, 1.2], z=1.56, p=0.12), but a highly significant effect of age on negative trials 
ȕ &,>@] p<0.0001). 
3.4.2.1.3. Comprehension performance relative to production of ³No´ and ³Not´ 
 Figure 3.VKRZVWKHWUDMHFWRU\RIFKLOGUHQ¶VFRPSUHKHQVLRQSHUIRUPDQFHZLWKDJHRQ
both ³1R´ and ³1RW´, alongside their rate of production of both words. As in Experiments 1 and 
ZHXVHWKHVDPHPRGHOLQJDSSURDFKWRORRNDWZKHWKHUFKLOGUHQ¶VSHUIRUPDQFHLQWKHVe 
comprehension tasks tracks with their production of the words ³1R´ and ³1RW´. We find that 
production of ³1R´ does not significantly predict performance on either affirmative or negative 
trials. However, production of ³1RW´ significantly predicts performance on negative trials 
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ȕ &,>@] p=0.006), but not on affirmative trials. As in Experiments 
1 and 2, however, there is no independent contribution of producing ³1RW´ in a model that also 
includes total CDI score as a predictor. We conclude that production of ³1RW´, but not of ³1R´, 
tracks with comprehension success of the truth-functional meaning of the word ³1R´, just as it 
did for comprehending that meaning of ³1RW´. This also suggests that the methodological 
differences between the single-experimenter design of Experiments 1-2 on the one hand and the 
design of both Experiment 3 and Austin, et al. (2014) on the other, where children overheard the 
clues as a dialog between two adults, GLGQRWLPSDFWFKLOGUHQ¶VFRPSUHKHQVLRQSHUIormance. 
3.4.2.1.4. Block order effects 
Figure 3.2 shows the results of Experiment 3 broken down by block order. Since we 
manipulated block order within Experiment 3, we can directly compare the performance of 
children who received the affirmative block first to those who received it second. We find that 
getting affirmative trials first increases success with negative trials only at the transitional age 
group of 24-month-olds. Although there are half as many children in this comparison as in the 
equivalent comparison between Experiments 1 and 2, a Mann-Whitney test finds a marginally 
significant difference at the transitional age for successful performance on negative trials ± 
between the 24-month-old children who got affirmative clues first and those who got negative 
clues first (W=42.5, p=0.07). We find no such differences for other age groups. Those 24-
month-olds who received the affirmative block first performed significantly better than chance 
on a Mann-Whitney test (W=58, p=0.02), while those who received the negative block first 
performed at chance levels (W=9.5, p=0.91). This indicates that the overall above-chance 
performance of 24-month-olds in Experiment 3 is driven by those children who received the 
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DIILUPDWLYHEORFNRIWULDOVILUVW,QFRQWUDVWFKLOGUHQ¶VSHUIRUPDQFHRQDIILUPDWLYHWULDOVGLGQRW
differ by block order in any age group. 
 However, as in Experiment 2, the statistical significance of order effects depends on the 
exclusion criterion. The results reported above hold when applying the most stringent criterion, 
excluding those children who fail any of the practice trials on the first try. Using no exclusion 
criterion (which includes an additional three children) reduces the effect, with the performance of 
24-month-olds who received the affirmative block of trials becoming marginally different from 
chance (W=78, p=0.1), and no difference approaching significance between the children who got 
affirmative trials first and those who got negative trials first.  
  
87 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.3: A&KLOGUHQ¶VSHUIRUPDQFHRQDIILUPDWLYHDQGQHJDWLYHWULDOVLQ([SHULPHQWVDQGSRROHG
together) and Experiment 3, by month. B) The percent of all children in Experiments 1-3 producing the 
words ³1R´ and ³1RW´ E\PRQWKWDNHQIURPSDUHQWV¶UHSRUWRQWKe CDI. 
B) 
A) 
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3.4.2.2. Comparing Experiment 3 to 1 and 2: Comprehending logical ³No´ vs. ³Not´ 
3.4.2.2.1. Comparing ages of success 
Experiment 3 confirms the findings of Austin et al., that 2-year-olds begin to comprehend 
³1R´ and ³1RW´ at the same time, despite producing ³1R´ at a much younger age. Figure 3.2 
VKRZVWKHFRPSDULVRQRIFKLOGUHQ¶VSHUIRUPDQFHLQ([SHULPHQWWR([SHULPHQWVDQG
broken down by age group. Since block order is manipulated between Experiments 1 and 2 and 
within Experiment 3, for the purposes of comparing Experiments 1 and 2 to Experiment 3, we 
pool participants from Experiments 1 and 2 together for the 20- and 24-month-old groups. Since 
we did not test 26-month-olds in Experiment 2, such that all 26-month-olds tested on 
comprehension of logical ³1RW´ received only the negative trials first, we compare these children 
to just those 26-month-olds in Experiment 3 who also got the negative block of trials first. There 
were no significant differences between the results of Experiments 1 and 2 and Experiment 3 in 
any age group according to a Mann-Whitney test (20-month-olds: W=251, p=0.69; 24-month-
olds: W=661, p=0.57; 27-month-olds: W=112; p=0.34). 
 Looking at age as a continuous variable, we fit logistic regression models with fixed 
effects for Experiment (1 or 2, vs. 3), Block Order (Affirmative-First vs. Negative-First) and 
$JHFHQWHUHGE\WKHPHDQRISDUWLFLSDQWV¶DJHVIURPDOOWKUHHH[SHULPHQWVDVZHOODVWKHIXOOVHW
of interaction terms between these variables. As in previous models, there was a random effect of 
participant, fit with a random intercept. The only significant predictor of performance on either 
DIILUPDWLYHRUQHJDWLYHWULDOVZDV$JH$IILUPDWLYHȕ &,>@] 
p=0.01; NegaWLYHȕ &,>@] p<0.0001). There were no significant 
interactions, and no other significant fixed effects. 
3.4.2.2.2. Comparing affirmative and negative trials 
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 We also compare performance on affirmative and negative trials across all three 
experiments. As Figure 3.2 shows, performance on affirmative trials is consistently better than 
performance on negative trials across all three experiments, independently of age (W=22828.5, 
p<0.0001). Broken down by age group, this difference holds for 20-month-olds (W=2802.5, 
p<0.0001) and 24-month-olds (W=3811.5, p<0.0001), but not at the oldest group of 27-month-
olds (W=1382, p=0.55), at which point performance on negative trials has caught up (see Fig. 
3.2 and 3.3). In a logistic regression looking at the performance of children at all ages across all 
four experiments and including the variables of Trial Type (Affirmative or Negative), 
Experiment (1, 2 and 3) and Age, along with all interactions, there were no significant 
interactions with the variable of Trial Type. 
3.4.3. Discussion 
Confirming the results of Austin, et al. (2014) on negative trials, Experiment 3 shows that 
children begin to understand the logical meaning of the word ³1R´ at the same time as they 
understand the same meaning of ³1RW´. They are below chance at 20 months, above chance 
(when getting the affirmative block of trials first) at 24 months and above chance regardless of 
block order at 27 months. While in Experiments 1 and 2 we found that the developmental 
trajectories of truth-functional comprehension and production of ³1RW´ track closely together, 
comprehending truth-functional ³1R´ does not track with production of the word ³1R´ at all. 
Rather, as Figure 3.3 shows, it tracks with producing ³1RW´. The comprehension of ³1R´ as a 
logical operator lags production of the word by about a year. This suggests that mapping the 
concept to the word poses a significant challenge ± either because the concept is not available at 
15 months when the word is first learned, or because the mapping problem is a particularly 
difficult one. The gap also suggests that when younger toddlers produce ³1R´, they use it with 
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VRPHPHDQLQJRWKHUWKDQWKHORJLFDORQH7KLVLQWXUQVXJJHVWVWKDW\RXQJFKLOGUHQ¶VPDLQHDUO\
use of ³1R´ ± WRVLJQLI\µUHMHFWLRQ¶± is indeed likely to rely on a semantically different concept 
rather than being a different usage of the logical concept, just as Bloom (1970) hypothesized. 
3.4.3.1. Converging results 
Although Austin, et al. (2014) do not compare comprehension to production in their data, 
they do provide converging evidence for similar ages of comprehension success. They find 
success at 24 months, but not earlier, when children are given the single-word clue ³1R´ as well 
as the word ³1RW´ contained in a sentence like, ³,W¶VQRWLQWKHEXFNHW´. Although the clue used in 
our Experiment 3 is ³1RLW¶VQRW´ rather than a single-word ³1R´, that we find success at a 
similar age range to Austin, et al. suggests that the word ³1RW´ is playing nRUROHLQFKLOGUHQ¶V
responses on negative trials in Experiment 3. However, we find robust success at 27 months in 
comprehension of logical ³1R´ and ³1RW´ both, with success at 24 months depending on block 
order, while Austin et al. report success at 24 months with alternating affirmative and negative 
trials. What accounts for these differences?  
First, Austin, et al. exclude 30% of children (53/179) across all ages for failing to 
complete at least three quarters of the trials, and 29% of children (17/59) at the critical group of 
24-month-olds. Using the same criterion, we exclude 12% (26/211) across all ages and 9% (7/74) 
of the 24-month-olds. While it is unclear what difference between either our methods or samples 
caused this large difference in exclusion rates, it is reasonable to assume that the same fussy 
children are more likely to both choose incorrectly and quit the study early, so that excluding 
PRUHFKLOGUHQRYHUDOOZRXOGOLNHO\OHDGWRDVOLJKWO\HDUOLHUDJHRIVXFFHVVLQ$XVWLQHWDO¶V
experiment. In addition, while Austin, et al. find success on negative trials at 24 months, they do 
not find success on affirmative trials, using the construction ,W¶VLQWKHEXFNHWKRXVH either at 24 
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months or even the oldest group in their experiment, 29 month-olds. Though we do not apply a 
Bonferroni correction, we find a consistent pattern of success on affirmative trials that would 
survive this correction for the 24- and 27-month-old age groups, as well as reliably greater 
success on affirmative relative to negative trials across the three experiments. This pattern of 
results gives us confidence that we have found a reliable age of success on negative trials within 
the same paradigm. 
Austin, et al. also use a paradigm in which two experimenters are interacting and the 
child is observing and overhearing their conversation. One experimenter asks whether the ball is 
in the bucket or the house, and the other responds with, ³,W¶VLQWKHEXFNHWKRXVH´ or ³,W¶VQRWLQ
the bucket/house´. While we use a similar question-answer design in Experiment 3, Experiment 
1 and 2 have just one experimenter hiding the ball and then simply telling the child either where 
it is or is not. Despite all of these differences, both Austin, et al. and the present report converge 
on the range around 23-27 months as the age at which children begin to comprehend logical 
negation.  
3.4.3.2. Inhibitory control: the deflationary hypothesis 
Taken together, the results of the three preceding experiments suggest that there is some 
common factor, developing between 19 and 28 months, that leads to understanding the logical 
meanings of both English negation words, ³1RW´ and ³1R´ at the same time. In addition to the 
conceptual and linguistic accounts we have mentioned, there is another deflationary explanation. 
Successfully acting on negative information, as given in a sentence like, ³,W¶VQRWLQWKHEXFNHW´ 
or the question-answer dialogue, ³Is it in the bucket?´ ³±1RLW¶VQRW´ requires forming a 
representation of the bucket before shifting to the truck. Inhibiting attention (and in a search task, 
inhibiting motor planning and action) towards the referent of the affirmative predicate in order to 
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attend to its negated counterpart is a necessary aspect of processing all logical negation, and so is 
common to the processing both of ³1R´ and ³1RW´. Indeed, Nordmeyer and Frank (2014) find 
evidence that inhibitory control is a source of great difficulty foUFKLOGUHQ¶VRQOLQHSURFHVVLQJRI
sentences containing negation. They find that children much older than 28 months fail to 
demonstrate comprehension of logical negation when presented with referents for both the 
affirmative predicate and its negative countHUSDUW7KH\DUJXHWKHIDLOXUHLVGXHWRFKLOGUHQ¶V
attention being strongly drawn to the affirmative referent when they hear its name and then 
getting stuck there, failing to ever shift over to the negative. 
Indeed, in our search paradigm, inhibitory control may pose difficulty for children not 
only in sentence processing but also after, in deciding where to look for the ball, even if they 
have successfully processed the negative verbal information. Since success on negative trials 
requires an additional inferential step ± from where the ball is not to where it might be ± and 
since this step requires inhibiting attention to the first location the child has considered, a failure 
of inhibitory control may also explain why young children perform better on affirmative than 
negative trials, and improving inhibitory control with age may explain the shrinking of this 
difference, which we found over Experiments 1-3 across the age groups. 
%RWKFKLOGUHQ¶VEHWWHUSHUIRUPDQFHRQDIILUPDWLYHUHODWLYHWRQHJDWLYHWULDOVDt younger, 
but not older ages, and their improving success on negative trials over the range of ages we 
tested may thus reveal something about their improving inhibitory control and executive 
functioning, not an improving understanding of negation. It would account not only for the 
chance behavior of the middle age group of 24-month-olds, but also for the systematically 
incorrect choices of the youngest 20-month-old group. These children could be choosing the 
named container, whether the word is in a negative or an affirmative statement, because they 
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hear its name and cannot shift their attention away from it. Experiment 4 examines this 
possibility. 
3.5. Experiment 4: Testing the inhibitory control hypothesis 
In Experiment 4, we place a similar inhibitory demand on children as in Experiments 1-3, 
while changing the way they are given negative information. Instead of being told that the ball is 
not in the bucket or in the truck on negative trials, they are shown that the bucket or the truck is 
empty. To do this, the experimenter looks at the empty container, lifts it up and tilts it to show its 
contents to the child, while saying, Look at the [bucket/truck]! The other container is not named 
or highlighted in any way. We test the youngest age group from Experiments 1-3, reasoning that 
if 20-month-olds fail to comprehend negation because they cannot inhibit their attention to the 
named container, they ought to fail in this task as well. If, on the other hand, increasing success 
with age reflects an increasing facility with the language of logical negation, and if even the 
youngest children can reason from the visible emptiness of a container to searching in a different 
location, then the youngest children should succeed. 
3.5.1. Methods 
3.5.1.1. Participants 
 Twenty-four monolingual English-speaking participants (mean age: 21.0, 19.2-22.7, 12 
boys) were recruited in the greater Boston area. All of them were tested at the Laboratory for 
Developmental Studies at Harvard University and none had previously participated in any of the 
other experiments reported here. Recruitment and compensation were identical to Experiment 1. 
Twelve additional toddlers were excluded from analysis: four for searching incorrectly on any of 
the practice trials, six for failure to complete the study, and two for only searching in one 
location (i.e. side bias). 
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3.5.1.2. Materials 
The stimuli were identical to those of Experiments 1-3, except that a slightly larger 
yellow ball was used for the task. This change was made so that the ball would be more easily 
visible to children on affirmative trials when the container was tipped towards them, without 
needing to tilt the container so far that the ball would roll out. 
3.5.1.3. Procedure 
As in Experiments 1 and 2, there was no dialog between the parent and the experimenter 
in this experiment. The verbal clues in Experiments 1-3 were replaced by visual clues. To give a 
clue, the experimenter would look at the container, pick it up and tilt it until it was lying 
sideways on the table and the child could see inside. While tilting it over, the experimenter said, 
Look at the [bucket/truck]! On affirmative test trials, the ball was visible within the container, 
and on negative trials, the container was empty (with the ball hidden in the other container). The 
experimenter kept the container down for approximately two seconds while the child was 
looking at it. If the child was not looking when the container was first tilted, the experimenter 
called WKHFKLOG¶VDWWHQWLRQWRWKHFRQWDLQHUDQGKHOGWKHFRQWDLQHUGRZQXQWLOWKHFKLOGORRNHG
NHHSLQJLWGRZQIRUWZRVHFRQGVDIWHUWKHFKLOG¶VDWWHQWLRQZDVGUDZQ7KHH[SHULPHQWHUWKHQ
returned the container to its upright position and invited the child to search. Since the last thing 
the experimenter had told the child was to look at the container, we reasoned that children might 
be confused by the phrase, Can you find it, can you find the ball? that was used in the previous 
experiments, thinking It might refer to the container instead of the ball. So in Experiment 4, we 
reversed this instruction, asking the children, Can you find the ball, can you find it? All other 
details of counterbalancing were kept the same as in the previous experiments, and block order 
was counterbalanced as in Experiment 3. 
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3.5.2. Results 
Four trials were excluded because the child did not make a clear response (e.g. failed to 
approach the table, stood in front of the bucket or the truck but did not touch them or indicate a 
preference, etc.) 
3.5.2.1. Performance relative to chance 
Figure 3.4 shows the results of Experiment 4, alongside results from the 20-month-old 
age group in Experiments 1 and 2 (averaged together), as well as Experiment 3. We find that, on 
both affirmative and negative trials, 20-month-olds in Experiment 4 chose the correct container 
significantly above chance (See Fig. 3.2; Affirmative: W=349, p=0.0001; Negative: W=141, 
p=0.01). There were no significant effects of block order on either affirmative or negative trials. 
3.5.2.2. Performance relative to Experiments 1-3 
&RPSDULQJWKHVHSDUWLFLSDQWV¶SHUIRUPDQFHWRWKHVDPHDJHJURXSVLQ([SHULPHQWV
and 3, a Kruskall-Wallis test revealed a significant difference between the Experiments on 
QHJDWLYHȤ2=15.39, p DQGDIILUPDWLYHȤ2=14.51, p=0.002) trials. A series of pairwise 
Mann-:KLWQH\WHVWVFRPSDULQJWKHVHSDUWLFLSDQWV¶SHUIRUPDQFHWRHDFKRIWKHSUHYLRXV
experiments, shows significant differences between Experiment 4 and Experiment 1 on 
Affirmative (W=417.5, p=0.0004) and Negative trials (W=415, p=0.0007), between Experiment 
4 and Experiment 2 on Affirmative (W=157, p=0.03) and Negative (W=157, p=0.04) trials. 
Between Experiment 4 and Experiment 3, the difference is marginal on Affirmative trials 
(W=295.5, p=0.07), but significant on Negative trials (W=348, p=0.003). There were no 
significant effects of block order on either Affirmative (W=66.5, p=0.97) or Negative (W=53, 
p=0.39) trials. 
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3.5.2.3. Comparing affirmative and negative trials 
 As in Experiments 1-3, the 20-month-olds in Experiment 4 performed better on 
affirmative than negative trials (W=433, p=0.002). In a logistic regression looking at the 
performance of the 20-month-olds across all four experiments and including the variables of 
Trial Type (Affirmative or Negative), Experiment (1, 2, 3, and 4) and their interactions, there 
was no significant interaction between Trial Type and any of the experiments. 
Fig. 3.4: Performance on negative and affirmative trials of the 20-month-old age group in Experiments 1-
4. Data from Experiments 1 and 2 is combined, with the mean reflecting average comprehension 
performance with ³1RW´, across both block orders. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. 
  
3.5.3. Discussion 
In Experiments 1-3 we find that 20-month-old children go to the named container, 
ignoring both the words ³1R´ and ³1RW´ to search in the wrong location. In Experiment 4 we 
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find that children at this age can nevertheless successfully avoid a container that they have seen 
is empty to find the ball at above-chance levels, even when the wrong container is named and 
FKLOGUHQ¶VDWWHQWLRQLVGUDZQWRLW7KDWWKH\VXFFHHGLQWKLVFDVHVXJJHVWVWKDWLPPDWXUH
inhibitory control alone cannot be responsible for their failure in Experiments 1-3, nor for the 
increasing success of children with increasing age. If anything, the inhibitory control needed to 
succeed in Experiment 4 is greater than in the preceding experiments. While in Experiments 1-3 
children hear the name of the wrong search location when given the negative clue, in Experiment 
4 they not only hear the wrong container named, but that container is also attended to by the 
experimenter, picked up, and tilted down so they can see into it. 
 While the inhibitory demands of Experiment 4 are greater, one might argue that the 
information provided children is of higher quality. Even if children did understand the meaning 
of ³,W¶VQRWLQWKHEXFNHW´ or ³Is it in the bucket?´ ³±1RLW¶VQRW´, seeing that the bucket is empty 
for themselves may be better evidence of where the ball is than hearing about it from the 
experimenter. Indeed, evidence that children do better with visual than verbal information more 
generally comes from their greater success on affirmative trials in Experiment 4 relative to 
Experiments 1-3. Although the advantage of visual over verbal information likely does play 
VRPHUROHLQFKLOGUHQ¶VLPSURYHGSHUIRUPDQFHLQWKHQHJDWLYHWULDOVRI([SHULPHQW it cannot 
fully explain their success. If children understood the negative verbal clues given in Experiments 
1-3, but either found the information unreliable or did not encode it as well, they would have 
performed at chance. Instead, 20-month-olds performed significantly below chance when given 
verbal negative clues, indicating that they did use the information they were given ± incorrectly. 
They reliably used the words Bucket and Truck to guide their search. They just did not use ³1R´ 
or ³1RW´. 
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 The results of Experiment 4 also bear on interpreting the difference in performance 
between affirmative and negative trials in all four experiments. Better performance on 
affirmative than negative trials is over-determined. It could reflect difficulties in processing 
negation words in particular, or in inhibiting attention to the affirmative referent more generally. 
Twenty-month-olds in Experiment 4 perform better on affirmative than negative trials by the 
same margin as in Experiments 1-3, despite no verbal negation being used in Experiment 4. This 
suggests that the constant size of this performance difference reflects the inhibitory demands ± 
avoiding going to the named container ± that are common to all four experiments. Note that this 
does not mean that the comprehension of negation words poses no separate difficulty ± in fact, it 
must to account for 20-month-olds below-chance performance with both verbal ³1R´ and ³1RW´. 
It is just that this difficulty is not additive on top of the significant difficulty already posed by the 
inhibitory demands of negative trials. The advantage of affirmative over negative trials in 
Experiment 4 supports the idea that the difference between the two types of trials in Experiments 
1-3 is not a good indicator of the difficulty of verbal negation in particular. 
 $OWKRXJKFKLOGUHQ¶VLQKLELWRU\FRQWUROLVQRGRXEWGHYHORSLQJEHWZHHQDQGPRQWKV
the results of Experiment 4 show that this development cannot completely account for their 
increasing success in comprehending negation words as logical operators. What representation 
JXLGHVFKLOGUHQ¶VVXFFHVVIXOVHDUFKLQ([SHULPHQW"2QHSRVVLELOLW\LVWKDWFKLOGUHQSRVVHVVD
concept of logical negation and use it to represent that the ball is not in the bucket when they see 
an empty bucket, but have not mapped this concept to either the words ³1R´ or ³1RW´. The other 
possibility is that children do not yet have a concept of logical negation, and are relying on a 
different concept to succeed on the negative trials in Experiment 4, such as a concept of 
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emptiness in relation to containers, and a heuristic that guides them to avoid searching in places 
known to be empty. 
3.6. General Discussion 
 In Experiments 1 and 2 we find that understanding the logical force of the word ³1RW´ 
parallels its emerging production, with 20-month-olds ignoring this word entirely, 24-month-olds 
successfully using it to guide their search only if they have done a block of affirmative trials first, 
and 27-month-olds showing robust comprehension of the logical meaning of ³1RW´ regardless of 
block order. In Experiment 3 we find that although ³1R´ is produced much earlier than ³1RW´, 
the comprehension of truth-functional ³1R´ emerges at just the same age as the comprehension 
of truth-functional ³1RW´ and tracks with production of ³1RW´ rather than ³1R´. That the 
comprehension of logical ³1R´ and ³1RW´ track so close to each other (see Fig. 3.3) suggests that 
DVLQJOHFRPPRQIDFWRUXQGHUOLHVFKLOGUHQ¶VDELOLW\WRPDSERWKZRUGVWRWhe concept of negation. 
Experiment 4 rules out one deflationary account of that factor, showing that it cannot be 
increasing inhibitory control relative to the named container (the wrong choice on negative 
trials), since even the youngest children can make the correct choice when their attention is 
drawn to a container that is shown to be empty. 
3.6.1. Conceptual versus linguistic factors 
What is the common factor driving the similar developmental course of comprehending 
both ³1R´ and ³1RW´ as logical operators? We see two possibilities. One is that the limiting 
factor is conceptual ± children younger than 24 months on average do not have the concept of 
logical negation. When they acquire it early in the third year of life, they quickly map both of the 
words ³1R´ and ³1RW´ to it. The other possibility is that the limiting factor is linguistic. On this 
account children do have the concept of a logical negation operator, but making the mapping 
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between this operator and either the word ³1R´ or ³1RW´ poses a difficult problem that most 
children will not solve until they turn two (this despite hearing both words frequently; see 
Cameron-Faulkner, et al., 2007). Importantly, since children map both words to logical negation 
at the same time, the mapping problem appears to be the same for both. While the grammatical 
properties of ³1R´ and ³1RW´ and the speech acts each word gets used for are quite different ± 
English ³1R´ can be quantificational, anaphoric, a single-word prohibition or an answer to a 
question, while ³1RW´ cannot ± it appears that these differences do not have an effect on 
FKLOGUHQ¶VOHDUQLQJWRFRPSUHKHQGWKHPDVORJLFDORSHUDWRUV 
Both conceptual and linguistic limitations are attested in different cases where production 
precedes comprehension. For some words, like numbers and the theoretical terms alive and dead, 
there is reason to believe that the adult-like concepts are not initially available and that children 
must undergo significant conceptual change to build them before the right concept-word 
mapping can be made (for number: see Carey, 2009; for alive and dead: see Carey, 1985). For 
other cases, like color words, the mapping problem may be primarily linguistic rather than 
conceptual. Despite early arguments that children have difficulty identifying the conceptual 
domain that color words refer to (Sandhofer & Smith, 1999; Kowalski and Zimiles, 2006), recent 
evidence suggests that children map color words to this domain early on (and therefore have the 
domain available to conceptual thought), but take much longer to figure out exactly what 
partition of color space each word maps onto (Wagner, Dobkins & Barner, 2013). 
Both conceptual and linguistic explanations for the comprehension-production gap with 
³1R´ are possible. Some suggestive support for the limiting factor being linguistic rather than 
conceptual comes from the fact that the comprehension of both logical ³1R´ and ³1RW´ tracks 
FORVHO\ZLWKFKLOGUHQ¶VHPHUJLQJSURGXFWLRQRI³1RW´. This connection would be unprincipled if 
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the limitation on the mapping was caused by a missing concept. When children hear parents 
using ³1RW´, it is used to express denial only slightly more often than ³1R´ is, and is also 
frequently used to indicate rejection or the failure of an action plan (Cameron-Faulkner, et al., 
2007). There would be no reason why ³1RW´ could not be produced before its logical meaning is 
comprehended, just like ³1R´ is, perhaps with a distinct meaning like rejection. It is possible that 
once children have mapped ³1RW´ to a concept of logical negation, they are quickly able to do 
the same for ³1R´. 
Future work should test between the conceptual and linguistic factors directly. One 
approach would be to use international adoption as a natural experiment (see Snedeker, Geren & 
Shafto, 2007; Snedeker, Geren & Shafto, 2012). International adoptees who begin to learn 
English as toddlers have much more sophisticated cognitive abilities than native English-learning 
infants when they are at the same points in language development. On the comprehension side, if 
children lack a concept of negation until they are about 24 months old, we might expect these 
older children to successfully understand both ³1R´ and ³1RW´ at a much earlier point in their 
language learning. On the other hand, the problem could be in making the mapping from the 
words to the logical concept, with children needing to know enough language ± the meanings of 
content words and the syntactic instructions for combining these words together with the 
negative particle ± in order to make that mapping. In that case we might expect the older 
adoptees to succeed in understanding ³1R´ and ³1RW´ truth-functionally only after they have 
reached a similar degree of language proficiency as 25-month-old native learners. On the 
production side, if a concept of negation is acquired around 25 months, we might expect older 
DGRSWHHVWRVWDUWSURGXFLQJµGHQLDO¶QHJDWLRQV± the function most closely associated with the 
truth-functional operator ± at an earlier point in language development than native learners. If the 
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limitation has to do with language development, denials should emerge as children learn more 
words, at the same rate for adoptees and native learners. 
3.6.2. The different meanings of ³No´ 
What, then, does ³1R´ mean for children between 15 months, when a majority already 
produce it, and about 24 months, when they begin to comprehend it as a truth-functional 
RSHUDWRU"2QHSRVVLELOLW\JRHVEDFNWRVXJJHVWLRQVPDGHLQVWXGLHVRIFKLOGUHQ¶VSURGXFWLRQ
transcripts. Bloom (1970) and Pea (1980a), finding that younger children produce more 
µUHMHFWLRQ¶DQGµQRQH[LVWHQFH¶QHJDWLRQVWKDQµGHQLDOV¶SRVLWHGWKDWWKHVHDUHWKUHHGLVWLQFW
semantic representations and suggested that the acquisition of the concept of denial is derived 
from the two preceding concepts. As we argued above, production data alone cannot provide 
sufficient evidence for this conclusion. However, when this data is taken together with evidence 
that the comprehension of logical, truth-functional negation, comes about a year later than the 
production of the negation word ³1R´, there is now good reason to believe that these meanings 
are distinct and independently acquired rather than being different usages of a single extant 
concept.  
If they are distinct concepts, how are they related? One possibility is that they are not ± if 
mapping ³1R´ and ³1RW´ to logical negation is a linguistic mapping problem, not a conceptual 
problem, then there is no issue of needing to build the concept of the logical operator. If, 
however, the limitation is that there is no logical negation concept available, it is also possible 
that ³1R´ initially serves as a linguistic placeholder structure for the emergence of this concept 
(see Carey, 2009 for this sort of argument in the domain of number word learning). 
Children who have learned that ³1R´ PHDQVUHMHFWLRQPD\QRWLFHWKDWVRPHRIDGXOWV¶
uses of that word do not seem to denote negative affect, just as saying ³There are no bears on 
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Mars´ GRHVQRWWHOOXVPXFKDERXWWKHVSHDNHU¶VIHHOLQJVDERXWEHDUVRU0DUVRUWKHRQHEHLQJRQ
the other. In their speech to children, adults appear to use verbal negation of all forms 
predominantly for two functions ± to issue prohibitions, and to express denials (Cameron-
Faulkner, et al., 2007)3HUKDSVWKHGLVFRQQHFWEHWZHHQWKHµUHMHFWLRQ¶PHDQLQJFKLOGUHQKDYH
acquired and the broader set of meanings (some of them incomprehensible) that are used by 
adults serve as an invitation to form a new category. This invitation might induce children to 
learn the concept of logical negation in one of several possible ways. Thus the language of 
negation may serve as input to a Quinian bootstrapping process (see Carey, 2009), with the word 
³1R´PDSSHGWRµUHMHFWLRQ¶Verving as a placeholder on which to build a logical operator. 
Perhaps children would begin to notice the correspondence between the truth value of a given 
proposition with and without a negation word (e.g. if THIS IS A BEAR is true, THIS IS NOT A BEAR is 
false, and vice versa), noticing also that the rejection meaning they already have forms a special 
case of truth-functional negation (i.e. NOT WANT). 
$GLIIHUHQWSRVVLELOLW\LVWKDWWKHODQJXDJHKHOSVWRµIL[¶WKHFRQFHSWE\K\SRWKHVLV-testing 
over a space of innately available possibilities that include a logical operator that changes truth 
YDOXHDVLQ)RGRU¶VUDGLFDOQDWLYLVWDFFRXQW2QWKLVDFFRXQWODQJXDJHPD\DOVRSOD\D
central role in concept fixation. Without the syntactic data about the distribution of grammatical 
constructions in which negation words appear and without sufficient lexical and syntactic 
knowledge to understand what the proposition would mean without the negation operator 
applied, it may not be possible for the hypothesis-testing procedure to fix the right concept in 
thought.  
Of course, even the most basic computations involved in any mental processing done by 
children involve some computation-internal use of logical negation. Logical NOT-gates are 
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among the most basic building blocks of all computation. What, if any, is the connection 
between these small computational elements, which can be specified as inhibitory activation 
even in the intracellular mechanisms of individual cells, and the concept of negation ± that 
representation which gets mapped to the words ³1R´ and ³1RW´ early in the third year of life, and 
which combines so freely with other concepts, like BEARS and MARS? Coming up with a detailed 
account for how truth-functional negation could be derived from a different, non-logical meaning 
is a central problem for future research on the development of negation. One possibility 
suggested by Bloom (1970) and supported by Pea (1980a) is that truth-functional negation is not 
derived from rejection, but rather from a different, intermediate meaning. 
3.6.1. Nonexistence vs. Denial 
2QHRIWKHWKUHHFDWHJRULHVRULJLQDOO\XVHGLQ%ORRP¶VWD[RQRP\RIQHJDWLRQSURGXFWLRQ
is nonexistence. As Bloom (1970) and Pea (1980a) suggest, nonexistence may be a distinct 
meaning that emerges after rejection and before denial, and the ability to deny might be built 
upon the ability to express nonexistence. We have said little about it to this point, focusing 
mostly on the contrast between rejection and denial, yet the hiding-game paradigms used both by 
us here and by Austin, et al. (2014) are readily viewed as testing the comprehension of 
nonexistence negation rather than denial. After all, the negative clue gives information about the 
ball not being in one of the containers after the hiding procedure established that it might have 
been there. That may seem as clear a case of nonexistence negation as ever there was. 
Nevertheless there are a number of reasons to think that the hiding paradigms test for the 
presence of truth-functional negation, perhaps not in contrast to, but in the specific context of 
nonexistence. First, despite Bloom distinguishing nonexistence from denial as separate 
meanings, and Pea associating the latter but not the former with the truth-functional logical 
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operator, it is not clear that nonexistence and truth-functional negation could possibly be 
semantically distinct. What would it look like to specify the meaning of a nonexistence concept 
as something distinct from truth-functional negation? One tempting option might be to say that 
negation specifies a set of things that does not contain the predicate being negated, so that the 
utterance ³No juice!´ uttered upon opening the fridge means something like, 'the things in the 
fridge each have the property of not being juice'. As semanticists have often pointed out, this 
analysis of the meaning of negation quickly runs into problems (Geach, 1972; see Heim and 
Kratzer, 1998). Compare the sentences: 
(1a) There are no bears on Mars 
(1b) There is a bear named Smokey on Mars 
If we treat both noun phrases in 1a and 1b as denoting sets of entities, in the case of 1b 
we would analyze that phrase as specifying a set containing a bear. Composing it with the 
predicate ON MARS, the meaning of the sentence would be: There is something that is a bear 
named Smokey and that thing is also on Mars. That reflects the meaning of 1b just fine. But if 
we run the same analysis for 1a, we get gibberish. Taking NO BEARS to mean the set of things that 
are not bears and combining it with the predicate ON MARS, the meaning of the sentence would 
be: there are things that are not bears and those things are on Mars. This is clearly not the right 
meaning, at least not for adults. To posit that children have a separate 'nonexistence' negation 
along these lines would be to posit that this incorrect meaning is exactly the one children would 
derive from ³There are no bears on Mars´. While this has not been tested empirically, we 
propose that it is extremely unlikely children derive this kind of incorrect interpretation 
systematically.  
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The solution, semantically, is to identify ³1R´ not with a function that takes some 
subsection of a set (that is, none of it), but as a function that relates two sets to each other. By 
this analysis, the ³1R´ in ³There are no bears on Mars´ specifies a relation between the set of 
bears and the set of things that are on Mars ± it specifies that these two sets do not intersect (a bit 
more technically, that their intersection is the empty set). With this denotation of negation, the 
meaning of ³No juice!´ in the context of opening the fridge is: the set of juice and the set of 
things in the fridge do not intersect. That gives the right meaning, but it is also just the standard 
semantic denotation for truth-functional negation. For anyone claiming that nonexistence 
negation and truth-functional negation are distinct, the challenge would be to define a distinct 
meaning for nonexistence that makes the right predictions about how it is used and understood 
by children. 
(YHQLIDQDGHTXDWHGHQRWDWLRQIRUµQRQH[LVWHQFH¶FRXOGEHJLYHQDQGLIWKHPHDQLQJVRI
µGHQLDO¶DQGµQRQH[LVWHQFH¶QHJDWLRQUHDOO\DUHVHSDrate, there is another reason to think that the 
search task used here and by Austin, et al. relies on understanding denials. Children begin to 
produce denial negations reliably between 24-30 months, by various estimates (Bloom, 1970; 
Pea, 1980b, 1982; Hummer, Wimmer and Antes, 1993; Choi, 1988). The ages over which 
children begin to succeed in these tasks match the ages over which they begin to produce denials, 
DQGQRWWKHDJHDWZKLFKWKH\SURGXFHµQRQH[LVWHQFH¶QHJDWLRQVZKLFKLVVLJQLILFDQWO\HDUOLHU
(Bloom, 1970, Pea, 1980a; Choi, 1988). 
3.6.2. Denial and truth-functional negation 
While here we have equated denial negation uses with the truth-functional concept, a 
QXPEHURIUHVHDUFKHUVKDYHVXJJHVWHGWKDWFKLOGUHQ¶VGHQLDOVDUHPHWDOLQJXLVWLFUDWKHUWhan truth-
functional (Hummer, et al., 1993; Moll, 2013; Guidetti, 2005). A metalinguistic negation is a 
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judgment that the negated statement is in some way conversationally inappropriate. It is indeed 
plausible that at least some of the denial negations produced by children are of this kind. When 
an adult points to a picture of a bear and calls it a cat, causing the child to say ³No! Bear!´ 
(Hummer, et al., 1993), the child may not be representing that it is false that the picture depicts a 
cat. Instead, the child might notice that no cats are present or had been mentioned previously, 
DQGDQ\ZD\WKDWLWLVZHLUGWRFDOOWKLVWKLQJWKDWLVFOHDUO\DEHDUDQ\WKLQJEXW&KLOGUHQ¶V³No!´ 
may therefore be commenting on the inappropriate speech act of the adult rather than its truth 
YDOXH,QWKLVZD\DPHWDOLQJXLVWLFUHMHFWLRQLVFORVHVWWRµUHMHFWLRQ¶LQPHDQLQJ± it is a labeling 
of an aversive response, but with the response being to a speech act rather than an offer or an 
order. 
While it is plausible that a child saying ³No!´ is making a metalinguistic denial, it is 
harder to see the comprehension of sentence-internal negation as the comprehension of 
metalinguistic speech acts in the present experimental context. Perhaps in Experiment 3, where 
the parent asks, ³Is it in the bucket?´ and the experimenter answers ³1RLW¶VQRW´, the negation 
could be interpreted as metalinguistic. But what metalinguistic interpretation could be given to 
the negative utterances in Experiments 1 and 2, where the experimenter simply says, ³,W¶VQRWLQ
the bucket?´ To see this as a metalinguistic denial, the child would need to think that the 
experimenter is commenting on the inappropriateness of the claim that the ball is in the bucket; 
but no such claim had been made, except in the clause that is negated by the Experimenter 
herself. That children correctly understand the negated sentence and search in the other location 
suggests that they understand negation as a semantic, truth-functional operator. And in turn, that 
the ages at which children increasingly produce denial negations match the ages at which they 
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come to understand both ³1RW´ and ³1R´ in the search paradigm suggests that denials reflect the 
use of the same logical operator in production. 
 
 
3.6.3. Affirmatives and the processing of negation 
While the block order effects we find are less robust than the ages of success and failure, 
depending as they do on the exclusion criterion used, they are consistent across Experiments 1-3. 
That there are block order effects suggests that the 24-month-old group does not perform at 
chance merely because it consists of some kids who have mapped the words ³1R´ and ³1RW´ to 
the logical concept and some who have not, but that children go through a genuine transitional 
phase ± a point at which they have mapped ³1R´ and ³1RW´ to the logical concept, but do not 
consistently deploy it when they get negative trials first. Why would getting affirmative trials 
ILUVWKHOSWKHVHFKLOGUHQ¶VSHUIRUPDQFH" 
One possibility is semantic ± perhaps constructing representations of negative statements 
is a semantically taxing process, with a negation operator being particularly difficult to integrate 
into the meaning of a proposition. If constructing a negation involves first constructing an 
affirmative and then negating it, so that practice with the affirmative decreases the overall 
workload involved in computing the negation (Kaup, et al., 2006; Clark & Chase, 1972; 1974; 
Carpenter & Just, 1975).  
Another possibility is pragmatic ± perhaps negatives are more plausible or natural within 
a discourse following a series of affirmatives, and similar affirmatives in particular (see Flusberg 
& DeVilliers, 1975; Wason, 1965). Indeed, proponents of this account have argued that many 
studies pointing to the general difficulty of comprehending negation do not provide a sufficiently 
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supportive discourse context. Hearing a series of similar affirmative assertions lends pragmatic 
support and contextual plausibility to a relevant negative assertion appearing later on in the 
discourse, and this appears to facilitate the processing of negation for adults (Niewland & 
Kuperberg, 2008; Tian Breheny, & Ferguson, 201). 
Testing between these two possibilities would require isolating semantic and pragmatic 
factors. One approach would be to make the discourse context as supportive as possible for the 
introduction of a negation, without actually introducing the affirmative proposition into the 
discourse. If this eases comprehension success, it would point to the involvement of pragmatic 
factors. If it eliminates the difficulty with processing negation entirely, it would point to the lack 
of purely semantic difficulty. 
3.6.4. What underlies the representation of emptiness?  
When 20-month-olds who fail in comprehending the truth-functional meaning of ³1R´ 
and ³1RW´ successfully avoid a bucket they have seen is empty, what underlies their success? 
What, if any, is the relationship between the representation generated when seeing the empty 
bucket and the representation only older children build when hearing that the ball is ³not in the 
bucket?´ One possibility is that 20-month-olds in Experiment 4 succeed on negative trials by 
using a logical negation operator, representing that ³the ball is not in the bucket´. In this case, 
their failure given verbal clues would indicate that they have not yet mapped the words ³1R´ and 
³1RW´ to the logical operator concept that they possess. Alternatively, their success with visual 
cues could be due to a non-logical representation ± perhaps a representation of emptiness, or a 
representation in a non-propositional format, such as visual imagery, which may not be able to 
support the use of a logical negation operator. 
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One way to choose between these possibilities would be with a non-verbal test of logical 
negation. Several studies that have presented pre-linguistic with tasks where they could succeed 
by deploying a negation operator have found a failure to do so. Feiman, Carey & Cushman  
(2015) found that although 7- and 14-month-olds represent APPROACH, but fail to represent 
AVOID, which they could compose as NOT-APPROACH if they possessed a negation operator able 
to participate in combinatorial thought. Similarly, Hochmann, Mody & Carey (under review) 
found that 14-month-olds represent SAME but not different, which they could have composed as 
NOT-SAME using a negation operator. Another clue is that children also begin to succeed on some 
tasks that may involve a negation operator around 18 months, such as using the mutual 
exclusivity criterion for word learning (Halberda, 2003), close to the age at which they succeed 
in the search task of Experiment 4. Taken together, these results point to the possibility that the 
representation of an empty container in Experiment 4 could deploy a logical negation operator, 
perhaps in a representation like THE BALL IS NOT IN THE BUCKET. However, a more direct test of 
the existence of a domain-general logical negation operator pre-linguistically is urgently needed. 
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Chapter 4:  
The logic in language: How all quantifiers are alike, but each quantifier is 
different  
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4.1. Introduction 
All languages have systematic rules of interpretation, allowing listeners to derive 
complex sentence meanings from combinations of words. The simplest hypothesis is that the 
rules that govern semantic and syntactic composition are perfectly coupled, so that every 
different meaning is expressed by a unique natural language sentence (Montague, 1968). 
Semantic ambiguities ± cases where the same sentence has two different meanings ± challenge 
this simple hypothesis, and thus are central to our understanding of the relationship between 
meaning and form. A particularly systematic type of ambiguity, known as a scope ambiguity, has 
been studied extensively by semanticists. A scope ambiguity arises whenever two quantifiers 
(like EVERY and A) occur in the same clause. For example, take the sentence: 
(1) Every kid climbed a tree 
This sentence could mean either that there is a single tree, climbed by every kid, or that 
every kid climbed some tree, but no two kids necessarily climbed the same one. The ambiguity 
in this sentence does not reflect an ambiguity in the speaker's mind, since we surely know which 
meaning we want to convey. Thus we must have some format of representation that is less 
ambiguous than the English sentence and which precedes language production. In many 
semantic theories (see Hornstein, 1984; May, 1985; Heim & Kratzer, 1998 inter alia), this is 
captured by positing a level of representation, Logical Form (LF), separate from the surface form 
of the sentence, where the two interpretations are distinct. The two LFs for (1), ignoring tense, 
are presented below, with corresponding paraphrases: 
(2a) ׊x[Kid(x) Æ ׌y[Tree(y) ר climbed(x,y)]] 
For every x, if x is a kid, then there exists a y, such that y is a tree and x climbed y 
(2b) ׌y[Tree(y) ר ׊x[Kid(x) Æ climbed(x,y)]] 
There exists a y, such that y is a tree, and for all x, if x is a kid, then x climbed y 
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These LF representations are not ambiguous the way the English sentence (1) is because 
they specify the order in which the two quantifiers bind their variables. (2a) has the universal 
quantifier EVERY taking the widest possible scope, with the value for y being fixed relative to 
each choice of the value for x. This is the interpretation with potentially many trees ± for every 
kid, a different tree. We refer to tKLVDVD³8QLYHUVDO-ZLGH´RU³8-ZLGH´LQWHUSUHWDWLRQELVWKH
interpretation where there can be only one tree. The variable for the tree, y, is fixed first, and then 
the universal quantifier ranges over many values of x in relation to that y. This sort of LF has the 
Existential quantifier, AWDNLQJZLGHVFRSHDQGZHUHIHUWRLWDVDQ³([LVWHQWLDO-ZLGH´RU³(-
ZLGH´LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ6HQWHQFHVOLNHDUHWKXVVFRSDOO\DPELJXRXVEHFDXVHWKHWZRSRVVLEOH
meanings arise from the relative scope of the two quantifiers EVERY and A in LF. 
The factors that affect how scope ambiguities are interpreted have been a topic of 
extensive study and debate within linguistics, but only recently has the application of 
psycholinguistic methods been used to ask about the content of LF representations (Raffray & 
Pickering, 2010; see also, Chemla & Bott, 2015). Raffray and Pickering were interested in how 
the construction of one LF representation affects the construction of another and what these 
patterns can tell us about the information that is relevant for constructing a logical form.  Their 
study focused solely on sentences with EVERY and A. Participants read scopally ambiguous 
sentences like (1), and then picked, from two pictures, the one they thought best matched the 
sentence. On the prime trials, participants were forced to pick a picture corresponding to one 
scopal interpretation (e.g. the U-wide interpretation) because the other picture mismatched the 
sentence based either on the subject or object noun. On the target trials, which immediately 
followed the primes, participants read a new scopally ambiguous sentence, like (3) with the same 
two quantifiers, but different nouns.  
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(3) Every hiker climbed a hill 
Participants were then given a choice between two pictures, one for each of the scopal readings 
of the target sentence (see Fig. 4.3). Raffray and Pickering found that participants were more 
likely to pick a U-wide target picture after a U-wide prime than an E-wide prime. They interpret 
this priming effect as evidence of shared representational resources across the LFs constructed 
from the prime and target sentences. 
Our experiments explore the locus of this priming effect, asking whether there are shared 
mental structures across sentences with different quantifiers and those with different verbs. We 
have two main goals. One is to home in on the nature of the operations used to construct 
different scopal interpretations, exploring what is represented explicitly by the combinatorial 
semantic machinery, and what kinds of content are irrelevant for these operations (what 
distinctions they abstract away from). For example, is it the case that the specific lexical entries 
of verbs are called upon as part of the combinatorial process that assembles quantifiers in 
different scopal relations to each other, or are individual verb meanings irrelevant to the scopal 
operations that are being primed in this procedure? The other, complimentary goal is to use our 
findings about the degree of abstraction in LF to speak to longstanding assumptions in the formal 
semantics literature about the distinction between conceptual content and the combinatorial 
properties of meaning, as well as to debates on whether different quantifiers with similar 
meanings (e.g., universals) have different combinatorial properties and mechanisms for assigning 
scope.  Specifically we will explore: whether some quantifiers necessarily force a U-wide or E-
wide reading (and therefore do not, in fact, give rise to scope ambiguities), whether some types 
of readings are systematically more difficult to construct than others, and whether particular 
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quantifiers (EVERY, ALL, and EACH; TWO, THREE and FOUR) share a common mechanism of scope 
assignment. 
In the remainder of the introduction, we provide a brief outline of linguistic theories of 
TXDQWLILHUVFRSHGLVFXVVKRZ5DIIUD\DQG3LFNHULQJ¶VH[SHULPHQWVEHDURQWKHVHWKHRULHVDQG
outline our plan to exploit this paradigm to answer new questions. 
4.1.1 Theoretical approaches to quantifier scope 
How listeners derive an unambiguous representation from an ambiguous surface structure 
like (1) is a matter of longstanding debate (for a review see Ruys and Winter, 2010). Several 
classes of theories have been proposed. All posit additional operations on top of syntactic parsing 
of the surface structure, but they differ as to whether these operations are syntactic (e.g. 
Quantifier Raising or QR, Chomsky, 1976; May, 1977; 1985; Quantifying-in, Montague, 1972; 
Rodman, 1976) or semantic (e.g. Cooper storage, Cooper, 1983; Keller, 1988; type-shifting of 
expressions, Hendriks, 1988; type-shifting of composition rules, Barker, 2002) or involve a more 
complex mapping at the syntax-semantics interface (e.g., a lexicalized grammar where different 
quantifier words have different scopal mechanisms,  Beghelli and Stowell, 1997; Steedman, 
2012; See also Reinhart, 1997; Winter, 2001). 
Evidence for and against different theories of quantifier scope has come from patterns of 
judgments about the availability of different readings for scopally ambiguous sentences. For 
example, prima facie evidence of parallel constraints on the movement of both Wh-phrases and 
quantifiers out of relative clauses provided some of the early evidence in favor of quantifier 
scope relying on syntactic operations like QR, but no theory yet exists that can easily account for 
all of the intricate patterns of preference and grammaticality judgments of different readings (see 
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Ruys and Winter, 2010). Indeed, finding such a theory has been one of the key projects of 
semantics. 
,WLVZRUWKQRWLQJWKDWWKHWHUP³/RJLFDO)RUP´LVVSHFLILFWRWKHV\QWDFWLFWKHRULHV
though we will be using it in a theory-neutral manner. Following Hornstein (1984) and May 
(1985), LF is commonly described as a level of representation that is separate from surface 
syntax, directly interpreted by a semantic mechanism, but not directly connected to phonetic 
form (with operations like QR therefore being covert, as opposed to overt syntactic operations 
like Wh- movement). Our use of the term LF throughout this paper does not indicate a 
commitment to this framework. All theories require some representations that disambiguate 
between the kinds of readings given by (2a) and (2b). We refer to these unambiguous 
representations as LF, and to the derivation of unambiguous meaning as the construction of LF, 
both for convenience and because the LF tradition has been the most dominant one in 
discussions of scope ambiguity. Importantly, however, the questions that we address in this paper 
arise in all theories of scope ambiguity, even though the terminology changes. 
4.1.2 Accounting for scope preferences 
Prior linguistic work has identified three factors that may influence which reading of a 
scope ambiguity is preferred. First, the order of the quantifiers in the sentence has been argued to 
be a major factor in their relative scope assignment, with quantifiers earlier in the sentence 
preferring wide scope (Johnson-Laird, 1969; Lakoff, 1971). In languages like English, the earlier 
quantifier is typically the quantifier that is higher in the syntactic tree.  When these factors are 
disentangled, some theorists have argued that it is the higher quantifier (not the earlier one) that 
takes wide scope (Jackendoff, 1972; VanLehn, 1978; Lidz & Musolino, 2002). This observation 
is broadly consistent with syntactic theories (e.g. May, 1985), which posit that a costly raising 
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operation is required when a quantifier that is lower in the syntactic tree (like an object 
quantifier) takes wide scope. If we assume that the parser avoids costly operations, this predicts a 
preference for linear scope readings (see Lidz & Musolino, 2002 for discussion). 
Second, other theorists have suggested that scope preferences have a lexical component. 
In her seminal work, Ioup (1975) observed that different quantifier words seem to fall along a 
hierarchy based on the scope they prefer to take (see also VanLehn, 1978; Vendler, 1967; Quine, 
1960 for related observations). This hierarchy is reproduced in (4) with quantifiers preferring 
wider scope appearing on the left: 
(4) EACH > EVERY > ALL > MOST > MANY > SEVERAL > SOME > A FEW 
Ioup observes that, in general, quantifiers that select a larger set size seem to prefer wide 
scope over those that select smaller sets, but she makes no claims about why that should be. 
Since then, nearly every study of the comprehension and production of scopally ambiguous 
sentences has found lexically-based differences in the preferred scope assignments of 
quantifiers±though most of these studies have only examined sentences containing EVERY and A . 
EVERY prefers to take wide scope over A (generating the U-wide reading) regardless of the linear 
or hierarchical order of the quantifiers (Chemla & Bott, 2015; Clark & Kar, 2011; Raffray & 
Pickering, 2010; Bott & Radó, 2007; Filik, Paterson & Liversedge, 2004; Gillen, 1991; Micham, 
Catlin, VanDerven & Loveland, 1980; Catlin & Micham, 1975). The one exception to this 
generalization is a study by Kurtzman and MacDonald (1993), which found a slight preference 
for A to take wide scope over EVERY. This finding, however, has been argued to reflect factors 
specific to the dependent measure that they used (see Tunstall, 1998, for discussion). Thus the 
broader generalization appears to be secure. 
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However, it is not clear that the observed differences between sentences containing 
different quantifiers are caused by stable lexical properties that play a role in scope assignment. 
The third and final possibility is that scopal disambiguation is based on more general conceptual 
knowledge or expectations about the sorts of things that speakers are likely to say (Katz, 1980; 
Fodor, 1982; Van Berkum, Brown, & Hagoort, 1999; Altmann & Steedman, 1988).  For 
example, if the context suggests that there might be a single referent for a singular indefinite 
(like A TREE) then the listener is more likely to get an E-wide reading. But if the context suggests 
that multiple referents would be needed, then a U-wide reading would be preferred. On this 
hypothesis, differences in the number of things being discussed affect the plausibility of the 
message and so different quantifiers will show different patterns of interpretation, even though 
lexical knowledge plays no direct role in comprehension. For example, the observation that 
EVERY often takes scope over A could merely be a side effect of the fact that the discourses we 
encounter and construct with these words are more apt to support a U-wide interpretation than an 
E-wide one. 
4.1.3 The abstractness of the operation 
The present paper uses priming to explore the nature of the operations involved in 
disambiguating scope, following Raffray and Pickering (2010).  These questions are separate 
from the debates between QR, type-shifting, and other linguistic theories, although they bear on 
those issues. Whatever theory one takes, there is a question about the abstractness of the 
disambiguating operations. For example, if the E-wide LF in (2b) is constructed by raising the 
object quantifier to a higher scope position in LF, then there is a question of how many raising 
operations there are and how they work ± is there a single operation that raises the object 
quantifier or the second quantifier in a sentence, whatever it happens to be? Or is there a single 
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operation for raising universal quantifiers but a separate operation for raising number 
quantifiers? Or are there different raising operations for each quantifier word? These same 
questions arise for a type-shifting account, only phrased in terms of the nature of the type-
shifting operations. And perhaps some quantifiers are subject to movement by QR while others 
take wide scope through type-shifting or another mechanism. 
The factors that influence preferred scope readings bear on the issue of the abstractness of 
WKHVFRSLQJRSHUDWLRQV,RXS¶VREVHUYDWLRQVJLYHXVUHDVRQWRVXVSHFWWKDWWKHUHPLJKWEH
different operations for different quantifiers ± the operation that acts on EACH and preferentially 
gives it wide scope might be different than the operation acting on A, which prefers to assign it 
narrow scope. That evidence is only suggestive, however. It could also be the case that there is a 
single abstract operation, but that quantifier words vary in the degree to which they call upon it. 
And as we mentioned above, it is possible that these differences reflect expectations about 
different situations in the world or the things others are likely to talk about, with different 
quantifier words being correlated with these expectations. 
Raffray and Pickering's findings (2010) provide some initial insights into properties of 
the operations involved in constructing LF. Their first experiment, described above, 
demonstrates that scopal relations can be primed when the quantifiers are held constant but the 
nouns vary.  In the subsequent experiments they established that the priming effect holds when 
the prime sentence is passivized, while the target stays active.  The U-wide interpretation of a 
sentence like, ³$WUHHZDVFOLPEHGE\HYHU\NLG´ primes the U-wide interpretation of a sentence 
like "Every hiker climbed a hill". This pattern demonstrates that the primed operation (or 
representation) is sensitive to the underlying agent (the deep subject) but unaffected by changing 
the syntactic position of the arguments.  These results, however, leave open the question of 
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whether LF construction involves a number of different operations that are specific to individual 
quantifier words, like EVERY and A, or is one general operation that applies to many or even all 
quantifiers. 
One way we address this question in the present work is by asking what role lexical 
content plays in LF construction. Are lexical items merely one cue (among many) that bias us 
toward particular scope relations?  Or is LF construction differentiated according to the lexical or 
semantic content of quantifiers? This investigation also provides an opportunity for looking at 
the meaning shared between different quantifiers ± if an LF is abstract relative to the universal 
quantifiers, but not others, it would suggest that the universals have an underlying 
representational similarity that plays a role in scope assignment and LF construction. 
In Experiment 1, we begin with baseline measures of how scopally ambiguous sentences 
with different quantifiers are interpreted, when not preceded by any prime. We test the three 
English universals EVERY, EACH, and ALL, as well as numbers like THREE, FOUR and FIVE. This 
will allow us to test whether these different quantifiers show different scopal preferences, as 
suggested by Ioup (1975) and others.  It will also provide a baseline for subsequent priming 
effects. In Experiment 2, we take the same quantifiers and use them as both primes and targets in 
order to look at whether the priming effect found by Raffray and Pickering extends from one 
universal quantifier to another (e.g.  EACH to ALL, EVERY to EACH, etc.), holding constant other 
factors like discourse, noun and verb content. We also examine whether there is a priming effect 
at LF between quantifiers from different families ± from a universal in the prime to a number in 
the target, and vice versa. We find that priming seems to be limited to cases where the same 
quantifier appears in the prime and the target. Experiment 3 rules out the hypothesis that this 
pattern simply reflects a sudden drop off in priming due to the number of words that the prime 
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and target have in common. We compare prime and target sentences that share the same 
quantifiers and have either the same verb or different verbs, and find robust priming effects in 
both cases. Experiment 4 looks at priming across sentences with different numbers. Although 
they are different lexical items, they are highly semantically related. We find priming that 
extends from one number to another. 
4.2. Experiment 1: Baselines 
4.2.1 Method 
4.2.1.1. Participants 
For every condition in every experiment reported below, we recruited 128 unique 
participants on Amazon Mechanical Turk. Participants had to have had 98% of their previous 
work approved and had to be logging in from an IP address within the United States. Participants 
were barred from participating in more than one condition across all the experiments reported 
here. Participants were excluded for answering less than 90% of filler trials correctly in all 
experiments or if they indicated that English was not their first language. After these exclusions 
were applied, there were 116 participants in each of the EVERY (Mean age: 30.7, Range: 18-78), 
ALL (Mean age: 30.4, Range: 18-66) and number (Mean age: 34.8, Range: 19-73) conditions, and 
119 in the EACH condition (Mean age: 30.4, Range: 18-57), who were included in the results 
below. 
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Fig. 4.1.: Sample stimuli for Experiment 1. Filler trials (top) always directly preceded target trials 
(bottom). The correct picture choice on the filler trial depicted the corresponding reading of the sentence 
while the incorrect choice pictured a noun not present in the sentence. 
 
4.2.1.2. Stimuli 
Experiment 1 used 24 target items, taken from Raffray and Pickering (2010, R&P 
hereafter), each of which consisted of a scopally ambiguous sentence (e.g. ³(YHU\KLNHUFOLPEHG
DKLOO´) and two pictures.  One picture depicted a U-wide reading (e.g. three hikers, each 
climbing a different hill), and the other depicted the E-wide reading (e.g. three hikers climbing 
the same hill). An example of a target trial is shown in Figure 4.1. Depending on the condition, 
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the subject quantifier in the sentence was either EVERY, EACH, ALL, or one of the numbers 
(THREE, FOUR or FIVE). The object quantifier was always A.  
$VLQ5	3¶V([SHULPHQWDOO of the sentences contained 12 past tense verbs (e.g., 
CLIMBED, CHASED, WATCHED) in an active construction, with animate subject nouns and either 
animate or inanimate objects in equal halves (E.g. ³7KUHHKLNHUVFOLPEHGDKLOO´ or ³)RXUVDLORUV
saw an airplDQH´). There were either three, four or five subject entities (with a third of the trials 
having each number. The number of object entities was either one (for the E-wide pictures), or 
the same as the number of subject entities (for the U-wide pictures; see Fig. 4.1). The side on 
which the U-wide and E-wide pictures appeared was counterbalanced within subjects. 
Target trials were separated by three to five filler trials. There were 96 unambiguous filler 
trials in total. These, like target trials, consisted of a sentence and two pictures. However, fillers 
had unambiguous transitive sentences (e.g. ³7KHDQJHOVPHOOHGWKHIORZHU´; see Fig. 4.1) which 
matched one of the pictures, while the other picture depicted a different subject or object. Of the 
fillers, 72 items were taken from R&P, altered only to make all sentences transitive, so that they 
would more closely resemble target items.  The remaining 24 fillers were new items, constructed 
E\UHXVLQJVRPHRIWKHSLFWXUHSDLUVIURP5	3¶VILOOHUVEXWFKDQJLQJWKH sentence so that the 
picture choice that was previously a distractor would be correct (e.g. ³7KHDQJHOVPHOOHGWKH
SHUIXPH´ for the same sample filler pictures in Fig. 4.1). To familiarize participants to the 
forced-choice task, an additional seven practice trials were provided. These had the same 
structure as the fillers. Stimuli were presented in one of two orders, one the reverse of the other. 
4.2.1.3. Procedure 
Participants first filled out a demographic questionnaire that asked, among other 
questions, whether English was their first language. They then completed the seven practice 
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trials before proceeding with the experiment. On each trial, participants read a printed sentence 
centered above two pictures. Participants were instructed to select the picture that matched their 
interpretation of the sentence. They made their selection by clicking on one of the radio buttons 
located underneath each picture. Participants could not click on both buttons, and could not 
advance to the next trial until they clicked a button. Each trial was presented on a separate page, 
so that participants could not see multiple trials at once or return to a previous trial. 
4.2.2 Results and Discussion 
Our dependent variable was whether the participant selected the universal wide picture, 
which we will call a U-wide response, on the target trials. Results for each quantifier condition 
are presented in Figure 4.2. The data was analyzed in the R programming language, v3.1.0 using 
the lme4 package, v1.1-8 (Bates, et al., 2015) to build a logit mixed-effects model (see Jaeger, 
2008) with the maximal random effects structure appropriate for this experimental design (Barr, 
et al., 2013). Table 4.1 shows the results of the statistical analyses and Figure 4.2 shows the U-
wide response rates by condition.  
Target Quantifier, in this experiment, was the fixed variable of interest, with four levels 
corresponding to the different quantifier words tested. In our initial omnibus model we treated 
the ALL condition as the baseline and included three predictors, one for each of the remaining 
conditions (i.e., a dummy coding scheme). In addition, the model included subject and item as 
random effects with random intercepts. In this analysis, EACH and EVERY resulted in more U-
wide responding than ALL, while the numbers results in less U-wide responding than ALL (see 
Table 4.1). Follow-up analyses contrasted pairs of conditions in descending order of U-wide 
response rate: EACH vs. EVERY (z=3.29; p=0.001; EVERY vs. ALL (z=15.1, p<0.0001); ALL vs. 
numbers(z=-9.55; p<0.0001). 
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Fig. 4.2.3DUWLFLSDQWV¶UDWHVRI8-wide choices on ambiguous target trials in Experiment 1. Error bars 
indicate 95% confidence intervals, averaged across items with subjects as the random variable. 
 
Predictor Coefficient Wald Z p-value 
Intercept -2.62 -7.35  0.0001   *** 
Condition = Every Baseline       6.64 14.82 <0.0001  *** 
Condition = Each Baseline   8.14 16.81 <0.0001  *** 
Condition = Number Baseline    -4.31 -9.58 <0.0001  *** 
Table 4.1: Logit mixed effects omnibus model for Experiment 1, with all quantifier baselines and the ALL 
condition as the dummy-coded contrast. 
 
These findings strongly support earlier claims, grounded in linguistic intuitions, that 
different quantifier words strongly influence scope resolution (Ioup, 1975; Vendler, 1967; Quine, 
$WILUVWJODQFHWKHVHUHVXOWVDSSHDUWRFRQILUP,RXS¶VKLHUDUFKy, in which EACH has the 
strongest wide-scope preference, followed closely by EVERY, with ALL showing a preference for 
a narrow scope reading (i.e., an E-ZLGHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQ%XWFULWLFDOO\,RXS¶VSURSRVDOLVDERXW
the relative scope preferences between these different quantifiers (e.g., that EVERY will take 
scope over ALL). Our findings demonstrate, instead, that there are differences in how likely these 
quantifiers are to take scope over another quantifier, the indefinite A.  
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Ioup observes that the ordering of quantifiers in her hierarchy can be characterized as a 
tendency for quantifiers picking out large sets to take scope over those picking out smaller sets. 
Ioup therefore predicts that universal quantifiers will consistently take scope over singular 
indefinites.  This prediction is correct for EVERY and EACH but not for ALL, which was often 
given an E-wide interpretation, even though ALL picks out sets that are just as large, if not larger 
(see Tunstall, 1998) than the others. Similarly, on Ioup's proposal, numbers should take scope 
over A (since THREE clearly picks out more than one entity) but we instead find that the numbers 
had an extremely strong E-wide bias. In the General Discussion, we return to the implications of 
these findings for accounts that emphasize the influence of structural rather than lexical factors 
on scope preference. 
We now proceed to the heart of the investigation, exploring whether and to what degree 
different quantifiers share common mechanisms of scope assignment by looking at patterns of 
priming. The results of Experiment 1 will provide a baseline for evaluating the priming effects of 
Experiment 2. 
4.3. Experiment 2: Between and within quantifiers 
4.3.1. Method 
4.3.1.1. Participants 
An additional 128 unique participants were recruited for every prime-target quantifier 
pairing. The exclusion criteria were the same as for Experiment 1. After these exclusions were 
applied, the means of ages ranged between 29.4 and 33.1 across conditions, with comparably 
wide age ranges to Experiment 1. Table 4.2 shows the numbers of participants in each prime-
target quantifier pairing after the application of the same exclusion criteria as in Experiment 1. 
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  Every Each All Number 
Every 112 112 108 116 
Each 118 123 121 120 
All 110 120 111 110 
Number 108 118 117 110 
Table 4.2: Numbers of participants in each prime-target quantifier pairing, after exclusion criteria were 
applied. Columns indicate the quantifier word in the target sentences and rows indicate the quantifier in 
the prime. 
 
4.3.1.2. Stimuli and Procedure 
The stimuli of Experiment 2 were similar to Experiment 1. We used the same target 
trials, preceded by novel primes. The prime trials took the place of the extra fillers created for 
Experiment 1, and were placed immediately before the corresponding target trials. The target 
trials and the other fillers were unchanged from Experiment 1. Each prime sentence was 
accompanied by a prime picture that matched the sentence (but forced the reading that was being 
primed) and a distractor picture, which mismatched the sentence on the subject noun (50%) or 
the object noun (50%), but matched the correct picture in terms of its quantifier-scope 
assignments (see for example, the U-wide and E-wide distractor items in Figure 4.3). The stimuli 
(sentences and pictures for both primes and targets) were taken from R&P, modifying only the 
quantifier words in the primes and targets. 
Across conditions, we manipulated the quantifier words used in the subject of the prime 
and target sentences (EVERY, EACH, ALL,18 or the numbers THREE, FOUR or FIVE) for a fully 
crossed 4(Prime Quantifier) X 4(Target Quantifier) between-participants design. Within 
participants, we manipulated Prime Scope (U-wide or E-wide). 
                                                          
18
 We used the partitive ALL OF THE instead of ALL to ensure that participants interpreted the sentence as referring 
solely to the depicted referents. ³$OONLGVFOLPEHGDWUHH´ could be interpreted as a universal generalization about 
children as a kind (e.g., All dogs descended from wolves), and under this interpretation the E-wide interpretation is 
wildly implausible. 
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We counterbalanced (within subjects and across items): the side of the correct prime 
picture, the side of the matching target picture, and whether the correct prime picture and 
matching target picture were on the same or opposite sides. The Prime Scope (U-wide or E-wide) 
was manipulated within item and within participant by creating two counterbalanced lists. Two 
orders were generated as in Experiment 1 with the constraint that no more than two trials in a 
row had the same Prime Scope. In all other respects, the procedure was identical to Experiment 
1. 
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Fig. 4.3: Sample prime and target items for Experiments 2 and 4. Prime trials (top) always directly 
preceded target trials (bottom). There were two types of prime trials ± U-wide and E-wide. The correct 
picture choice on the prime trial depicted the corresponding reading of the sentence while the incorrect 
choice pictured a noun not present in the sentence. Participants in the within-quantifier conditions of 
Experiment 2 saw prime and target sentences with the same quantifier words while participants in the 
between-quantifier conditions saw a different quantifier word in the prime than the target sentence. In 
Experiment 4, prime pictures were modified to show a different number of subject entities (e.g. extra 
kids) so that the prime sentence used a different bare numeral than the target (e.g³)RXUNLGVFOLPEHGD
WUHH´LQVWHDGRIWKUHHZKLOHWKHWDUJHWWULDOUHPDLQHGWKHVDPHHJ³7KUHHKLNHUVFOLPEHGDKLOO´ 
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4.3.2. Results and Discussion 
As in Experiment 1, the data was analyzed using logit mixed effects models. For all of 
the analyses described below, we modeled response type on the target trials (U-wide or E-wide), 
with random intercepts and random slopes relative to prime scope for subjects and items 
(uncorrelated with each other).19
 
Our central question is how different primes might influence the processing of the target 
sentences that follow them. From Experiment 1, we know that there are large baseline 
differences in preferred reading between target sentences with different quantifiers. Therefore, to 
look for priming effects, we hold the target sentence constant and look for changes in 
SDUWLFLSDQWV¶UHVSRQVHVDVDIDFWRURIERWKWKHW\SHRISULPHSUHFHGLQJDQ\JLYHQWDUJHW8-wide 
or E-wide) and the different quantifier words in the prime sentences. Critically, this analysis 
strategy allows us to focus on responses to the exact same target sentence and explore whether 
they vary based on the preceding primes.20 
4.3.2.1. Within-Quantifier Priming 
First, we want to establish whether the picture priming paradigm used here can indeed 
affecWSDUWLFLSDQWV¶WDUJHWFKRLFHZKHQWKHTXDQWLILHUVLQWKHSULPHDQGWDUJHWVHQWHQFHVPDWFK
The use of EVERY LQERWKSULPHDQGWDUJHWUHSOLFDWHVWKHGHVLJQRI5DIIUD\DQG3LFNHULQJ¶V
Experiment 1 (and see Chemla & Bott, 2015), while the other conditions extend this within-
                                                          
19
 In almost all of the analyses in all experiments, the inclusion of a parameter of correlation between the random 
slope and intercept in the model (the default setting in lme4 version 1.1-7) resulted in overparameterization of the 
model. This is unsurprising given that Prime Scope ± the variable by which the slope was being estimated ± is 
binary. In no analysis did the inclusion of the correlation estimate improve model fit on an ANOVA test between 
models. This parameter was therefore excluded from all analyses. 
20
 We tested all of the models reported here and in Experiment 3 and 4 with and without the two-level fixed effects 
of Order and List. We found some significant main effects and interactions of Prime Type and Prime Quantifier with 
these variables, reflecting the effects of specific items and orders. In no case did the inclusion or exclusion of these 
effects change the significance of the effects we were interested in. For simplicity and consistency, we therefore 
report the analyses without these fixed effects throughout. 
131 
 
quantifier priming design to the other quantifiers ± EACH, ALL, and the numbers THREE, FOUR, 
and FIVE. 
We find significant priming effects Within-Quantifier for EVERY (ȕ 0.63; z=3.8; 
p=0.0001), EACH (ȕ ] p<0.0001), ALL ȕ ] p<0.0001), and a marginally 
VLJQLILFDQWHIIHFWIRUWKHQXPEHUVȕ ] p=0.05). In a model including all four 
Within-Quantifier conditions, there were no significant interactions between Prime Scope and 
Condition, indicating that the size of the priming effects in each of the Within-Quantifier cases 
did not differ significantly from each other. 
4.3.2.2. Comparison of Between- vs. Within-Quantifier priming effects 
Next, we want to ask whether there are also priming effects between different quantifiers 
± when the prime contains one quantifier and the target another ± and whether these differ from 
the priming effects Within-Quantifier. We analyze each target quantifier separately, including 
fixed effects of Prime Scope (U- or E-wide), and Quantifier Overlap (Within- or Between-
Quantifier) and their interaction (Table 4.3). The interactions between Prime Scope and 
Quantifier Overlap are significant in all cases except for the numbers. 
Since we already know that there is Within-Quantifier priming for all four quantifiers in 
target position, we next examined only the Between-Quantifier conditions (without the Within-
Quantifier conditions for each target quantifier). These analyses included the fixed effects of 
Prime Scope (U- or E-wide) and Prime Quantifier (with three different prime quantifiers for 
every target quantifier, varying by target; for example, if EVERY was in the target, the three prime 
quantifiers included in this Between-Quantifier analysis would be EACH, ALL, and numbers). 
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  Intercept Prime Scope Quantifier 
Overlap 
Quantifier 
Overlap X 
Prime Scope 
Every ȕ  
z=10.12 
p<0.0001   *** 
ȕ  
z=0.48 
p=0.63 
ȕ -0.72 
z=-2.67 
p=0.008       
** 
ȕ  
z=3.68 
p=0.0002   *** 
Each ȕ  
z=19.59 
p<0.0001   *** 
ȕ  
z=1.93 
p=0.05             
ȕ -1.55 
z=-5.81 
p<0.0001   
*** 
ȕ  
z=2.89 
p=0.004       ** 
All ȕ -2.21 
z=-8.25 
p<0.0001   *** 
ȕ  
z=2.84 
p=0.004       ** 
ȕ -0.2 
z=-0.95 
p=0.34 
ȕ  
z=2.4 
p=0.01            * 
Number ȕ -4.62 
z=-17.39 
p<0.0001   *** 
ȕ  
z=0.06 
p=0.95 
ȕ  
z=1.31 
p=0.19 
ȕ  
z=1.47 
p=0.14 
Table 4.3: Within- vs Between-Quantifier analyses in Experiment 2. U-wide responses are coded as 1, 
and E-wide as 0. Each row is a separate logit mixed effects model, individuated by Target Quantifier. 
Each model includes a within-participant fixed effect of Prime Scope, a between-participants fixed effect 
of Quantifier Overlap, and an interaction between the two. 
 
We found a significant interaction between Prime Scope and Prime Quantifier in the case 
of number targets. Logistic mixed effects models of each Between-Quantifier condition (ie. with 
different Prime Quantifiers) separately showed that this interaction was driven by a significant 
effect of Prime Scope in the condition where the target sentences contained ALL and the prime 
sentences contained numbers (Z=2.01, p=0.04). Since this was a small effect and was not 
predicted by any theoretical account, we replicated this condition with an additional 128 
participants. Including the data from both the original run and the replication, the effect was no 
longer significant in this condition (z=1.51; p=0.13), nor was there any longer a significant Prime 
Scope by Prime Quantifier interaction in the larger Between-Quantifier model that included all 
of the Between-Quantifier conditions with number targets. We therefore conclude that the 
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original effect was a false positive. We conclude that there was no robust effect of Between-
Quantifier priming across any two quantifiers. 
Despite the lack of main effects of Prime Scope in the Between-Quantifier analyses for 
different target quantifiers, another planned comparison of theoretical interest is between the 
different types of Between-Quantifier cases. For example, if the quantifier in the target sentence 
is EVERY, primes with both EACH and a number are Between-Quantifier conditions. However, 
one of the central questions of this design is to ask whether there is more representational overlap 
between two quantifiers that may share a universal quantifier denotation (e.g. EVERY and EACH), 
as opposed to one universal quantifier and one existential with a specified set cardinality (e.g. 
EVERY and THREE). Looking only within the Between-Quantifier conditions, we separate 
universal primes EACH, EVERY, and ALL from non-universal number primes. Taking only the 
universal targets (EACH, EVERY, and ALL), we fit another logistic mixed effects model with fixed 
effects of Prime Scope and the factor of Universal-vs-Number-Prime, as well as their interaction. 
If, for example, there was a priming effect of EACH on EVERY, but not of THREE on EVERY, we 
would expect to see a significant interaction term. However, there were no significant 
interactions for any of the universal target quantifiers: EACH, EVERY, or ALL. 
Across the four target types, there was consistent scopal priming when and only when the 
prime and target shared the same quantifier.  This pattern seems to suggest that the operations 
that construct logical form are in some way specific to the individual quantifiers that are being 
manipulated.  For example, we would expect a pattern like this if a different Quantifier Raising 
operation was used in each case or if Logical Form templates were stored in a lexicalized 
grammar. 
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Fig. 4.3DUWLFLSDQWV¶UDWHRI8-wide choices on ambiguous target trials in Experiments 2, separated by 
whether the target quantifier was (a) EVERY (b) EACH (c) ALL or (d) numbers. Note the different scales on 
the Y-axes between panels. Responses are broken down by whether the target trial was preceded by a U-
wide or E-wide prime trial. The leftmost pair of bars in each graph shows the within-quantifier priming 
condition in that experiment, where the quantifier word is the same in both prime and target trials. The 
other pairs of bars show the between-quantifier conditions, with other quantifier words used in the prime 
sentences. 
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4.3.2.3. Context effects: Effects of Prime Quantifier independent of Prime Scope 
In addition to the priming effects of a prime on the target that follows it, seeing sentences 
with the same prime quantifier repeated throughout the experiment may have a contextual effect 
on target choice, independent of the prime scope in a specific prime-target pair. As Experiment 1 
shows, some quantifiers are strongly biased toward a U-wide interpretation (EACH being the most 
biased) and others are heavily E-ZLGHELDVHGWKHQXPEHUVPRVWVR'HVSLWHDSDUWLFLSDQWV¶
preferred reading, half of the prime trials a participant sees always force a U-wide reading, and 
the other half, an E-wide reading. This gradually gives participants increasing evidence that the 
normally dispreferred reading may be an acceptable one for that quantifier, and possibly for 
other quantifiers that are seen as similar. Thus, if participants repeatedly see a quantifier that they 
would normally assign either a U-wide or E-wide interpretation in the context of prime trials 
where the only available reading is the dispreferred one, they may adjust their expectations over 
time, resulting in a weaker bias on subsequent target trials containing that quantifier. If two 
different quantifiers are biased in the same direction, this effect may extend from one to the other 
in Between-Quantifier cases. In all cases, we would expect such a context effect to push target 
trial responses away from the baseline for that individual quantifier and closer to chance. 
4.3.2.4. Within-Quantifier Context Effects 
In the Within-Quantifier conditions, participants see the same quantifier word on 
subsequent trials ± within each prime-target pair ± as well as repeated through the experiment. 
Since each quantifier has a strong baseline bias, experience with primes that only match this bias 
half of the time could shift performance toward chance. For each target quantifier, we 
constructed a separate model comparing the baseline data from Experiment 1 to the Within-
Quantifier priming condition for that word in Experiment 2. The models included a between-
137 
 
subjects two-level variable of Prime Presence as the main predictor of interest (for example, the 
EVERY baseline from Experiment 1 compared to the EVERY-to-EVERY priming condition in 
Experiment 2).  
There was a significant effect of Prime Presence for every quantifier, except in the ALL-
to-ALL condition (z=1.61, p=0.1), suggesting that participants were sensitive to the presence of 
primes where they were forced to pick a dispreferred interpretation (see Fig. 4.5). We replicated 
the ALL-to-ALL Within-Quantifier condition with an additional 256 participants, of which 235 
were included, after the usual exclusions. Including both the original run and replication data, we 
first fit a logistic mixed-effects model to look for the effect of Prime Type in this condition, but 
adding a two-level fixed effect of replication (Replication vs. Original Run) and found no effect 
of replication, nor any interaction between prime type and replication. In this data, we replicated 
a highly significant effect of prime type (U-wide or E-wide), with p<0.0001 (see Sec 3.2.1.). 
Pooling both the replication and original data, we fit a model comparing the Within-Quantifier 
ALL condition to the ALL baseline from Experiment 1. Including the additional replication data, 
we now found a significant effect of Prime Presence (z=2.51, p=0.01), indicating a significant 
difference between the Within-Quantifier priming ALL-to-ALL condition and the ALL baseline 
condition. Consistent with the results for the other quantifiers, the priming condition was closer 
to chance (23% mean U-wide responses) than the baseline condition (21% U-wide responses). 
Given this pattern of results, we conclude that the original failure to find an effect in the ALL-to-
ALL condition was a false negative, and that there is a significant context effect between all 
Within-Quantifier conditions and their respective baselines. 
This pattern of results confirms that all of the quantifiers we tested allow for both 
readings. While all quantifiers were biased toward one of the readings, the context effect (as well 
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as the priming effect) show that experience with multiple readings can result in systematic shifts 
in how these ambiguous sentences are interpreted.   
 
Fig. 4.5: The Within-Quantifier conditions of Experiment 2 alongside the baselines from Experiment 1. 
Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals, averaged across items with subjects as the random variable. 
 
4.3.2.5. Between-Quantifier Context Effects 
*LYHQWKDWGLVWULEXWLRQDOLQIRUPDWLRQDERXWDTXDQWLILHU¶VVFRSHSUHIHUHQFHLVDFFXPXODWHG
and stored, we can ask which sets of quantifiers this information is aggregated over. Does 
information that changes the bias of one quantifier change the bias of the other as well? It could 
be that probabilities get updated only for a specific quantifier word, in which case we would 
expect to see main effects of Prime Quantifier in the Within-Quantifier conditions, but not 
Between-Quantifier condition, just as with the priming effects. Alternatively, it could be that two 
or more quantifiers form a single class, such that evidence that one quantifier is more or less 
biased than expected would shift the bias of another quantifier in the same class. Finally it is 
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possible that these probabilities are aggregated across all of the quantifiers as a single class, in 
which case there should be effects of Prime Quantifier in all of the Between-Quantifier 
conditions. 
 The relevant statistical test of this hypothesis ± a test for the main effect of Prime 
Quantifier for a given target, independent of the Prime Scope ± were hidden away in the 
Between-Quantifier analyses we discussed in Sec 3.2.2 above. Recall that in this analysis we 
constructed four separate models, one for each target quantifier, each of which included the 
following predictors: a three-level fixed effect of Prime Quantifier (capturing the three different 
Between Quantifier conditions), a two-level fixed effect of Prime Scope, and their interaction. 
Across these four models, we find only two significant main effects of Prime Quantifier (out of a 
total of 12 possible effects). In the model where EVERY is the target, we find a main effect of the 
condition where EACH is the prime (z=-3.49, p=0.0005), and in the model where EACH is the 
target, we find a main effect of the condition where EVERY is the prime (z=-2.96, p=0.003). To 
follow up on these effects, we compared these conditions to respective baselines for those target 
quantifiers (from Experiment 1). In a model including just the EVERY baseline condition from 
Experiment 1 and the EACH-to-EVERY priming condition from Experiment 2, we find a highly 
significant effect of Prime Presence (z=-7.41; p<0.0001). Similarly, in a model including the 
EACH baseline condition from Experiment 1 and the EVERY-to-EACH priming condition from 
Experiment 2, we find a significant effect of Prime Presence (z=-3.19; p=0.001). These effects 
are parallel to the Within-Quantifier context effects: the presence of a prime pushes target 
responses down closer to 50-DQGDZD\IURPWKHTXDQWLILHU¶VELDV 
We interpret these effects as evidence that participants adjust their expectations about the 
scope bias of EACH based on distributional information about EVERY, and vice versa. Why does 
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this information get aggregated across this pair of quantifiers and not across other pairs?  Perhaps 
there is some semantic property that is shared by EVERY and EACH, making them more similar to 
one another than they are to ALL or to numbers (see Champollion, 2010; Steedman, 2012, and 
Sec. 4.6.3. and 4.6.4. for theoretical considerations along these lines). Note, however, that any 
similarity of this kind is apparently not sufficient to allow scopal priming between EVERY and 
EACH. The systematic lack of Between-Quantifier priming effects between EACH and EVERY and 
the consistent presence of Between-Quantifier context effects for this pair suggests that there are 
at least two distinct types of representations or processes involved in LF construction (operating 
over different time scales), which our theoretical accounts should address. Constructing an LF 
online is a process that draws on prior beliefs about the scope bias of the quantifiers involved. 
The process that updates these prior beliefs appears to be sensitive to a representational similarity 
between EACH and EVERY. In contrast, the process that constructs the representation of quantifier 
scope (presumably based on the instructions provided by these priors) seems to treat these 
quantifiers as wholly distinct. 
4.3.2.6. Addressing deflationary accounts of the priming effects 
The pattern of findings reported above rules out several deflationary accounts of the locus 
of priming. First, given that we use a picture-choice task for both primes and targets, one 
deflationary possibility is that any priming effect might be due to greater visual similarity 
between a U-wide target picture and a U-wide prime ± rather than an E-wide prime ± picture. All 
U-wide pictures have pairs of agents acting on themes, while all E-wide pictures show many 
agents acting on a single theme. Similarly, the U-wide and E-wide pictures differ in the kinds of 
events they depict. In the U-wide picture, there are multiple events ± each agent acts separately 
on a different theme. The E-wide picture depicts a single event, where all of the agents act 
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together on the same theme. Another deflationary possibility is that the priming effect has little 
to do with linguistic representations, and occurs instead at the level of event representations. 
However, the significant interaction between the Within- and Between-Quantifier 
conditions and the lack of priming Between-Quantifiers provide strong evidence that picture 
similarity and event similarity are not responsible for this form of priming. Not only are the 
pictures and event structures the same in the Between-Quantifier conditions that do not prime as 
in the Within-Quantifier conditions that do, but the prime sentences in the Between-Quantifier 
conditions are ones that are capable of priming ± the very same prime sentences that produce a 
priming effect in their respective Within-Quantifier conditions.21 
Our findings demonstrate that scopal priming is mediated by linguistic representations: it 
depends on the identity of the quantifier and not just the picture or the event structure. Any 
deflationary account of priming would have to capitalize on the distinction between the 
conditions where priming is observed (Within Quantifier) and the conditions where it is absent 
(Between Quantifier). For example, the adjacent prime and target sentences in the Within-
Quantifier cases are more similar to one another, at the phonological and lexical levels, than the 
corresponding sentences in the Between-Quantifier cases, simply because they share an 
additional word. Maybe this global increase in sentence similarity leads participants to draw 
comparisons between the two sentences or to infer that similar responses are expected. 
Experiment 3 explores whether reducing the similarity of the prime and target sentences, without 
changing the quantifier, will decrease or eliminate scopal priming. In Experiment 2 (and in R&P) 
                                                          
21
 Raffray and Pickering (2010, Experiment 4) argue against an event- or picture-based interpretation of the priming 
effect, using a control condition that pairs the same pictures with generic sentences not containing quantifiers (e.g. 
³.LGVFOLPEWUHHV´7KH\ILQGQRSULPLQJHIIHFWEXWDQRYHUDOOLQIODWHGUDWHRIWDUJHW8-wide responding relative to 
sentences quantified with EVERY. This suggests participants may interpret such generics as closely matching U-wide 
pictures, and so the lack of priming may be specific to the U-wide reading of generics overriding any picture 
priming effect, rather than a demonstration that there is no such effect when the sentences are scopally ambiguous. 
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the primes and targets always had the same verb. In Experiment 3, the primes and targets have 
different verbs (but the same quantifier). We chose to manipulate similarity by changing the verb 
because verbs define the event type and are thus likely to affect perceived similarity. 
Furthermore, while verbs have no privileged role in interpreting quantifiers, they do play a 
critical role in language processing. For example, in studies of syntactic priming (the priming of 
argument structure alternations) effects are often larger when two sentences share a verb than 
when they do not (see e.g., Pickering & Branigan, 1998). If scopal priming depends on mere 
similarity, it should be reduced or absent in this Between-Verb study. In contrast, if the effects in 
Experiment 2 are due to quantifier specificity in the operations that build Logical Form, then 
priming in this Between-Verb study should be equal to the corresponding condition of 
Experiment 2. 
4.4. Experiment 3: Between-Verb priming 
4.4.1. Method 
4.4.1.1. Participants 
An additional 128 participants were recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk. The 
exclusion criteria were the same as for the previous experiments. After these exclusions were 
applied, 107 participants remained (M Age: 31.7, Range: 18-64). 
4.4.1.2. Stimuli and Procedure 
Experiment 3 used the same stimuli and procedure as the Within-Quantifier condition 
with EVERY in both prime and target sentences, with the only difference being in the pairing of 
prime-target trials; prime-target pairs were scrambled so that target trials no longer followed 
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prime trials containing the same verb (see Fig. 4.6 for an example).
 
Fig. 4.6: Sample prime and target items for Experiment 3. Prime trials (top) always directly preceded 
target trials (bottom). There were two types of prime trials ± U-wide and E-wide. The correct picture 
choice on the prime trial depicted the corresponding reading of the sentence while the incorrect choice 
pictured a noun not present in the sentence. The pairings of prime and target pairs was reshuffled in 
Experiment 3 relative to Experiment 2, so that prime and target sentences no longer shared their verb. 
 
4.4.2. Results and Discussion 
The data from target trials was analyzed using the same type of logistic mixed-effects 
model as Experiment 2, with a maximal random effects structure. We modeled response type on 
the target trials, with random slopes (relative to Prime Scope) and intercepts for subjects and 
144 
 
items and Prime Scope as a fixed factor. We found a main effect of Prime Scope in this 
Between-Verb condition (z=3.11; p=0.002). 
 
)LJ3DUWLFLSDQWV¶UDWHRI8-wide choices on ambiguous target trials in Experiment 3. Target trial 
responses are broken down by whether the target trial was preceded by a U-wide or E-wide prime trial. 
The left pair of bars shows the data from the Every-to-Every condition in Experiment 2. Error bars 
indicate 95% confidence intervals, averaged across items with subjects as the random variable. 
 
To compare the Between-Verb results from Experiment 3 to the equivalent Within-Verb 
condition of Experiment 2, another model included the EVERY-to-EVERY Within-Quantifier 
condition, including the same random effects, as well as the fixed effects of Prime Scope, Verb 
Overlap (Between- vs. Within-Verb) and their interaction. This model found no significant 
interaction (z=-0.8; p=0.42) and no main effect of Verb Overlap (z=0.35; p=0.73), but a highly 
significant main effect of Prime Type (z=4.31, p<0.0001). Figure 4.7 shows the rate of U-wide 
responding in Experiment 3 and the EVERY-to-EVERY condition of Experiment 2, which are 
similar. These results demonstrate that priming is not dependent on global similarity.  Changing 
the verb between prime and target had no effect on the magnitude of scopal priming.  In contrast, 
changing the quantifier in Experiment 2 eliminated scopal priming. 
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There are, however, two different ways in which priming could be quantifier-specific. 
First, priming could be tied to the phonological label of the quantifier. For example, each 
phonological label could have two semantic entries, one of which contains a type-shifting, QR, 
or some other operation to assign the quantifier wide scope, while the other does not. Thus 
priming of scope would occur only through a given phonological label. The second possibility is 
that quantifier specificity could be tied to substantive differences in the meanings of the 
operators. While scope ambiguity is a general property of quantification, some theorists have 
invoked distinct combinatorial structures and mechanisms to explain both general combinatorial 
and specific scopal properties of EVERY, EACH and ALL (Steedman, 2012; Beghelli & Stowell, 
1997; Champollion, 2010; see the General Discussion). Perhaps it is the differences between 
these meanings that are responsible for the specificity of the scopal priming effects. 
To disentangle the effects of phonological form from shared meaning, in Experiment 4 
we look for priming when a different number is used in the prime sentence than in the target 
sentence (THREE, FOUR or FIVE). Although there are many different analyses of the combinatorial 
semantics of number words (see, for example, Steedman, 2012; Heim and Kratzer, 1998; 
Beghelli and Stowell, 1997), within a given theory, different numbers always have identical 
combinatorial properties. The only differences between them are in the cardinality of the set they 
pick out. Thus, if different number words do not prime each other, it would suggest that the 
priming effect is mediated by their phonological labels. If sentences containing one number word 
do prime sentences containing a different one, then it would show that priming can occur 
independent of the phonological label. That would in turn suggest that the lack of priming 
between quantifiers in Experiment 2 is a sign of differences in their meanings ± specifically, in 
the semantic mechanisms of scope construction of each quantifier.   
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4.5. Experiment 4: Between numbers 
4.5.1. Method 
4.5.1.1. Participants 
An additional 128 participants were recruited. After applying the same exclusion criteria 
as in the preceding experiments, 112 participants (M Age: 28.5, Range: 18-64) were included in 
the final analysis. 
4.5.1.2. Stimuli and Procedure 
The stimuli and procedure for Experiment 4 were identical to the Number-to-Number 
condition in Experiment 2, except that additional subject entities in the prime pictures were 
either added or removed from the prime pictures, so that the number of subject entities in the 
prime trial mismatched the number in the target trial (see Fig. 4.3). The target trials were 
unchanged for the sake of comparability with Experiment 2. For example, if the target trial 
presented a choice between two pictures ± one with three hikers climbing one hill (E-wide), and 
one with three hiker-hill pairs (U-wide), the E-wide prime trial in Experiment 4 presented a 
choice between four kids climbing one tree or four kids climbing one ladder, and the U-wide 
prime trial presented a choice between four kid-tree pairs and four kid-ladder pairs. The prime 
VHQWHQFHZRXOGFRUUHVSRQGLQJO\EH³)RXUNLGVFOLPEHGDWUHH´ZKLOHWKHWDUJHWVHQWHQFHZRXOG
UHPDLQDVEHIRUH³7KUHHKLNHUVFOLPEHGDKLOO´ 
4.5.2. Results and Discussion 
The data from target trials was analyzed using the same type of logistic mixed-effects 
model as the previous two experiments, with a maximal random effects structure. We again 
modeled Response Type on the target trials, with random slopes and intercepts for subjects and 
items, and with Prime Scope as a fixed factor. There was a significant effect of Prime Scope 
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(z=2.07; p=0.04). In a second model including the Between-Number data from Experiment 4 and 
the Number-to-Number Within-Quantifier condition from Experiment 2 (where the number 
words used in a given prime-target pair were always the same), we added the fixed effect of 
Number Overlap and its interaction with Prime Scope. In this model, there was no main effect of 
Number Overlap (z=-0.85; p=0.39) and no significant interaction with Prime Scope (z=0.12; 
p=0.9). There was a significant main effect of Prime Scope (z=2.26; p=0.02). Experiment 4 
demonstrates that priming does not depend on whether two quantifiers share the same 
phonological label. Priming from THREE to FIVE was as robust as priming from THREE to THREE. 
We discuss the significance of these findings in relation to linguistic theory in the General 
Discussion below (see 4.6.2). 
 
Fig. 4.8: The left pair of bars (Between-1XPEHUVVKRZVSDUWLFLSDQWV¶UDWHRI8-wide choices on 
DPELJXRXVWDUJHWWULDOVLQ([SHULPHQWZKLOHWKHULJKWSDLUVKRZVSDUWLFLSDQWV¶8-wide response rate on 
the Number-to-Number Within-Quantifier condition of Experiment 2 (Within-Numbers). Target trial 
responses are broken down by whether the target trial was preceded by a U-wide or E-wide prime trial. 
Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals, averaged across items with subjects as the random variable. 
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4.6. General Discussion 
The four experiments described above shed light both on the mechanisms of scope 
ambiguity resolution, and on the representation of quantifiers. In Experiment 1 we find large 
baseline differences in scope-taking behavior between the quantifiers EVERY, EACH, ALL, and 
numbers. Experiment 2 uses a priming paradigm to examine how forcing the resolution of scope 
ambiguity in one sentence influences the interpretation of a subsequent one. We find that forcing 
a U-wide or E-wide resolution of the prime sentence influences how participants resolve a 
subsequent sentence, but only when the subject quantifier word in the prime and target sentences 
is the same. Changing the quantifier word eliminates priming. Separate from priming, we find a 
context effect that occurs when the quantifiers in the primes and the targets are the same, and 
between the quantifiers EACH and EVERY. In these cases, repeated experience with primes that 
LOOXVWUDWHERWKVFRSHUHDGLQJVVKLIWVRXUSDUWLFLSDQWV¶LQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKHtarget sentences in the 
direction of chance (relative to the baseline) suggesting that their expectations for the scope of 
target quantifier has changed. Experiment 3 shows that the difference in priming between the 
Within- and Between-Quantifier conditions of Experiment 2 cannot be due to overall similarity, 
since the priming effect is still present when the prime and target sentences have different verbs. 
Experiment 4 demonstrates that Between-Quantifier priming is possible, when the quantifiers are 
different numbers, indicating that priming does not depend solely on the phonological label 
associated with the quantifier, but can occur when two different quantifiers have meanings that 
are sufficiently similar. These findings have implications: for our understanding of the 
mechanisms behind quantifier-scope phenomena, for the question of whether and how the three 
universal quantifiers differ in their meanings, and for the interface between language and 
conceptual representations. 
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4.6.1. Lexical versus structural factors in preferred scope reading 
Although many theorists have reported intuitive judgments about differences in scope 
preferences between quantifiers(e.g. Quine, 1960; Vendler, 1967; Ioup, 1975), the present 
studies provide quantitative evidence for variation between the scope-taking preferences of 
different quantifiers, lending empirical support to a specific ordering of scope preference across 
the quantifiers (EACH>EVERY>ALL>numbers). The differences that we observed across the 
quantifiers in Experiment 1 are dramatic: participants chose the U-wide reading 93% of the time 
for EACH, but only 2% of the time for the numbers. Such stark differences are easily explained if 
quantifier scope depends largely on lexical factors, but they are difficult to reconcile with 
accounts on which the resolution of scope ambiguity is driven by structural factors such as linear 
order (Johnson-Laird, 1969; Lakoff, 1971; Kroch, 1974; Fodor, 1982; Bunt, 1985), surface 
syntactic c-command (Jackendoff, 1972; VanLehn, 1978; May, 1985; Lidz and Musolino, 2002; 
Anderson, 2004), or a thematic hierarchy in which quantified agents take scope over quantified 
themes (Ioup, 1975; Jackendoff, 1972; Grimshaw, 1990; Kurtzmann & MacDonald, 1993). Our 
findings show that, to the extent that these other factors play a role (and they probably do; see 
Kurtzmann & MacDonald, 1993) they can be overridden by the lexical or conceptual properties 
of individual quantifiers. 
Why then have prior studies failed to observe these strong lexical biases? We suspect that 
it is because they have not looked for them. Most of the prior studies have focused on one pair of 
quantifiers (EVERY and A) and thus were not designed to compare the biases of different 
quantifiers. Because most of the studies looking at structural factors did not employ the most 
strongly biased quantifiers (the numbers and EACH), they may have overestimated the effects of 
structural variables. Where lexical constraints are weak the effects of syntactic or thematic 
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constraints may be clearest, but where lexical constraints are strong they may overwhelm these 
other biases. Moreover, recent work by Chemla and Bott (2015) shows less support for structural 
factors even when looking only at the scopal relationship between EVERY and A. Using a picture 
priming paradigm, they find that assigning EVERY a wide scope reading in one sentence primes 
EVERY to take wide scope in a subsequent sentence, even when linear, thematic and syntactic 
structural factors are specifically stacked in the other direction. 
We find not only that different quantifiers have different preferred scope biases, but that 
these biases can shift when seeing that a quantifier may appear in its typically dispreferred scope 
position. The context effects we find in Experiment 2 (separate from the trial-by-trial priming 
HIIHFWVVXJJHVWWKDWNQRZOHGJHRIDTXDQWLILHU¶VSUHIHUUHGVFRSHFDQEHXSGDWHGRYHUWKHWLPHLW
takes to complete the experiment. While this information is aggregated across trials within a 
single quantifier, we also find that information about the possible readings for EACH affects the 
scope bias of EVERY and vice versa, suggesting that updating of scope bias may involve some 
shared semantic properties between just these two quantifiers. In contrast, the online assignment 
of relative scope (which draws on quantifier biases as one input, and which is reflected in the 
trial-by-trial priming effects) is not sensitive to these same features. 
That quantifier words vary so widely in their preferred scope readings suggests people 
store some information on how to construct combinatorial meaning in the lexical entries of 
different quantifiers. But what are these entries like? Our findings point to a distinction between 
two different levels of representation for quantifier meaning ± the conceptual content of a 
quantifier word as one level and its combinatorial properties as another. 
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4.6.2. Combinatorial semantics versus conceptual content 
An assumption commonly made in the linguistics literature (e.g. Heim & Kratzer, 1998) 
is that the combinatorial semantic system which produces complex sentence meanings from 
individual words is distinct from the conceptual system which stores each individual lexical 
LWHP¶VFRQWHQW7KLVLVZK\VHPDQWLFGHQRWDWLRQVIRUPDQ\FRQWHQWZRUGVDUHFRQVSLFXRXVly 
vacuous. For example, the denotation for SWIM typically looks something like this: 
>VZLPV@ Ȝ[[ SWIMS 
7KLVGHQRWDWLRQVSHFLILHVWKHZD\LQZKLFKWKHZRUG³VZLPV´FRPELQHVZLWKRWKHUZRUGV
SWIMS is a function that maps individuals to sets of individuals. Specifically, it maps entities 
VXFKDV-RKQZKRPLJKWIHDWXUHLQWKHVHQWHQFH³-RKQVZLPV´WRDVHWLQWKLVFDVHWKHVHWRI
swimming things). But what constitutes a swimming thing? The combinatorial semantics do not 
say. The concept SWIMS is invoked on the right hand side of the equation only as a pointer to 
some content, which is assumed to be stored separately from the combinatorial properties of the 
word (perhaps in a single amodal conceptual store or perhaps as a distributed representation that 
is more tightly linked to perception and action). In just the same way, the differences in meaning 
between different number quantifiers are assumed to be stored in a separate conceptual system, 
with the semantic combinatorial system at LF providing pointers to the relevant conceptual 
entries. The combinatorial semantics of any number word specify that There exists a set of M 
with cardinality N, where the value of M is filled in by the noun being quantified, and the value 
of N is given by the number word. The conceptual content of any specific cardinality N ± its 
intensional and extensional properties ± would be stored in a separate conceptual inventory. 
The pattern of priming effects that we find is quantifier-specific in a way that closely 
reflects this division of labor. That we find priming effects between different numbers (THREE, 
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FOUR and FIVE), but not between different universal quantifiers (EACH, EVERY and ALL) supports 
the view that the former differ only in which concept they point to, while the latter differ in terms 
of their combinatorial semantic structure. The differences between the meanings of THREE, FOUR, 
and FIVE are handled by a different set of cognitive systems than the ones responsible for the 
construction of LF and the resolution of scope ambiguity.22 EACH, EVERY and ALL, on the other 
hand, do appear to differ in terms of their combinatorial properties.  
While the division of labor between conceptual content and combinatorial properties is 
common to all linguistic theories of meaning, there is a wide array of specific theories of LF 
construction and scope assignment. We find that the mechanism that constructs LF is quantifier-
specific rather than abstract, that different quantifiers prefer very different scope assignments, 
and that these preferences can shift depending on distributional information about possible 
readings for each quantifier, and between EACH and EVERY. While these findings provide new 
constraints on all theories of LF, they also fit more naturally with some accounts than with 
others. 
4.6.3. A range of quantifier scope theories 
For our purposes, theories of quantifier scope can be divided along a continuum, 
depending on how much they IDYRU³OXPSLQJ´RU³VSOLWWLQJ´RIVFRSLQJPHFKDQLVPVDFURVV
different quantifiers. Theories on the lumping end posit a common mechanism responsible for all 
scope phenomena, while those on the splitting end hold that all quantifiers differ from each other 
in their scopal mechanisms. There are also many intermediate positions along the continuum, 
positing shared properties for some, but not all quantifiers. The extreme lumping end of the 
continuum, in particular, is densely populated. Theories at this end range from positing that all 
                                                          
22
 See for example, Dehaene (1997), LeCorre and Carey (2007), for discussion of how the meanings of different 
number words are mapped to different representations in the Approximate Number System and other non-linguistic 
representational structures. 
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quantifiers share common syntactic operations, like Quantifier Raising, or QR (May, 1977; 
1985) and quantifying-in (Montague, 1972; Rodman, 1976), to semantic mechanisms, like 
various forms of type-shifting; e.g. Barker, 2002; Hendriks, 1988) or Cooper Storage (Cooper, 
1983; Keller, 1988). 23 All quantifier words in these theories are treated as Generalized 
Quantifiers in the sense first introduced by Montague (1972), with semantic denotations bearing 
the logical force of quantifiers in first-order predicate logic. Syntactically, too, all are members 
of the same category. 
The combination of within-quantifier priming effects for all quantifiers and the lack of 
any priming effects between quantifiers cannot be explained by any single abstract operation 
acting on all of the different quantifiers during the online construction of meaning. It suggests 
instead that the operation or semantic feature responsible for scoping behavior is individualized 
by quantifier, possibly stored as part of HDFKTXDQWLILHU¶VOH[LFDOHQWU\2XUILQGLQJVDUH
unexpected from the perspective of extreme lumping theories ± the dominant framework in 
formal semantics for many decades ± because, if the locus of priming was a single mechanism, it 
should have led to priming between all pairs of quantifiers. 
Theories that favor some degree of splitting take as their central fact that quantifiers 
differ in their patterns of permitted scope-taking behavior. To give one common example, 
compare the scoping behavior of EVERY and A in relative clauses (Fodor & Sag, 1982). EVERY 
does not appear to be able to take wide scope when it is contained in a relative clause. Take the 
following sentence: 
(5) A teacher heard the rumor that every student of mine was called before the dean 
                                                          
23
 See Von Stechow (1991) for discussion of how semantic and syntactic approaches in this class become more 
similar as they posit more powerful operations on either end. 
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There does not seem to be a U-wide reading where, for every student, there is a different teacher. 
In contrast, when A is within a relative clause instead of EVERY, it takes wide scope readily. 
 (6) Every teacher heard the rumor that a student of mine was called before the dean 
Both readings of (6) are available ± both a U-wide reading where every teacher heard about a 
different student, and the E-wide reading where every teacher heard about the same one. 
To account for the finding that A can scope out of relative clauses while EVERY cannot, 
Fodor and Sag (1982) propose splitting the mechanisms by which these quantifiers take wide 
scope. They argue that the indefinite A has an alternative meaning that is referential and not 
quantificational, and that in its referential form, A can take scope freely anywhere in a sentence, 
even if it is contained in a relative clause. 
While Fodor and Sag (1982) attempt to preserve a large degree of lumping by arguing 
that A is unique in having a non-quantificational reading and that all other quantifiers have a 
common mechanism for taking scope, later theorists have committed more strongly to the 
extreme splitting end of the continuum, positing different scoping mechanisms for different 
quantifiers (eg. VanLehn, 1978; Reinhart, 1997; Beghelli and Stowell, 1997; Winter, 2001; 
Champollion, 2010; Steedman, 2012 and many others). Perhaps the most detailed extreme 
splitting account is given by Beghelli and Stowell (1997), who argue that there is no single 
mechanism for LF construction and posit a fully lexicalized system of scope, with feature-based 
denotations of quantifiers in the lexicon and feature-dependent landing sites at LF. Quantifier-
scope is determined by c-command relations in the resulting constructed LF, and scope 
ambiguities arise because some quantifiers have multiple features, with different ones being 
active in different sentences and contexts. One feature of A, if active, would land it at a site 
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higher than the site that attracts EACH, and the other would land it lower, corresponding to A 
taking either wide or narrow scope relative to EACH. 
$OWKRXJKQRWKLQJLQRXUVWXG\EHDUVRQWKHVSHFLILFVRI%HJKHOOLDQG6WRZHOO¶V
proposal, our primary finding favors theories on the splitting end of the continuum. We find 
robust within-quantifier priming but no between-quantifier priming.  We interpret this pattern as 
evidence that the procedures involved in constructing Logical Form during language 
comprehension are specific to individual quantifiers (or to narrow semantic classes of 
quantifiers, such as numbers). For example, when we construct a representation where EVERY 
takes wide scope over A, we may activate a representational chunk that captures this precise 
scopal relation. If we later encounter a sentence which contains both EVERY and A, we will be 
more likely to activate the same scopal structure than the alternative (see Sec. 4.3.2.1.). 
However, if we encounter a sentence with EACH and A, then neither of these representations will 
be relevant and no priming will occur (see Sec. 4.3.2.2.). 
However, these studies also demonstrate that there are representational similarities across 
quantifiers, similarities which are not active on a trial-by-trial basis but can influence scope 
resolution on a longer time scale. Specifically, in Experiment 2, we observed context effects 
which were present both when the prime and target had the same quantifier and between primes 
or targets with EACH and those with EVERY. We interpret these context effects as the result of 
participants updating their prior beliefs about the target on the basis of the prime sentences. The 
fact that examples of EACH influence beliefs about EVERY (and vice versa) suggests that learners 
represent some commonality between them, a commonality that is not shared by ALL or the 
numerals. Steedman's (2012) book offers one possible explanation. He proposes that only the 
denotations of the quantifiers EVERY and EACH contain the universal logical operator, ׊. Other 
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quantifiers, like A, THREE and ALL, use entirely different formal combinatorial machinery 
(Skolem functions and constants; see also Reinhart, 1997; Winter, 2001). Along the continuum 
IURPOXPSLQJWRVSOLWWLQJ6WHHGPDQ¶VSURSRVDOOLHVLQWKHPLGGOH+HJURXSVEVERY and EACH 
into a single category, but splits these off from all the other quantifiers. As we mentioned, the 
absence of between-quantifier priming effects on a trial-by-trial basis gives no reason for 
grouping EACH with EVERY, or any of the other quantifiers together. If we assume, however, that 
the representational similarities posited by Steedman guide the rapid learning observed in the 
present study rather than online LF construction on a trial-by-WULDOEDVLVWKHQ6WHHGPDQ¶VWKHRU\
would predict context effects between the numbers and ALL, and between EVERY and EACH.  We 
find one of these effects (the context effects between sentences with EVERY and EACH) but not 
the other (no effect between numbers and ALL). At first blush this suggests that Steedman's 
theory is right only in part. However, the predictions of such a theory depend on whether the 
different Skolem functions employed by various non-universal quantifiers are similar enough to 
each other to form a common basis for generalization. If they are not then the context effects 
may be fully consistent with this proposal.  
4.6.4. Preferred versus possible scope readings 
All of the theories described above, regardless of their position on the lumping-splitting 
continuum, account for the possible scope behavior of different quantifiers, but they are largely 
mum on explaining differences in preferred readings. Even theories towards the splitting end, 
which posit semantic differences between quantifiers (e.g. Beghelli and Stowell, 1997), seek to 
explain which readings are allowed and not why some of the allowable readings are preferred to 
others. We find that all of the quantifiers we tested can take either wide or narrow scope relative 
to A and that even extremely dispreferred readings can become more available due to context and 
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priming effects. Most linguistic theories of quantifier scope assume that differences in preferred 
readings are due to the effects of discourse context, and so foist off the explanation of these 
differences to the domains of pragmatics and domain-general, extra-linguistic cognition. 
The results of Experiment 1 challenge this assumption. All of our target sentence were presented 
in exactly the same context regardless of the quantifier used: the filler trials, the instructions, the 
specific pictures presented, and the other words in the target sentences were identical across 
conditions. Only the quantifier in the subject noun phrase varied. Nevertheless, we found 
systematic baseline differences in the scopal preferences of the quantifiers we tested: while 
EVERY and EACH strongly preferred to take wide scope, ALL and the number quantifiers preferred 
to take narrow scope. In fact, every quantifier in our study was reliably different from each of the 
others. Since these differences cannot be chalked up to different pragmatic or discourse-level 
effects, they must be attributable to some lexically encoded difference between the quantifiers, 
based either on their semantic content or on their patterns of use.  
One factor that is likely to play a role is the semantic feature of Quantifier Distributivity, 
which is posited to be an inherent part of the meaning of some quantifiers but optional or absent 
in others (see Roberts, 1987; Beghelli and Stowell, 1997; Tunstall, 1998; Winter, 2001; 
Champolion, 2010, among others). A distributive quantifier is one that forces each atom in the 
quantified noun set to have the predicated property applied to it separately. For example, EACH is 
argued to be necessarily distributive and thus unacceptable in contexts where the predicate is 
necessarily collective, Dowty (1987) argues that this accounts for the contrast between (7a) and 
(7b). 
(7a) *Each boy gathered in the yard 
(7b) All of the boys gathered in the yard  
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 Dowty argues that (7a) is ungrammatical because GATHER requires a collective noun, and 
EACH can only provide individual atoms rather than collections. ALL, on the other hand, is able to 
take the entire set of boys as a collection (but see Champollion, 2010). This distinction between 
distributive and non-distributive quantifiers seems to pattern with the preferences we saw in 
scope assignment: EACH is typically argued to be mandatorily distributive and showed the 
greatest preference for a U-wide scope reading; EVERY is often argued to be at least optionally 
distributive (Tunstall, 1998) and had a robust but less categorical U-wide preference; ALL, which 
seems to resist the distributive reading, showed a systematic E-wide preference. If EACH and 
EVERY both carry the distributivity feature, that could also account for the context effect we find 
in Experiment 2, where accumulated information about possible readings for EACH gradually 
affects the preferred scope bias of EVERY, and vice versa. But it is critical to note that differences 
in distributivity alone cannot directly predict performance in this study. While the E-wide 
pictures in our study might seem more "collective" than the U-wide pictures, both types of 
stimuli depict semantically distributive events. In both the U- and E-wide pictures, each subject 
is acting independently on its theme (e.g. each individual kid is climbing a tree in both the E-
wide picture and in the U-wide picture). Thus we would need a hypothesis that connected 
distributivity both to online scope assignment and to the updating of quantifier scope bias to 
account for this data pattern. At present, we are not aware of any theoretical account of this 
kind.24 The investigation of a principled connection between this feature of quantifier meaning 
DQGWKHTXDQWLILHUV¶VFRSHEHKDYLRULVDSURPLVLQJWDUJHWIRUIXWXUHUHVHDUFKLQERWKVHPDQWLF
theory and psycholinguistics. 
                                                          
24
 Beghelli and Stowell (1997) do link distributivity to the possible scope assignments of EACH and EVERY ±these 
quantifiers can have a [+Dist] feature determines their landing site at LF. But they do not provide an account of why 
this would cause EACH and EVERY to preferentially take scope over A, since A can attach to a landing site either 
above or below DistP at LF. In other words, their account, like most others in the literature on scope, seeks to 
account for possible rather than preferred scope readings, and does not explicitly connect the two issues. 
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4.7. Conclusion 
In relating our psycholinguistic investigation to semantic theories of quantifiers and 
quantifier scope, we attempt to connect the two fields to the benefit of both. In the field of 
semantics, theorists strive to provide adequate model-theoretic descriptions of the combinatorial 
machinery of language. In psycholinguistics and psychology, experimentalists strive to identify 
the mental representations that implement a combinatorial system in both language and thought. 
The experiments described above form a case study where these two projects constrain each 
other, providing important data for future theories to contend with. 
We find empirical justification for a central assumption in linguistic theory ± that 
representations of conceptual content are distinct from representations of the combinatorial 
properties of concepts. While for the universal quantifiers EACH, EVERY and ALL, the scope 
assigned to a quantifier in one sentence only influences the next sentence if it has the same 
quantifier, sentences with different numbers (THREE, FOUR and FIVE) influence each other. This 
suggests that the combinatorial machinery that assigns scope and constructs LF is sensitive to 
some differences between quantifiers (as between the different universals), but not to the 
differences between number concepts. 
We also find systematic differences across quantifiers with respect to the preferred scopal 
reading. These biases can be pushed around through experience with the dispreferred readings, 
providing further evidence that this is merely a preference rather than a hard difference in 
acceptability. These preferences, and their ability to change with experience, do not map cleanly 
to anything posited in current theories of quantifier scope. Future linguistic theories should seek 
to explain the representational basis of this learning (what we are counting over when we update 
our priors) and how it relates to the mechanisms underlying quantifier scope assignment and LF 
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construction. A central unresolved question is why this updating process treats EACH and EVERY 
(but not ALL) as belonging to the same class. While we cannot neatly link these data patterns to 
existing semantic theories, we see these findings as part of a dialog between psycholinguistics 
and formal semantics which is still in its earliest stages. We are seeking out the phenomena that 
will drive future work, challenge our current theories and build a broader bridge between these 
fields. 
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Chapter 5: 
Conclusion 
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5.1. The development of negation 
The three papers in this dissertation present separate case studies in the development and 
structure of combinatorial thought. Each asks different questions, looking at different 
populations (infants, toddlers, adults). In the first paper we find evidence that infants represent 
other agents as having goals to approach an object, but not to avoid one, when given comparable 
amounts and types of information about each goal. Avoidance goals could be represented in one 
of two ways: either using a separate representation that is not compositionally related to 
approach, or composing approach with a mental symbol that has the content of logical negation, 
to form not-approach. Either one of these representations would be independently sufficient to 
UHSUHVHQWDQDYRLGDQFHJRDODQGLQIDQWV¶IDLOXUHVXJJHVWVWKDWneither type of representation is 
DYDLODEOHWRWKHP6LQFHWKHUHLVHYLGHQFHERWKIURPRXUWDVNDQGIURPWKHOLWHUDWXUHRQLQIDQWV¶
goal representations (Woodward, 1998; 1999), of their representing approachLQIDQWV¶IDLOXUHWR
represent not-approach points either to their not having a negation operator or their being unable 
to combine that operator with approach, perhaps because the approach representation is not a 
concept ± that is, does not have the right format for productive, meaningful combination with 
other concepts. 
In the second paper, we find no evidence of a logical negation concept not only 
SUHOLQJXLVWLFDOO\EXWHYHQORQJDIWHULQIDQWVKDYHEHJXQSURGXFLQJWKHQHJDWLRQZRUG³QR´
Although the majority of 15-month-ROGVVD\³QR´ZHILQGWKDWWKey do not comprehend the 
logical meaning of this word until about a year after they begin to produce it, at around 24 
PRQWKV7KHLUFRPSUHKHQVLRQRIORJLFDO³QR´FR-occurs with several related developments. At 
the same age, toddlers begin to produce anotheUIUHTXHQW(QJOLVKQHJDWLRQZRUG³QRW´DQGWR
FRPSUHKHQGWKHORJLFDOPHDQLQJRI³QRW´DVZHOO7KH\DOVRFRQVLVWHQWO\EHJLQWRGHSOR\ERWK
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words to deny the truth of propositions, including both statements others have made and 
spontaneous, self-initiated utterances that something is not the case. The convergence of all these 
changes at a single age suggests a common underlying factor. That factor could be the 
emergence of conceptual logical negation, or an emerging ability to map a pre-existing concept 
to DQ\ZRUGHLWKHU³QR´RU³QRW´0DNLQJWKHPDSSLQJEHWZHHQWKHZRUGVDQGWKHORJLFDO
FRQFHSWGHSHQGVRQVHYHUDODVSHFWVRIODQJXDJHOHDUQLQJ%HIRUHOHDUQLQJWKDW³QR´DQG³QRW´
negate propositions, the child must be able to represent propositions as the content of utterances, 
which requires knowing a sufficient number of other words as well as the syntactic and semantic 
rules for how these words combine. Knowing the syntactic role that a negation particle plays 
may also help to constrain the hypothesis space for the meanings of negation words, perhaps to 
the fairly small space of sentence-level semantic operators. 
Given that children both fail to combine logical negation with the representation 
approach pre-OLQJXLVWLFDOO\DQGIDLOWRPDSLWWRWKHZRUG³QR´ZKHQWKH\EHJLQWRSURGXFHWKLV
word, it may be tempting to conclude that they simply do not have a truth-functional negation 
concept. At present, however, there is a gap of a few potentially crucial months between the ages 
tested in these papers; we test 7- and 14-month-olds in the first paper, while the youngest group 
in the second paper is 20-month-olds. There is some reason to think that a compositional 
negation concept could emerge between these ages. 
5.1.1. A suspicious coincidence 
Mutual exclusivity is an inductive bias that assumes every object has just one name 
(Markman & Wachtel, 1988). Used as a word-learning strategy, a learner who sees some familiar 
referents and one novel one, and hears a novel word, would map the novel word to the novel 
object. This procedure might have nothing to do with negation, instead involving a domain-
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specific heuristic like a preference to make novel-to-novel mappings between words and objects. 
But, as Halberda (2003) argues, it could also reflect a computation wherein children represent 
that the novel word does not map to the familiar object, and conclude that the new object is 
therefore more likely. Halberda (2006) presents evidence that when older children and adults are 
faced with the same kind of word-learning scenario, they do deploy a negation operator in just 
this way. Crucially, Halberda (2003) identifies 18 months as the age at which children 
successfully use mutual exclusivity, with the strategy emerging right between 14 and 18 months. 
The last experiment in the second paper also provides suggestive evidence that a negation 
operator may come online around this age. In this experiment, children succeed in a search task 
ZKHUHWKH\DUHVKRZQDQHPSW\EXFNHWUDWKHUWKDQEHLQJWROGWKDWWKHEDOOLV³QRWLQWKHEXFNHW´
In this case we find children succeeding at 20 months, significantly earlier than their success on 
WKHYHUVLRQVRIWKHVHDUFKWDVNWKDWLQYROYH³QR´DQG³QRW´7KHUHDUHVHYHUDOSRVVLEOH
UHSUHVHQWDWLRQVXQGHUO\LQJFKLOGUHQ¶VVXFFHVVVRPHRIZKLFKLQvolve negation (if children 
represent THE BALL IS NOT IN THE BUCKET EXWKDYHQRW\HWPDSSHGWKHZRUG³QRW´WRWKHORJLFDO
concept) and others that involve another domain-specific heuristic instead (like an understanding 
that one should avoid search in empty containers). If children start to succeed at this task 
between 14 and 18 months, the coincidence in having the same ages of success across a search 
task and a word-learning task that share nothing except a potential reliance on negation suggests 
a shared limiting factor. 
Finally, while 14-month-olds do not appear to represent not-approach, we have not yet 
tested 18-month-olds. If they succeed right at the same age at which they begin to succeed on 
these other tasks, the coincidence would grow even greater. Although it would be possible that 
18 months just happens to be the age when children develop an atomic concept avoid that is 
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unrelated to approach, the convergence of ages would mean that the most parsimonious 
explanation is one that posits a common factor developing at the same age across all three tasks ± 
conceptual, combinatorial negation. 
Given that negation can only be observed in combination with other representations, and 
given that there is always some positive characterization of a negated predicate, this approach is 
a general strategy for future research. The more different, otherwise unrelated tasks converge on 
the same age of success, where the only relevant feature they share is a possible reliance on 
conceptual negation, the more reason to think that an emerging understanding of negation 
underlies the common success. Of course, even if different tasks do involve a common factor, 
there are a variety of task-specific reasons why different tasks might not converge on the same 
age ± OLPLWDWLRQVVSHFLILFWRVHDUFKRUZRUGOHDUQLQJRULQIHUHQFHDERXWRWKHUV¶JRDOV$ODFNRI
convergence is therefore far less informative about the possible absence of negation. 
5.1.2. Negation as a wedge into the conceptual system 
In the introduction chapter, I argued that once an early conceptual logical negation had 
been identified, it could be useGDVDZHGJHLQWRWKHUHVWRIWKHFKLOG¶VFRQFHSWXDOV\VWHP%\
studying which other representations negation can combine with, we could test which of these 
have conceptual combinatorial properties. One issue with this strategy is that relies on the age at 
which negation is found being young enough. If a negation concept is late to the scene, emerging 
only after the child has already mastered the foundations of combinatorial language, there would 
already be plenty of other evidence about the combinability of different representations with 
each other (i.e. the child could make multi-word utterances or whole sentences). So only by 
acquiring evidence of a pre-linguistic or, at least an early linguistic concept of negation, would it 
be possible to use negation tRLQYHVWLJDWHWKHUHVWRIWKHFKLOG¶VFRQFHSWXDOUHSHUWRLUH:HKDYH
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not yet identified the presence of an early negation concept, but we have begun to narrow in on 
when and how this concept might emerge. And if the strategy of looking for converging ages of 
success identifies the emergence of negation at 18 months, that would be a young enough age to 
allow for the investigation of the conceptual status of many other representations. 
For instance, children are able to represent exact quantities up to three or four, as well as 
larger approximate quantities at 18 months (and much earlier). However, they do not map the 
small numbers to number words until they are 2 to 4 years old, and the larger approximate 
quantities to words until 4 to 5 years old (Le Corre & Carey, 2007; see Carey, 2009 for 
discussion). Do these representations have semantic combinatorial properties for 18-month-olds, 
or, for that matter, for the 24-month-olds who the second paper has identified as having the 
concept of truth-functional negation? To test this, we would need to devise a mode of presenting 
WKHQHJDWLRQRIGLIIHUHQWTXDQWLWLHVWKDWGRHVQRWUHO\RQQXPEHUZRUGV$GRQ¶W-give-a-number 
task has already been used to test what 3-year-olds think number words mean before they have 
mappHGWKHPWRWKHULJKWQXPHULFDOUHSUHVHQWDWLRQVHJ³'RQ¶WJLYHPHWKUHHEDQDQDV´
Hartshorne & Barner, 2011). It may be possible to modify this task to show children the 
approximate quantity that they are not to give, rather than using a number word (e.g³'RQ¶WJLYH
PHWKLVPDQ\´,IFKLOGUHQ¶VUHVSRQVHVV\VWHPDWLFDOO\H[FOXGHWKHQHJDWHGQXPEHUZHZRXOG
have evidence of them combining numerical representations with logical negation. It may be 
possible to similarly apply this strategy in other content domains in which children can represent 
information at a very young age (see Carey, 2009; Spelke and Kinzler, 2007). 
5.2. The development of quantification 
While the first and second papers attempt to understand the development of 
combinatorial thought through the case study of negation, the third paper investigates 
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combinatorial thought in its mature state. We find that when adults process sentences that 
contain a scope ambiguity due to the presence of two quantifiers, the computations that assign 
scope to each quantifier online are distinct for the three English universals: EACH, EVERY, and 
ALL. We find, however, that another family of quantifiers ± the numerals THREE, FOUR and FIVE ± 
do share a scope-assigning computation, suggesting that the operation is shared by quantifiers 
with similar combinatorial properties but different conceptual content, but not by quantifiers with 
similar content but arguably different combinatorial properties. 
How do children come to process these abstract relations between abstract concepts? 
Barner, Chow and Yang (2009) found that children begin to understand the meanings of many 
quantifier words between the ages of 3 and 5. One simple question that we do not yet have an 
answer to is what children make of scopally ambiguous sentences when they first begin to 
comprehend quantifier words. If children process scope ambiguities in a similar way to adults 
from the beginning, it would suggest that the resolution of scope ambiguity, like the phenomenon 
itself, is a direct consequence of the semantic relations quantifiers, not an additional 
compositional operation that is acquired separately. Given that some of the operations invoked to 
explain the resolution of scope ambiguities, and particularly the construction of inverse scope, 
are specialized and esoteric (e.g. quantifier-specific landing sites at LF; see Beghelli & Stowell, 
1997), this is not a trivial conclusion. 
Assuming children do resolve scope ambiguities in a systematic way soon after they 
NQRZWKHPHDQLQJVRIWKHTXDQWLILHUZRUGVZHFRXOGDOVRWHVWFKLOGUHQ¶VGLIIHUHQWLDOVFRSH
preferences to see if they match those of adults. This would provide additional evidence that 3-5 
year-olds have mapped quantifier words to adult-like meanings. Priming scope resolution in 
children would also allow us to investigate whether the labor of conceptual combination is 
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divided similarly for children as for adults. The priming paradigm provided support for the 
distinction between conceptual content and combinatorial properties in adults. Does the same 
distinction exist in the conceptual repertoires of children, or do children perhaps have a single 
conceptual store, with the entry for each concept carrying both its meaning and instructions for 
how to combine it with other concepts, and with these properties differentiating at some later 
point in development? 
5.2.1. The development of distributivity 
At the end of the third paper, we suggest that the differences in scope preferences 
between the different universal quantifiers may be linked to a feature of quantifiers known as 
µGLVWULEXWLYLW\¶6RPHSUHGLFDWHVOLNHgather, be numerous, elect, and decide unanimously, among 
many others, can only apply to a collection of individuals, not to any one individual (see 
Champollion, 2010). If a quantifier is distributive, it specifies that each individual in the 
quantified set has a predicate apply to it separately. Thus, a noun phrase quantified with a 
distributive quantifier cannot combine with a collective predicate ± the predicate wants a 
collection, and the noun phrase provides it with individuals, resulting in a violation. Evidence 
that EACH, in particular, is a distributive quantifier comes from judgments that sentences like the 
IROORZLQJDUHXQJUDPPDWLFDO³(DFKER\JDWKHUHGLQWKH\DUG´³(DFKDQWLQWKHFRORQ\ZDV
QXPHURXV´³(DFKYRWHUHOHFWHG%XVK´'RZW\&KDPSROOLRQ 
We find that the more strongly a quantifier is associated with the feature of 
µGLVWULEXWLYLW\¶WKHVWURQJHULWVSUHIHUHQFHWRWDNHZLGHVFRSH:KDWDUHWKHGHYHORSPHQWDO
origins of distributivity, of its relationship to scope and to the differences between the scope-
taking properties of different quantifiers? Do children understand that EACH is distributive and 
ALL is not from the earliest point at which they understand these quantifiers? Does the preference 
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for EACH to take wide scope and for ALL to take narrow VFRSHHPHUJHDORQJVLGHFKLOGUHQ¶V
XQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHGLVWULEXWLYLW\GLIIHUHQFHVEHWZHHQWKHVHWZRTXDQWLILHUVRUGRFKLOGUHQ¶V
representations of distributivity and scope preference emerge independently? Again, the 
developmental questions are informative above the adult representations ± if the two factors 
emerge independently, it would suggest that the connection between distributivity and preferred 
scope is less principled than it seems from the results of the third paper. 
5.3. Content and combination 
The ability to combine concepts into propositions underlies the expressive power of both 
human language and thought. The papers presented in this dissertation take the representations of 
two kinds of logical operators, negation and quantification, as case studies of a special class of 
concepts ± those whose content is fully determined by their combinatorial properties. These 
concepts serve as a direct window into the nature of combinatorial thought, both into its structure 
in adulthood and its developmental roots. Isolating the combinatorial properties of concepts is a 
useful method for studying the system of propositional thought, but a full understanding of the 
system will also require studying the interface between conceptual content and combination. If 
cRQFHSWXDOFRQWHQWDQGFRQFHSWV¶FRPELQDWRULDOSURSHUWLHVDUHVWRUHGVHSDUDWHO\ZKDWIHDWXUHVRI
each representation enable their rapid binding in productive thought? What are the limits on 
which content can be bound to which combinatorial properties? Although the present work does 
not provide answer to these questions, it has put us in a better position to ask them. 
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